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P R E F A C E 
Thie tsbliB o f a t s t u t s © o f a taodeOT tsnt Ssook omi the l a y o f t a r t ® 
Qjf cenfespact tadli eBn-feain a large numbes of etstutee hut It l a i l l bs found 
t h a t in t h i s t heg i s there are few rasntions o f s t a ty te s md thus t h i s 
BKesciae i s dawoted iBsgely to the CBmrnon Laa i@ the^efoffg earjeesTied 
w i t h laJiat i® genera l ly kmm m casg letio 
The f a s c i n a t i o n laith the Cefaraoni lew gosa baek to ay stydent days 
at BiraiimghaBi UfulMes-sitv tihgrt one stmsggled to this mtio o f a 
case and to d i s t i ingu i sh i t f^oia anothe^o Smh g?aat raastes-s as thg 
I s t e PsiDfeaaoK' JoUo Umges" eould s t ress the f i n e ? paints of a ease tJith 
so much ease that as one 's percept ion deynloped the beauty of the 
Common law unfoldedo One of the aspecta o f t h i s beeyty was the 
seelisatiaini of hQua ths ssme segul t may be spproaehed by d i f f e r e n t 
routes each eorapetiimg for ascendenGyo Sych r e s u l t s rasy not cause much 
controversy as uihen by app ly ing d i f f e r e n t reasoning divergent r e s u l t s 
are achieved on the asrae issueo Probably t h i s i s to me the greatest 
fasc i iDat ion o f the Comon l a u and bihich wi thout being accused o f b ias 
has made i t to ens a great system o f I S M t ha t i t s recept ion i n d i s t a n t 
lands has been less d i f f i c u l t , A system o f latu tha t can produc© rasny 
snsujara can s a t i s f y d i f f e r e n t needs of d i f f e r e n t peoples or of d i f f e r e n t 
generationso 
I t i s r eg re t t ed t ha t w i th the increased i n t r u s i o n of Parliament 
i n t o a l l branches of IEW subsequent generations may not have cause 
to get embroiled i n the con t rovers ies generated by t h i s branch of the 
l a u as l e g a l h i s t o r y i s beeoming to a large extent the i n t e r e s t o f fewo 
Thus soQim lis may be saying "Here l i e s the Ceramon Lay •= Rest in Peace»o 
Thi s t h e s i s i s t he r e fo r e en attempt to i d e n t i f y sEfas o f the contro^ 
ve r s i ea before s t a tu t e stsialloisja themo 
ii 
I have tE express my g r a t i t u d e to Professor F o E o Douriek of 
DurhafiB U n i v e r s i t y cand Mr. R o L o Purv ia of the Lay Departsnent of the 
Poly technic &f WeasSsstls^Upsn-Tytue f o r t h e i r eneourageKient dur ing 
the pe r iod nsfnen I imu m Efesd by the prospeot of t r y i n g to diseusa 
a ©ubjec t which many l egal l uminar ies hove high=lightedo 
I afsj ifudebted to my Sypervieor Professor M o J o Goodraon f o r h i g 
sympathy and to lerance throughout the prepara t ion ef t h i s thegsiBo 
Without h i s guidance and k ind a t t e n t i o n th i© thes i s uiauld never have 
been completedo T® these persons and many others I eennot nsme here 
I (371 deeply g r s t e f u l o 
F i r j a l l y the Common Lay s t i l l i s dynamic and i s changing to mest 
neu) challangeso For enample a f t e r the decioioin) i n Medley Byrne S C0O 
H e l l e r a P a r t n e r © OSGk) AC kS3 the Misrepreaentatiomi Act 1 9 S 7 
came be la ted and kss regarded i n some quar ters as a f i f t h tiiheelo 
Recently i n Sparhara^Soyter v TOCT Development Lord Denning M o R o 
gjtpressed the op in ion t h a t the comraan law p r i n c i p l e enunciated in 
t ha t case i s p r e f e r a b l e to the Defec t ive Premise© Act 1 9 7 2 o 
Besiring these constant changes i n mind i t i s t he re fo re gtated 
t h a t t h i s t h e s i s hs© only considered the law as i t ex is ted i n December 
1 5 7 6 c 
S T R A C T 
The h i s t o r i c s l o r i g i n s o f t o r t and con t rac t have l e f t sorae 
t e c h n i c a l r u l e s i-ihich separate them and may make i t edvantegeous 
f o r a p l a i n t i f f to sue i n t o r t os i n contrscto For sxsmple the duty 
i n c o n t r a c t i s genera l ly s t r i c t t ^ i l e tha t i n t o r t i s not general ly 
s o o A p l a i n t i f f feiho has a l t e r n a t i v e cauie o f ac t ion i n t o r t and 
con t r ac t may thus sue i n c o n t r a c t . But t h i s advantage i s not l i s i t e d 
t o the latsi o f con t r ac t f o r genera l ly the damages tha t are recoverable 
i n t o r t are udder than i n contraeto Also under the l i m i t a t i o n of 
ac t ions i t i s eubmitted t h a t given the seme circumstances a r i s i n g 
f rom breach o f duty^ tirae may begin to run or may expire i n cont rac t 
idhen i t has not begun to run i n t o r t c 
Th i s c o n f l i c t betu^en t o r t and con t rac t ra ises the problem as to 
utiat law ^ Q u l d be given primaroy i n a c o n f l i c t a i tua t iooo Three 
poss ib le ansiiisrs e x i s t ; 
( 1 ) To give primacy to con t r ac t as c r e a t i n g the 
( 2 ) To give primacy to t © r t on the basis tha t to 
exclude t o r t i s to s l l o w a wrongdoer b e n e f i t 
by commit t ing ttsco wrongs instead of one; 
( 3 ) To give primacy to none and a l low the p l a i n t i f f 
choose h i s cause o f actiono 
Some systems have made a choice between these but at common 
law only the second anstssr has not been adoptedo Thus a P l a i n t i f f 
may i n some cases b r i n g h i s ac t ion i n t o r t or i n cont rac t or i n 
con t r ac t alone depending on the capaci ty i n utiich the c a n t r a c t u s l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p i s entered intOo Th is c o n f l i c t has extended to P r iva te 
I n t e m a t i o n B l Law and i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to observe tha t the Courts 
have gone o f f i n ®11 d i r e c t i o n s to f i n d sn anawero 
The snatjiers have been gypported and c r i t i c i s e d on p r i n c i p l e 
or p o l i e y o Wo doubt the e o n f l i e t i t J i l l continue u n t i l the Common 
Lab) i s r e g r e t t a b l y sb^llQwed up by Statute LatsJo 
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CHAPTER 1 
For a long time e f t e r the conquest the r o y a l cour ts t s re mainly 
concerned ikJith ma in ta in ing law and order and d e f i n i n g the system of 
land tenurso The w r i t o f trespass from uihiGh the law of t o r t and 
subsequently the law of con t rac t wsre to develop was at i t s 
i n c e p t i o n of c r i m i n a l natureo The roya l cour t s were not concerned 
w i t h the p r i v a t e grievances of t o r t and contracto T o r t ms the 
f i r s t t o evolve end l i t t l e tsonder f o r thatp ss i t waa more c lose ly 
associated to c r i m i n a l law thsn contracto But w i t h i n the remedy 
provided by t o r t a sharp d i s t i n c t i o n i^ as dratsoi between misfeasance 
and non-fesganceo liihere a defendant undertook to do something and 
d i d i t badly a redress may be found w i t h i n the context of t o r to 
But i f the defendant d i d nothingp t h i s tiias non=feassncB and the 
cou r t s he ld t h a t "not doing was no t o r t ' o The attempt to overcorag 
t h i s ms long and f r u i t l e s s u n t i l assumpsit was evolved and the 
answer was given not w i t h i n the law of t o r t but bdth in contracts 
T h i s r e s u l t usa to create some conceptual d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r 
whi le the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i n t o misfeasance and non-feasance may be 
simple i n theory i t proved d i f f i c u l t w i t h i n the forms o f a c t i o n » 
Thus where the same f a c t s manifes t a cause of act ion i n t o r t as 
u s l l as i n con t rac t a p l a i n t i f f who sued i n cont rac t when the cause 
o f a c t i o n was c l a s s i f i e d i n t o r t had h i s ac t ion s truck o f f . . The 
County Courts Acts d i d not help matters f o r they c l a s s i f i e d causes 
o f ac t ions as e i t h e r "founded upon c o n t r a c t " 5 or ^founded upon t o r t " . 
For example i n POMTIFEX v M,Ro COo the s e l l e r of goods d i r ec t ed 
the c a r r i e r not to d e l i v e r to an inso lven t buyero IBe c a r r i e r 
never the less de l i ve red to the buyer. I t was held tha t the ac t ion 
agains t the c a r r i e r ma one i n t o r t and not cont rac t under the 
County Courts Act 1 8 6 7 , The c a r r i e r by not meeting the demand f o r 
2 
the r e t u r n @f the goods had terminated the eont rac t of car r i sge and 
h i s r e t e n t i o n o f the goods from then on became tortiouSo But f o r thics 
Act the n a t u r a l t h i n g fesuld have been to t r e a t the c la im as one of 
breach o f con t r ac t r e s u l t i n g also i n t o r t o 
Thus f rom i t e i n c e p t i o n the I S M o f con t rac t v i ed w i t h the law 
af t o r t as a eause o f ac t i on i n some given a i tua t ionso Although the 
forms o f a c t i o n have long been abol i shed , the i n t e r p l a y between t o r t 
and con t r ac t i s s t i l l much i n evidence today» For example5 there i s 
no doubt t h a t a r e l a t i o n s h i p uihich w r i n g s out of p r i v i t y of con t rac t 
between the p a r t i e s may give r i s e to an ac t ion i n t o r t f o r negligensso 
The p r i n c i p l e from such eases i s t h a t the cont rac t creates the duty 
and the neglec t to perform the duty or the non-feasance i s a ground 
f o r an a c t i o n i n t o r t o Df-eourse the p l a i n t i f f cannot recover 
damages i n both t o r t and contracto The p l a i n t i f f may i n the cireum= 
stances have a l t e r n a t i v e c la ims i n t o r t and con t rac t and i n the case 
o f doubt he rasy plead both causes of actiono This has been the ease 
w i t h car r ie rs '^ and alao w i t h innkeepers^ who by "the custom of ths 
realm" owe d u t i e s to the publ ico But the Courts have not been CDn= 
s i s t e n t i n ho ld ing t h a t the same circurastanees may give r i s e to an 
a c t i o n i n t o r t or i n con t r ac t and i n some p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence 
s i t u a t i o n s the con t r ac t has been held to displace the t o r t l i o b i l i t y o 
5 6 
Thus such p r o f e s s i o n a l advisers as s o l i c i t o r s stock^brokers and 
7 
a r c h i t e c t s are not l i a b l e otherwise than i n contracto I t has been 
j u s t i f i e d on the basis t h a t the p l a i n t i f f may not enr ich h imsel f by 
f r aming h i s ac t ion i n t o r t k^sm the daaages are arguably general ly 
wider than i n eontracto I t msy however be argued against t h i s tha t 
why should m defendant b e n e f i t merely because he commitB tm wrongo 
ins tead of oneo The only general p r o p o s i t i o n tha t emerges 
3 
f rom these cases seems to be t ha t i f the duty imposed i s so le ly based 
on the p l a i n t i f f s cons ide ra t ion f o r the defendants promise the ac t ion 
w i l l be i n con t r ac t and con t rac t alone. This i s t y p i c a l of the 
constant f r i c t i o n tha t e x i s t s between the tw lawB, 
There are hosssaver instances where the basis of l i a b i l i t y i s 
c l e a r l y cu t and i t has been long recognised t ha t every breach o f 
con t r ac t does not create an ac t ion i n t o r t . Th is was so even before 
the a b o l i t i o n of the forms of ac t ion by the Common Law Procedure Act 
1 8 5 2 , Thus i n Courteney v Earle i t stas held t ha t counts a l l e g i n g 
non-payment o f money are counts i n assumpsit and cannot be j o ined w i t h 
counts i n case. But t^ihere a l t e r n a t i v e causes of ac t ion e x i s t there 
are advantages which may be derived by f raming en ac t ion i n t o r t or 
i n c o n t r a c t . 
For example;, a predominant view i s tha t damages are wider i n 
t o r t than i n c o n t r a c t . Also exaraplary or v i n d i c t i v e damages are possible 
agains t a t o r t f e a s o r but i n con t rac t the general r u l e i s the other 
way. The r a t i o n a l e had been t h a t the aim of con t rac t lEf^ a i s the 
p r o t e c t i o n o f commercial i n t e r e s t s whi le exemplary danages ere en 
attempt to assuage i n j u r e d f e e l i n g s or d i g n i t y of the p l a i n t i f f , 
a 
However r ecen t ly the House of l o rds i n ROOHES v BARMARD has opened 
to the law o f con t rac t t h i s type o f damages, and exemplary damages may 
be granted where the defendant "w i th a c y n i c a l disregard to a p l a i n t i f f ' s 
r i g h t s has c a l c u l a t e d t ha t the money to be made out of h i s wrong doing 
"10 
w i l l probably exceed damages at r i s k , S i m i l a r d i f f e r e n c e e x i s t s 
i n the scale of costs to be awarded i n the County Caurta, Th is va r ies 
according to whether the ac t ion i s i n t o r t or i n c o n t r a c t . Another 
d i f f e r e n c e l i e s i n the service of w r i t out of j u r i s d i c t i o n . This w i l l 
depend on the nature of the a c t i o n . I f the cause of ac t ion i s i n t o r t 
then under Rules o f the Supreme Court Order I I r u l e 1 ( B ) 5 a w r i t 
cannot be served out o f j u r i s d i c t i o n o 
Th i s f r i c t i o n between the r u l e s of con t rac t and t o r t are not 
11 
conf ined to c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s . I n tilinterbottora v bl r ight i t t»os 
he ld by the Court o f Exchequer t h a t a t h i r d pa r ty cannot raeintQin 
an a c t i o n i n con t r ac t against s c o n t r a c t i n g pa r ty f o r damage sustained 
f rom breach o f con t r ac t between the defendant and the other con t r ac t i ng 
p a r t y o Th is decis ion was c o r r e c t but i t induced the erroneous b e l i e f 
w i th some quar te rs t h a t because a con t rac t e x i s t s between A and B; 
C cannot sue A i n t o r t an the f a c t s uf i ich d isc lose a breach of cont rac t 
between A and Bo 
12 
I n A l t o n V M«Re S Coc the p l a i n t i f f ' s servant was i n j u r e d by 
a Railway Company as c a r r i e r s o f passenger f o r h i r e . This was breach 
o f c o n t r a c t between the servant and the Railu^y Company to carry the 
servant s a f e l y o The p l a i n t i f f as master o f the servant sued f o r loss 
o f the servants services.. The Court turned down the c la im on the 
grounds o f p r i v i t y o W i l l e s , Jo ii^a sat wi th three o ther judges 
confused two independent and q u i t e compatible p ropos i t i ons u^en he 
acknowledged the r u l e s t h a t i n 
(1 ) no stranger to m con t r ac t can i n general sue on i t 5 and 
(2) 0 master can sue f o r the loss of services from i n j u r y 
done to h i s servanto 
The r e s u l t o f t h i s dec is ion was to submerge the second ru l e i n the 
f i r s t o 
13 
Donoghue v Stevenson has gone m long way to remedy t h i s 
incons is tency but to a la rge degree the anomaly s t i l l e x i s t s today. 
More r ecen t ly i n Esse Petrolean Co, L t d . v Mardon the Cpurt 
o f Appeal faced the i s a j e i^iether a neg l igen t p r e - ° c a n t r a c t u Q l statement 
founded an ac t ion i n con t r ac t as w e l l as i n t o r t under Hedley Byrne v 
H e l l e r , T h e f a c t s o f the case are tha t i n 1961 the p l a i n t i f f s 
5 
Esso Petroleum Co, L t d , wished to open s p e t r o l f i l l i n g s t a t i o n i n 
Southpor t , They acquired a s i t e i n East-bank Street,, Southport f o r 
t h i s and entered i n t o con t r ac t w i t h the defendant to l e t the f i l l i n g 
s t a t i o n t o him, Easo Petroleum estimated and informed the defendant 
t h a t the t | iraugh p u t , t ha t i s the estimated annual consumption of the 
East bank S t ree t s i t e , i n i t s t h i r d year of opera t ion , uauld amount to 
200,000 gallonSo Esso had contemplated tha t when the s t a t i o n was 
developed i t WQuld be i n f u l l view o f passing t r a f f i c . But when 
p lann ing consent mB granted i t ms f o r a development tiihich screened 
the pumps f rom the road and t h i s was bound to adversely a f f e c t the 
s t a t i o n s p o t e n t i a l , Esso never the less , adhered to iSheir o r i g i n a l 
eat imated annual consumption o f 200,000 ga l lons . The r e s u l t said the 
t r i a l judge ma a " t r a g i c s tory o f ussted endeavour and f i n a n c i a l 
16 
d i s a s t e r ' to the defendant , The defendant put c a p i t a l i n t o the 
s t a t i o n and incu r red a bank o v e r d r a f t but despi te h i s hard work, the 
s t a t i o n only sold 78,000 ga l lons of p e t r o l i n the f i r a t 15 months. 
I n Ju ly 196^ ^ the defendant tendered no t i ce to q u i t the tenancy but 
was persuaded to remain at a reduced rent by s tenancy agredment dated 
1st September 1964>, This d i d not help matters and i n August 1966 the 
defendant mm unable to pay Eaao f o r p e t r o l supp l ied . I n December 1966 
Esso issued a w r i t against the defendant c l a iming possession o f the 
s ta t ionp money due f o r p e t r o l and mesne p r o f i t s . The defendant 
cont inued t r a d i n g a t the s t a t i o n u n t i l March 1967 when he gave up 
possession. By h i s defence and countercla im the defendant a l leged 
i n t e r a l i a t h a t the represen ta t ion as to the through put amounted to 
neg l igen t misrepresenta t ion and Q breach of- warranty. The t r i a l judge 
r e j e c t e d the c la im f o r breach o f usrranty but held tha t Easo were l i a b l e 
f o r breach o f t h e i r duty of care to the defendant. The defendant 
appealed and Esso cross-appealed. 
The p l a i n t i f f s i n t h e i r cross-appeal argued t h a t Hedley Byrne 's 
case cannot be used to impose l i a b i l i t y f o r p r e ° c a n t r a c t u a l statementSo 
They argued t ha t the remedy i n such s i t u a t i o n s ( a t any ra t s before 
1967 Misrepresen ta t ion Act) l a s only i n uarranty or no th ing . They 
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r e l i e d p a r t i c u l a r l y an Clark v Mirby Smith and on Groom v Crockero 
There are o ther a u t h o r i t i e s to support t h i s conten t iono Lord Reid i n 
19 
Hedley Byrne ' s case sa id ; "where there i s a con t rac t there i s no 
d i f f i c u l t y as regards the c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s : the question i s whether 
there i s a usr rantyo" I n O l e i f i c i o Zuckhi SPA v Worthem Sales L t d o ^ ° 
McWair J o 8Bids"'ooo as at present advisedj I consider the submission 
advanced by the buyers = t ha t the r u l i n g i n Hedley Byrne appl iee as 
betwsen c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s i s wi thout foundat iono" 
The Court o f Appeal unanimously r e j ec t ed t h i s argumento Lord 
Denning M o R o r e i t e r a t e d h i s e a r l i e r statement i n Mclnemy v Lloyds 
21 
Bank L t d o ufiiere he sa id ; " o o o i f one person, by a neg l igen t mis--
statement „ induces another to enter i n t o a con t rac t = wi th h imself o r 
a t h i r d person •= he may be l i a b l e i n damages" The learned Lord went 
on to s t a t e tha t the cases c i t e d by counsel f o r Esso ware i n c o n f l i c t 
w i t h o ther decis ions of high a u t h o r i t y which were not c i t e d i n t h e m o 
He s ta ted t h a t the duty of a p r o f e s s i o n a l person exis ted i n con t r sc t 
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and i n t o r t and c i t e d the cases of Brown v Boorinan and Norton v Bord 
23 
Ashburton i n supporto I n the l a t t e r case Uiscount Haldane L o C o held 
t h a t a s o l i c i t o r may be l i a b l e i n t o r t as w a l l as i n eontracto The duty 
i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n was analogous to tha t owed by a master to h i s servant 
o r v i ce versSo 
Drarod LoJo f e l t the argument t h a t the Hedley Byms ' s^^ case had 
no a p p l i c a t i o n where the nego t i a t i ons r e su l t ed i n a con t r ac t a t t r a c t i v e p 
but he never theless r e j e c t e d i t . He s ta ted; "There i s no magic i n 
the phrase ' s p e c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p ' s i t means no more than s r e l a t i o n s h i p 
7 
the nature of uihich i s such t h a t one par ty f o r @ v a r i e t y of possible 
reasonsp w i l l be regarded by the law as under a duty of care to 
the o the r" Hedley Byrne ' s case the re fo re appl ied to govern the 
The t o r t or con t r ac t ana lys i s i s not confflned to the s i t u a t i o n s 
above and i t i s t h e r e f o r e intended to i n q u i r e i n t o other circumstances 
i n ufiiich the ru l e s o f con t r ac t may be re levant i n t o r t s i t u a t i o n s . 
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CHAPTER 2 
MASTER mo SERVANT 
Today the master and servant r e l a t i o n s h i p i s normally founded 
upon c o n t r a c t . Th is however need not be the basis of the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
i n every case. For example, a c h i l d l i v i n g at home may be a servant 
o f the f a t h e r by the f a c t o f render ing aervicea to the f a t h e r . 
S i m i l a r l y a vo lunteer who gives h i s services to another has been held 
2 
to be a servant . 
The r e l a t i o n s h i p creates c e r t a i n r i g h t s and du t i es between the 
p a r t i e s , ^ These o b l i g a t i o n s are normally c l a s s i f i e d i n t o three groups. 
S t r i c t l y only two groups of o b l i g a t i o n s e x i s t from the very f a c t of 
the r e l a t i o n s h i p , the t h i r d group only appl ies u^^ere the p a r t i e s have 
i n a con t r ac t expressly or by necessary i m p l i c a t i o n s , agreed upon them. 
C l a s s i f i e d the o b l i g a t i o n s ares-
(1 ) Those o b l i g a t i o n a imposed by the Common L@w on both p a r t i e s . 
These are known as the common duty o f care, 
(2) S ta tu te has also imposed c e r t a i n o b l i g a t i o n a on both p a r t i e s . 
These may derogate f rom or amp l i fy the comrnon law duty o f care or 
k 
the c o n t r a c t u a l du ty . The d u t i e s are normally personal , 
( 3 ) Where the r e l a t i o n s h i p a r i ses ex cont rac tu the p a r t i e s 
may create c e r t a i n o b l i g a t i o n s expressly or by necessary i m p l i c a t i o n . 
These o b l i g a t i o n s may be re levant to the other o b l i g a t i o n s f o r they 
may derogate from o r a m p l i f y them. The s t a tu to ry du t ies are however 
genera l ly couched i n absolute terms and may l i m i t the scope of 
con t r ac t o b l i g a t i o n s , 
With respect to the s t a t u t o r y and con t r ac tua l o b l i g a t i o n s the 
l e g a l consequences are clearo S ta tute general ly provides the penalty 
f o r breach o f s t a t u t o r y du ty . The ru l e s determining the l i a b i l i t y 
1D 
i s t o r t i o u s o Thus i n Davie v jMetu Megton Board MillB„^ Lord Reid 
stated t h a t the masters duty to provide safe p l a n t should be regardEd 
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as p a r t of the law of t o r t o Denning LoJo i n a dissenting judgment 
took the same wieuo There i s academic support f o r t h i s viewc Munkman 
on Employers L i a b i l i t y believes t h a t t h i s i s the correct i n t e r = 
p r e t a t i o n although he i s prepared to accept the Court of Appeal's 
decision i n Mattheua v Hubiait Betchel uihich goes the other m^o 
I n support of h i s contention he argues that the employer ouias a duty 
to persons ii^a are not employed by him eogo doctor uiho has come to 
rescue and also he r e l i e s on the provision of Section 2 of the Crown 
Proceedings Actj, 19'J7O This includes under the heading " L i a b i l i t y 
of the CroiiDi i n T o r t " , "breach of those duties tjihich a person owes 
to h i s servants or agents at common law by reason of being t h e i r 
employer"o With due respect the arguments are not convincing^ I n 
the f i r s t case th a t I ouie a duty to X i n a given s i t u a t i o n does not 
mean t h a t given t h a t same situation„ I ote the same type of duty to Yo 
The r e l a t i o n s h i p s may not be the same and there i s no reason iijhy t h i s 
should not make di f f e r e n c e to the nature of the duty„ 
I n the second place, Section 2 of the Act merely begs the queationc 
I t acknowledges t h a t the duty can be t o r t i o u s and on t h i s there i s no 
argument but the Act does not say uhether t h i s i s exclusively the casso 
The dogma t h a t the duty i s always t o r t i o u s may be a t t r i b u t a b l e to the 
f a c t t h a t i n c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n s devoid of contracts a duty of care 
has e j t i s t e d and to adherents of t h i s dogma i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see how 
the duty can be contractualo The contract does not create the r e l a t i o n ^ 
ship but i n some case may be i n c i d e n t a l to i t o This contention however 
does not explain why an acti o n may be brought i n contract f o r the same 
breach of dutyo 
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2o The duty i s purely eontractuBl 
T h i a view i s not ses-iously held beeause of i t s aelf=cont?Bdictiono 
Once i t i a admitted t h a t the seletionship m@y ewiat independent of 
cont r a c t and tha t the eomnion law impoaes the duty of care by reaaon of 
the r e l a t i o n s h i p alone i t becomea d i f f i c u l t t o maintain t h a t where no 
cont r a c t e x i s t a the duty of care may nevertheless be contractualo The 
premise in no my compel© the conclusiono There i s no contract from 
iiihich the duty m@y be irapliedo 
I t c@n houever be argued t h a t , certainly„ the duty of care betwsen 
master and aeryaot i s d i f f e r e n t from the duty of care ousd to a t h i r d 
p a r ty BOQO Q consumero So f a r as the l a t t e r i s concerned the duty muat 
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be t o r t i o u a and generally one i n negligence under Donoghue v Stevenaono 
Therefore the former uihich i s d i f f e r e n t from the l a t t e r must be con° 
tr a o t u s l o Thia i s not convincing f o r tua reaaon8;-= 
(a) I t has been shouffi above t h a t the premise does not usarrant 
such a conclusiono 
(b) At bottom the d i f f e r e n c e may be the content and not 
the nature of the dutyo Thus the duty i n t o r t f o r 
p h y s i c a l i n j u r y i s generally t h a t i n negligencSo 
S i m i l a r l y the duty f o r nervous shock i s i n negligence 
but as the cases ^ p l y shotai the contents of the duties 
are not the samso This has not prompted any re-
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of t h e i r nature and there seems no 
reason fejhy the same should not apply to master and 
aervant duty of care„ 
3o The duty i s i n t o r t and i n Contract; 
I t i s submitted t h a t t h i s i s the correct ansuisro H i s t o r i c a l l y i t 
i s not c e r t a i n hou the duty came to be baaed i n t o r t and i n eontract„ 
I t i s however speculated t h a t the o r i g i n of the duty must have been i n 
t o r t o I n fact5 i n view of the development of contract from t o r t t h i s 
i s self-evidento flut^ i n ttsam, s i t u a t i o n s arose uihere apart from the 
pure t o r t r e l a t i o n s h i p betwsen the master and the aervant a contract 
12 
e x i s t e d between thein and a r i g i d separation of the commoiri duty of caro 
from the contract d u t i e s msy have become unnecesaaryo GraduQliy the 
t o r t duty became asaimilsted with the contracto A u s e f u l vehicle f o r 
such a s s i m i l a t i o n was the doctrine of implied term i n contract f o r 
once the common duty of care had become notorious i t uss assumed to 
have been implied i n s l l contracts c r e a t i n g master and servant 
r e l a t i o n s h i p o I t waaimrosteriiil whether the duty was r e c i t e d as 
founded i n t o r t o r i n contracto Uhat was mBteriBl was th a t the 
p l a i n t i f f can sue iim botho Thus i n Brown v Boorman the Houss of 
Lords held t h a t wherever there i a a contract and something to be done 
i n the course of the employment which i s the subject of tha t c o n t r a c t , 
and there i s a breach of duty i n the course of tha t ejtjployment, the 
p l a i n t i f f can sue i n t o r t or i n contracto This a s s i m i l a t i o n led to 
some confusion i n thoughto For example the defence of common 
employment which was based on the f a c t that s servant "must be 
supposed to have contracted on the terms t h a t as betwsen himself and 
h i s master, he would run / f t h i s ^ ^ r i s k , " of i n j u r y by f e l l o w servant 
12 
i n common employment uas applied to a s i t u a t i o n manifestly devoid 
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of c o n t r a c t u a l i n t e n t i o n o I n e f f e c t the law of contract which hsd 
evolved from the l@w of t o r t u®s now c o n t r o l l i n g t o r t and s t i l l does 
80 i n many respects even todeyo 
APPLICATIOM OF TORT OR CONTRACT RULES 
In p r a c t i s e moat claims by servants f o r breach of duty are framed 
i n t o r t but there may be procedural or other advantages i n 1 ^  
the action i n contract., For example i n Matthews v (Kuwait Betehel 
the p l u i n t i f f contracted with the defendants to work abroad f o r theme 
He EsBs i n j u r e d by f a l l i n g i n t o a trench when he avoided an object which 
swung towards him as a rsasult of negligence of the teiployErSo This 
negligence also c o n s t i t u t e d a breach of the contract of employraento 
The 2.©0ye bsferQ tho oour^ tsog (whQthss' the p l i a i i m t i f f eon aygid thQ 
pro'Si'iQiQSDo of RoSoCo Qrdo I I mlQ 1 and mesfVQ h i s ffiife eyl^ of 
jM5?i©diE'Sio5Do Hs Eould do 'fehiQ i f h i s bE-it dlselooed o mum of 
aefeisn la eoinitrset but hs sould not do so i f i t diselooBd 0 eaussQ 
of a c t i o n i n t o r t alonoo Th® p l a i n t i f f feroyght h i g ae'Sian Qlleging 
breaeh of gomitreist and served h i s tsjrit out of juriodieiSigDno The 
defendonl^g eontended that the csysQ of action b®a i n t o r t snd the 
fairit ©Quld not be sewed out ©f j y r i B d i e t i o n o The eotort of fippeal 
m j e c t e d t h i s contenition) and held that the p l i i n t i f f could frsfne 
h i e ©QtioBT) i n contract or in t o r t o As he alleged a breaeh of eon-
t r a c t the cijrit could be seswed out of jur i sd ic t iono 
yOLUWTEER, COmm El^LOVMEfyT AWD yOLEWTI 
Under the d o c t r i n g o f esmmon employment a oeris/sint !I©B deemed 
to heye i m p l i e d l y agreed i n the eentract of ©ervic© not to sue the 
magter f o r i n j u r y r e s u l t i n g froci the act of f e l i e w oeruanto i n Qomrasni 
grapleymsnto liJhat Qmergss fs^sa t h i a lis that the defeocQ depg^ded on 
the e^iotQnee af a centract betiKien the master and the injured 
oervanto Weleriti an the other hand daee not require a contract t o 
a p p l y o Thug the defenee af osfsauon orapleyraant had no a p p l i c a t i o n 
(Where thu i n j y r s d seffwant wag not a cQntrsetyQl servant but 0 vslunteero 
This i© because of the Qboense of s csntr a c t on uihich t o iraply the 
eonsento y e l e n t i isihieh does not require a contract may m the other 
hand opp lyo Byt i n Deggs v Midland R a i l COo^ '^  the dBfenee wao 
maintained against a volunteer and on t h i s baois the v a l i d i t y of 
t h a t decig)i©n ean be qyestionedo How can m volunteer tiihs i a not 
0 c o n t r a c t i n g party be regarded ao haying impliedly agreed i n the 
eontraet of service to run the r i g k of injyry by f e l l o t ) servants? 
The defenee olhiould h^ye been one of w l e n t i mn f i t i n j y r i O o Thig 
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^isstin'Ction i s eyppsrted by the decision i n Corry ^ Olgenio 
There the defence of common employment f a i l e d on the gnsucDdo 
t h a t the eontract between the p l a i n t i f f i n f a n t ®nd the defendant 
employers mQ mid f o r not being wholly to the benefit of the 
in f a n t o The f a c t t h a t the court want on to conoider the question 
of v o l e n t i not i n the sontexi^ of the eontract but of knawledge 
and Eonsent ahowo t h a t i t drew a l i n e between th© tutn defences 
and t h i o l i n e depended on the existence or otherwise of a contrecto 
Thus JsJhere the duty wao merely t o r t i o u e as i n Degg'B Case eommon 
employment should be inmpplicsble because of the absence of 
contracto Conversely i n s i t u a t i o n s where the contractual servant 
ms i n j u r e d by a volunteer the defence of common employment Mould 
be applicableo This i o because of the existence of contract 
between the master and iaie servant from which the defence can be 
i n ^ l i e d o This case i s however of mere h i s t o r i e a l importance f o r 
the p o s i t i o n hiis changed by the a b o l i t i o n of the defence of soraraon 
employment by the Law Reform (Personol I n j u r i e o ) Act 19^}8o Thio 
Act d i d not a f f e c t the defence of V o l e n t i non f i t injuriOo 
Suppoae X enters i n t o contract of service with Y and there 
i s en exemption clause i n the contract,, The clause may f u l f i l a 
double rolBo I f Y i a damaged and brings h i s action i n contract 
the exeraptlon clause may be used as a defenceo The issue here 
w i l l be one of con s t r u c t i o n and such rul e s as the contra proferentera 
and doctrine of fundamental breach w i l l spplyc I f V auea i n t o r t , 
again the exemption clause may be used as a defence of v o l e n t i 
non f i t i n j u r i a and the issue w i l l be the same as i n contract and 
thus one of eonatruction, although i t i s not c e r t a i n whether the 
contra proferentem r u l e or doctrine of fundamental breach w i l l 
applyo I n Birch w Thomas^® the court considered the question of 
fundamental breach and i t would appear from the judgment th a t had 
the c o n t r a c t been broken i n a fundamental way the defence of 
v o l e n t i would not have applied. I n e f f e c t the contract r u l e i3gQin„ 
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19 supervenes the t o r t r u l e ^ I n Hedley Byrne v H e l l e r & Partnero Ltd, 
Lord Reid and Lord Pearee issre of the opinion t h a t these developmento 
i n c o n t r a c t had no s p p l i c s t i o n to the Hedley Byrne prineiplBo 
Lord Pearce stated; 
" I do note t h e r e f o r e , accept t h a t , even i f the p a r t i e s 
were already i n c o n t r a c t u a l or other special r e l a t i o n s h i p s 
the words would give no immunity to a negligent answer,^20 
To t h e i r Lordship t h e r e f o r e , the rules of contract and t o r t should 
be kept separate and applied according to whether the action was 
brought i n t o r t or i n contracto The submission i s t h a t t h i s i s 
c o r r e c t and as no conceivable diffQgence EKista between a d i e -
clairaer and v o l e n t i the consent can nevertheless apply to the 
t o r t even where i t i s rej e c t e d i n contracto Thia bmuld not be a 
new p r o p o s i t i o n f o r there ere already a i t u a t i o n a where the same 
f a c t s may disclose a cause of acti o n exclusively i n t o r t or i n 
contracto Why should t h i s p r i n c i p l e not apply to the defence to 
such actiona? Thus the d i s t i n c t i o n between t o r t and contract 
becomes c r i t i c a l o Such a s i t u a t i o n w i l l e x i s t s i n an i n f a n t ' s 
c o n t r a c t of service is^ich w i l l be void i f i t iraposeo onerous 
terms on the i n f a n t , 
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I n Olsen v Corry the p l a i n t i f f i n f a n t entered i n t o a contract 
w i t h h i s Bijployers who are the defendants. The eontrsct SKempted 
the defendants from l i a b i l i t y f o r negligence and also provided 
t h a t the employers w i l l to the best of t h e i r power teach him. As 
Q r e s u l t of a system which was found to be defective the p l a i n t i f f 
was i n j u r e d when the plans was switched on without adequate uamingo 
He brought an action and the lanployers sought to r e l y on the 
defence of common employment and v o l e n t i non f i t i n j u r i a . 
As already stated the judgment proceeded on two grounds; 
(1) The defence of common employment being c o n t r a c t u a l 
bas i n a p p l i c a b l e because the contract liss void. 
1S 
(2) On the question of v o l e n t i the f a c t t h a t the contract 
was void was not regarded as e s s e n t i a l and the court 
r e j e c t e d the defence purely on the grounds t h a t the 
i n f a n t p l a i n t i f f being a mere p u p i l had no knowledge 
and appreciation of the r i s k of swinging the p r o p e l l e r 
i n such circumstanceso To the court therefore t h i s 
question was one of consent and to be answered on the 
basis of the f a c t s as known to the p l a i n t i f f and not 
on whether the contract was v a l i d or noto 
Support i a l e n t to t h i s contention from the judgment of Stephenson, 3o 
22 
i n B u c k p i t t V Dates another case on v o l e n t i . He saidi 
cannot see any o b j e c t i o n i n law to drawing t h a t 
conclusion i n the case of an infanto I t i s a 
question of f a c t and not of law whether he has 
-assentedo" 
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Thus the c r u c i a l issue i n Corry v Olsen was whether the infant's 
consent was to be i n f e r r e d from the f a c t s of the casso Where as i n 
t h a t case the r i s k was so c o n j e c t u r a l i t i a d i f f i c u l t to see how 
the defence could have succeededo The submission therefore i s t h a t 
the defence msy s t i l l apply where i t i s given i n s void contract 
unless i t i n f r i n g e s s c l e a r l y defined r u l e of public p o l i c y as where 
the consent apart from being given i n a void contract also r e l a t e d 
to the commission of a crime, 
For example X allows Y to commit a c r i m i n a l assault on him. 
On grounds of p u b l i c p o l i c y i n any c r i m i n a l action Y cannot plead 
X°@ consent as a defence to the prosecutiono But betwsen X and Y 
there w i l l e x i s t some c o n t r a d i c t i o n s . I f X sues Y should Y be allowsd 
to r a i s e the consent? Such e r e s u l t would amount to allowing Y to 
get up h i s c r i m i n a l act as defence to t o r t sctiono Or should X i n s p i t e 
of h i s consent be allowed to b e n e f i t from h i s c r i m i n a l act? The 
answer has been found i n a maxim which has i t s o r i g i n i n contract 
and t h a t i s the maxim; ex t u s p i causa non o r i t u r actiOo^ X cannot 
Tlead h i s own d i s g r a c e f u l act as a cause of action. Today however 
the maxim has been extended to t o r t and i s interchangeable with v o l e n t i 
non f i t i n j u r i a . 
To r e t u r n to Birch v Thomaep i n Kenyon, Son £ Craven Ltd v Baxter, 
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Hoare & Co, L t d , „ i t was held t h a t where there i s a fundamental 
breach an exemption clause i a i n a p p l i c a b l e and therefore necessarily 
v o l e n t i i s i n i p p l i c a b l S o Dicta i n Birch v Thomas supported t h i s 
contention. I t i s r e s p e c t f u l l y submitted f o r the reason advanced 
above t h a t t h i s i a not c o r r e c t f o r the issue being one of consent 
and t h e r e f o r e question of factp the construction given t o the clause 
should apply to the t o r t even though i t s e o n t r a c t u s l a p p l i c a t i o n has 
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been displaced by the breach, A di s c e r n i b l e r a t i o from Hedley Byrne's 
case i s t h a t the disclaimer negatived l i a b i l i t y . Even i f that part §. 
of the judgement on ^ e e i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p i a treated as o b i t e r , i t 
cannot be denied t h a t the issue of the disclaimer i-ais a f a c t on which 
the House of Lords reached t h e i r decision. I t has already been 
stated from the judgsaent of Lord Pearce t h a t the f a c t t h a t a contract 
e x i s t s or not i s not m e t e r i a l to the operation of the disclaimer. 
I t umuld be an argument of l a s t r e s o r t to apply t h i s to words and 
not actso 
I f the argument stated eppesars to be a wide generalisation i t 
i s submitted t h a t a contrary r u l e wauld lead t o absurdity, For example„ 
X enters i n t o a contract with Y, An exemption clause l i m i t s l i a b i l i t y 
of X f o r negligence. The contract i s void. I f the r u l e t h a t the 
cont r a c t being void the clause i s inapplicable i s adopted, X cannot 
r e l y on the clause. I f X without a contract includes the exemption 
clause i n h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p with there being no contract with 
X can r e l y on i t . Such a conclusion doea not make commonsense, 
CQMTRIBUTDRV MEGLIGEMCE 
Before 19^ >5 a p l a i n t i f f ' s a ction i n t o r t was barred i f he wass 
c o n t r i b u t o r i l y responsible f o r the t o r t . The law was a l t e r e d by the 
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Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 19*»5 which provides t h a t 
t^sm the damage r e s u l t s p a r t l y from the p l a i n t i f f s ' ' f a u l t " and p a r t l y 
from the defendants " f a u l t " the p l a i n t i f f can nevertheless recover 
but the court i n awarding damages w i l l apportion i t between the 
p a r t i e s according to t h e i r degree of f a u l t . 
I n c o n tract the common law r u l e was th a t a p l a i n t i f f was generally 
not bound to guard against breach but against the consequences of 
known breach. So f a r as the l a t t e r i s concerned t h i s only r e l a t e s 
to m i t i g a t i o n of damages and such a l l i e d questions as remoteness of 
The question here i s , does the Act of 13^5 gpply to contract? 
For example i f a servant i s i n j u r e d p a r t l y as e r e s u l t of h i s own 
f a u l t and p a r t l y as a r e s u l t of the f a u l t of the master or of a 
servant f o r whom the master i s v i c a r i o u s l y l i a b l e , t o what extent 
umuld the Act of 19i»5 apply where the circumstances discloses • breach 
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of contract and also of t o r t ? The answer to t h i s question must 
necessarily bs determined i n the l i g h t of the recent decision i n 
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Lumsden & Co, v London Trustee Savings Bank, I t was stated i n t h i s 
case t h a t f o r the 19^5 Act to apply t o any ^ iven s i t u a t i o n i t has 
to be shown tha t c o n t r i b u t o r y negligence uss a defence p r i o r to 19'45, 
I t uras never doubted t h a t i t applied to t o r t actions. 
The answer to the question w i l l be divided i n t o two i n accordance 
with the nature of the duties i n a contract: 
(1) S t r i c t Contractual Duty 
(2) Ordinary Duty of Care 
1, STRICT CONTRACTUAL DUTY 
I n Quin V Burch, P a u l l , J, saids 
" I cannot t h i n k t h a t i n contract i t matters whether 
the breach i s brought about d e l i b e r a t e l y or n e g l i g e n t l y 
or per incuriBm," "You could have avoided the breach 
by a c t i n g c a r e f u l l y " i s o f no account i n the law of 
contract,"30 
Thia statement usa r e s t r i c t e d to s t r i c t contractuQl duties. 
Once the duty i s determined the question to be asked i s , has the 
defendant broken t h a t duty? I f the answer l a y©s, he i s l i a b l e . 
Thus a r e p a i r e r who r e p a i r s d e f e c t i v e l y w i l l be l i a b l e although there 
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has been no want of care. S i m i l a r l y a s e l l e r who s e l l s defective 
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goods cannot escape l i a b i l i t y by showing t h a t he exercised care. 
Admitting then t h a t negligence of the defendant i s i r r e l e v a n t 
when determining breach of s t r i c t duty, does the same r u l e apply to 
where the damage i n question i s also contributed by the negligence 
of the p l a i n t i f f ? C h i t t y on Contract says; " I t s t i l l awaits a u t h o r i t a -
33 
t i v e determination by the cour t s , " I t i s submitted that so f a r as 
the a u t h o r i t i e a stand the conclusion to be drawn must be i n the 
a f f i r m a t i v e and i t i a t h a t i n s t r i c t c o n t r a c t u a l duty s i t u a t i o n 
the Act of "iSkS has no applicationo Negligence when taken i n t o 
account i n contract r e l a t e s t o cauaation and at the close of the 
day the v e r d i c t w i l l be one of l i a b l e or not l i a b l e . I n Quin v Burch 
i t bss stated t h a t " i n contract i t has long been held that i t i s 
good defence to an action founded on a breach of contract that 
the party suing has chosen himself to act i n a my i n which a 
reasonable man would not act and so brought about the damage 
"Ik 
claimed. Such an act breaks the chain of causation leading to damage. 
I n t h i s case i t was implied i n the contract to carry out 
c e r t a i n b u i l d i n g works th a t the defendants should supply any 
equipment neceaaary f o r the work w i t h i n reasonable time. The 
defendants broke t h i s by not supplying s u i t a b l e ladder and the 
p l a i n t i f f s to get the work done used a t r e s t l e , which he knew ijiaa 
unsuitable unless footed by another person. The p l a i n t i f f was i n j u r e d 
by using i t without i t being footed. He therefore contributed to 
h i s i n j u r y . 
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He brought h i s a c t i o n i n c o n t r a c t , P a u l l , J, held t h a t the 
action must f a i l because of the p l a i n t i f f ' s c o n t r i b u t o r y negligence. 
To the learned judge the issue UHS therefore one of causation. By 
" f a u l t " i n Section k of the I9i>5 Act i s meant the purely t o r t i o u s 
d e f i n i t i o n but t h i s d e f i n i t i o n i s wide enough to apply to s i t u a t i o n s 
of c o n t r a c t u a l duty of care. The p l a i n t i f f ' s a ction had broken 
the chain of causation. To quote again from the judgment of P a u l l , J, 
He said: 
" I n my judgment, i n looking to see whether there 
was f a u l t w i t h i n the meaning of the Act of 19^ 5^p 
one cannot look at the manner i n which a contract 
has been broken; only the terms of the contract 
and the consequences of a breach of any such 
term. I n order to apply the Act of 19^*5, one 
has to f i n d t h a t there was some term which 
imported a duty not to be negligent end a breach 
of t h a t term. There i s no general duty to put 
or leave equipment on a s i t e where men are 
working. The o b l i g a t i o n can only arise under the 
terms of some contract,"35 
I n e f f e c t t h i s ma a breach of s t r i c t contractuEil duty and i s dis= 
tiniguishable from a c o n t r a c t u a l duty of care which i s same as "duty 
not be n e g l i g e n t , " I t i s submitted therefore that the Act of ISkd 
has no a p p l i c a t i o n to s t r i c t c o n t r a c t u a l duty. 
The case of Cork v Maclean^^ may at f i r s t s i g h t appear to stand 
opposed to t h i s submission. The p l a i n t i f f i n t h i s case brought an 
ac t i o n i n her capacity as a d m i n i s t r a t r i x of the deceasedo Her claim 
was f o r damages under the Law Reform (Missellaneous Provisions) Act, 
193ft, and the F a t a l Accidenta Act, 1B'*6=190a f o r breach of s t a t u t o r y 
duty. The deceased, an e p i l e p t i c , was employed by the defendants 
as a p a i n t e r . This necessitated working at a height of about twenty 
f e e t above the ground. The deceased's doctor had uamed him against 
t a k i n g such employment and he did not inform the employers of t h i s 
and ues found as of f a c t to be negligent. The defendants on the other 
hand had i n f r i n g e d the s t a t u t o r y regulations r e q u i r i n g the provision 
of adequate p l a t f o r m . 
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At f i r s t instance, Donovan J, held t h a t as the defendants could 
not discharge the burden of proof i o B , show tha t the deceased would 
nevertheless have f a l l e n despite adequate platformo They were there= 
f o r e l i a b l e f o r a l l the damageso The question to him ma therefore 
one of causation. 
I n the Court of Appeal he was reversed, the court holding t h a t 
the Act of ISkb applied and the damages were to be apportioned. The 
accident was a t t r i b u t a b l e to the deceased and to the defendants. 
Singleton CoJ, r e f e r r e d to Section k of the 19^5 Act and adopted the 
statement of Alderson Bo i n B l y t h v Birmingham Waterworks Co, t h a t ; 
'"[\legligence i a the omission to do something which a 
reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which 
o r d i n a r i l y regulate the conduct of human a f f a i r s , would 
do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable 
man would not do,"37 
This d e f i n i t i o n he held applied to the case and i t i a conceded i s 
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wide enough to cover the s i t u a t i o n i n Quin v Bureh, The inference 
t h e r e f o r e would be t h a t where the duty i s s t r i c t i n contract i f the 
" f a u l t . " of the p l a i n t i f f f i t s the above d e f i n i t i o n then the Act of 
"\Sk5 a p p l i e s . Such a concluaion w i l l houever be too wide, (\!o decision 
hoiiBver august i s a p r o p o s i t i o n f o r a point of law that was not con-
sidered. I t was not disputed i n t h i s case th a t the Act of 19^5 d i d 
apply to actions f o r breach of s t a t u t o r y duty and the whole decision 
proceeded on t h i a assumption. The court did not consider s t r i c t 
c o n t r a c t u a l duty and on the f i n d i n g s i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see how the 
decision below could have been af f i r m e d , 
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A s i m i l a r issue arose i n Lavender v Oiamints Ltd, The f a c t s 
are t h a t the defendants owners of a f a c t o r y employed the p l a i n t i f f 
window cleaner as an independent contractor. The r o o f i n g of the fa c t o r y 
d i d not comply with s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s under the Factories Act 1937, 
While the p l a i n t i f f ma working he f e l l through the asbestos sheet 
which could not support h i s weight and he brought t h i s action f o r damages. 
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At f i r s t instance Denning,, J, held t h a t h i s action must f a i l . 
No doubt the defendants were i n breach of s t a t u t o r y regulation but 
the accident ma a t t r i b u t a b l e to the negligence of the defendant. 
Thus to the learned judge the question was one of causation and 
he saw no reason to apportion the damages merely because there was 
some breach by the defendants. 
On appeal he was reversed the Court of Appeal t a k i n g a d i f f e r e n t 
view on the evidence, Turker CoJ, could f i n d "nothing i n the evidence 
to support ^ i j 7 view t h a t the p l a i n t i f f ' s f a i l u r e t o provide the 
planking might have obviated the accident or the f a c t t h a t he 
slipped c o n s t i t u t e d negligence on h i s parto"^'^ 
Singleton LoJ, also d i d not agree th a t the evidence established 
" t h a t i t ma the duty of window cleaners to take s l l planks necessary 
to make a roof safe,"^^ The issue therefore was s t i l l one of 
causation and supports the submission already advanced. I t w i l l 
however be conceded t h a t l a t e r i n h i s judgment Singleton LoJ, stated 
t h a t i t "was f o r the defendants to show t h a t the p l a i n t i f f was 
negligent i n a uay which caused, or which contributed t o , the 
accident,"^^ This w i l l imply t h a t c o n t r i b u t o r y negligence Act would 
have applied. But t h i s i s mere speculation, P a u l l J, above canvassed 
the same idea and answered t h a t "such an act breaks the chain of 
causation leading to damage," 
There i s an eminent academic opinion which seems to oppose 
the conclusion advanced. Professor G l a n v i l l e U i l l i a m s on J o i n t 
T o r t s and Contributory Negligence gave the whole question a good 
consideration and concludes t h a t the Act of 19i*5 should apply to 
breach o f c o n t r a c t u a l duty. He argues: 
"Even i f the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n j u s t advasced i s 
thought t o be too spun, i t i s submitted t h a t 
where the same act or omission c o n s t i t u t e s both 
a t o r t and a breach of contract, so tha t i n i t s 
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" t o r t aspect the case i s subject to the provisions 
of the Aet, then the case i s subject to the Act 
even i n i t s contract aspecto The Act i s paramount. 
Hence the new t o r t r u l e ought to be regarded as a 
matter of p o l i c y as exclusive of the o l d contract 
r u l e , where both issues arise i n the same ca8B,"ij3 
With due respect t h i s argument i s not convincing f o r the 
f o l l o w i n g reasons;-
1, The i l l u s t r a t i o n s he gives are a l l casea where the duty 
i n c o n t r a c t i s one of duty of care and on t h i a there i s no argument 
t h a t the Act sppliea, 
2, The a u t h o r i t i e s are against the p r o p o s i t i o n . I n Quin v 
Burch^^ the p l a i n t i f f ' s action being i n contract f a i l e d on the grounds 
t h a t the Act would not apply. Had the action been i n t o r t the Act 
would have applied and damages apportioned. Also the judgment i n 
Lumadsn & Co, v London Trustee Saving Bank^^ i s against h i s contention 
f o r as seen i n t h a t case i t was stated that f o r the Act of 19^ *5 to 
apply i t must be shown tha t c o n t r i b u t o r y negligence applied i n 
s i m i l a r a i t u a t i o n a before 19't5, 
3e His argument i s h y p o t h e t i c a l and i a not intended to be 
a statement of e x i s t i n g law. He admits that before 19^ *5 c o n t r i b u t o r y 
negligence would not have applied and t h i s admission reduces h i s 
case to a vanishing p o i n t . He however argues t h a t as a matter of 
p o l i c y the Act should apply. Here i s not a place to consider p o l i c y 
but s u f f i c e i t to say t h a t i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see what s u b s t a n t i a l 
change such a reversal of p r i n c i p l e can b r i n g . In Quin v Burch^^ 
an action i n t o r t would have succeeded and the paucity of cases where 
t h i s r u l e i n contract has been c r i t i c a l to an action does not make 
a change so compelling. I f a change need be, i t ought to be l e f t to 
Parliament, 
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2, THE CONTRACTUAL DUTY OF CARE 
In the above discussion i t has been admitted that the Act of 
igt}5 a pplies where the c o n t r a c t u a l duty i s one to take care. Here 
again the a u t h o r i t i e s are barren, but the judgment of Paul, J, 
i n Quin v Burch^'^ contains dictum i n sjp p o r t . The cause of the 
action here w i l l be, he said, "negligence ex contractu, a cause 
of a c t i o n w a l l known and which has many of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 
of an ac t i o n i n pure tort,"^® T r e i t e l i n The Law of Contract 
gave a f l i n c h i n g support to the dictum by s t a t i n g , " i t i s c e r t a i n l y 
hard to see any good reason of p o l i c y why i t should not apply," 
To him however, such a conclusion w i l l depend on the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
given t o " f a u l t " i n Section k of the 'ISkB Act, and i s , t h a t i t 
i s not r e s t r i c t e d to the purely t o r t i o u s meaning. At issue then 
i s the question whether the c o n t r a c t u a l duty of care i s co°extensivs 
with t h a t i n negligence? There l a no reason to suggest th a t i t 
i s not. The dictum i n Quin v Burch^^ supports t h i s conclusion. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THIRD PARTY RIGHTS 
The issue t o be considered i n t h i s chapter w i l l be divided 
i n t o two:° 
( 1 ) Whether a defendant can r e l y on the defence of v o l e n t i 
non f i t i n j u r i a where a con t r a c t between the p l a i n t i f f and a t h i r d 
p a r t y a n t i c i p a t e s the defendants p a r t i c i p a t i o n and an exemption 
clsuae i n the contract expressly or by necessary i m p l i c a t i o n gives 
the defendant some p r o t e c t i o n , 
( 2 ) Can a t h i r d p a r t y sue a co n t r a c t i n g party where he i s 
damaged as a r e s u l t of breach of the contract by the defendant. 
Both issues come under the question as to what extent i s 
the r u l e i n contract t h a t a stranger to i t cannot sue or be sued 
under i t relevant to a t o r t action? At f i r s t sight the answer 
may appear simple but as w i l l be seen i t has not been anwwered 
s a t i s f a c t o r i l y on both sides o f the fence and much unwarrantable 
attempts have been made to press the doctrine of p r i v i t y of 
con t r a c t beyond i t s l i m i t s , 
1, Where the defendant i s stranger t o the contract 
The c r i t e r i o n f o r l i a b i l i t y i n negligence under Donoghue v 
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Stevenson t h a t the defendant can foresee the p l a i n t i f f as 
l i k e l y t o be aff e c t e d by the consequences of h i s conduct. This 
t h e r e f o r e creates the relationahipo The c o r - o l l a r y to t h i s i s 
t h a t the p l a i n t i f f can also foresee the defendant as one l i k e l y to 
damage himo Thus a mot o r i s t foresees t h a t some other motorist"a 
negligence may i n j u r e himo The defendant may therefore be d e s c r i ^ 
bed as "foreseen defendant^. The issue therefore i s whether t h i s 
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"foresesn defendant" can r e l y on an exemption clause l i j h i c h has 
been d r a f t e d i n h i s fawouSo I t i a submitted t h a t he should r e l y 
on the exemption clause and t h a t i t makes no difference bihethes' 
there i s a contract or n e t o The House of Lords decision i n 
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Elder DemD-^,ster v Patterson Zochonis r e l i e d upon f o r t h i s 
submissiono 
UOLEWT NOW FIT INJURIA 
Generally a person ujho knows of a r i s k and consents to i t 
cannot complain i f the r i s k materialiseso His action w i l l be met 
by the defence of v o l e n t i non f i t i h j u r i a ^ ^ To t h i s p r i n c i p l e 
there ere exceptions: 
(1) The defence does not apply idiere the complainant merely 
knows but does not consent to the risko The defence i s one of 
v o l e n t i and not s c i e n t i non f i t i n j u r i s o ^ 
(2) Where the duty of the defendant i s a s t a t u t o r y duty publie 
p o l i c y demands t h a t he cannot exonerate himself by s h i f t i n g the 
duty on the p l a i n t i f f or to another perssno Dtheruise the a u t h o r i t y 
of Parliament u d l l be underminedo^ 
I t has been urged that the same ru l e should apply to bihere 
the consent i s given i n a contract ivhich i s v o i d o I t i s submitted 
t h a t there i s no reason of p o l i c y or p r i n c i p l e uihy t h i s should be soo 
Exemption clauses and v o l e n t i 
Uhere a contract e x i s t s betiueen A and B the same act may give 
r i s e to a cause of action i n t o r t or i n contracto As f a r back as 
"iBkk the House of Lords acknowledged t h i s p r i n c i p l e i n Broum v Boorman^ 
Lord Macmillan r e i t e r a t e d t h i s i n Donoghue v Stevenson^tiihen he 
said t h a t 5 "the f a c t t h a t there i s a contractual r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
the p a r t i e s which may give r i s e to an aetion f o r breach of contract^ 
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does not BKCIUCIB the co=e«istsncB of a r i g h t of action founded on 
negligence as betiueen the same p a r t i e s 5 independently of the contysctp 
though a r i s i n g out of the r e l a t i o n s h i p i n f a c t brought about by 
the contracto"® 
This however has not been the yule f o r a l l times f o r as S i r 
Frederick Pollock stated ' ' i t appears th a t there has been (though 
perhaps there i s no longes") a c e r t a i n tendency to hold t h a t f a c t s 
a 
uihich c o n s t i t u t e a contract cannot have any other l e | B l e f f e c t o " 
Today theref o r e the h y p o t h e t i c a l s i t u a t i o n abQ=ve can o f f e r tuia 
defences depending on u i h e t h e r the a c t i o n i s i n t o r t or i n contracto 
I n c o n t r a c t as an exemption clause and i n t o r t as defence of 
v o l e n t i non f i t i n j u r i a and the contract betutssn A and B i s 
merely i n c i d e n t a l and of e v i d e n t i a l purposes onlyo The issue 
then i s one of c o n s t r u c t i o H o Houever iiihile t h e courts have maintained 
the f r e e d o K of p a r t i e s to enter i n t o contract on one hand they have 
been astute to check the abuse of exemption clauses by construing 
them narrowlyc, 
I n LJhite v John Uarrick & COQIO the defendants h i r e d a t r i c y c l e 
t o the p l a i n t i f f o The contract provided that;, "nothing i n t h i s 
agreement s h a l l render the oisiners l i a b l e f o r any personal i n j u r i e s 
t o the r i d e r s o f the machine hiredo" The machine mn defective 
and as a r e s u l t the p l a i n t i f f was throum o f f and wag i n j u r e d o I n 
h i s a c t i o n the unanimous Court of Appeal held t h a t i n the absence 
of a c l e a r and unambiguous assertion that the exempting clause 
should apply to t o r t damages i t must be r e s t r i c t e d to c o n t r a c t u a l 
l i a b i l i t i e s o Denning Lo 3o stated t h a t j 
" i f there are ttjo possible heads of l i a b i l i t y on 
the defendant p me f o r negligence end the other 
a s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y 5 an exempting clause w i l l be 
construed, so f a r as possible5 as exempting the 
defendant only from h i s s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y and not 
as r e l i e v i n g him from h i s l i a b i l i t y f o r n e g l i g e n c B o " 
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This ra i s e s some d i f f i c u l t y f o r i t implies t h a t where duties e x i s t 
i n t o r t and contract something near to two exemption clauses y i l l 
be d r a f t e d to cover the party seeking to escape l i a b i l i t y o I t i s 
generally said t h a t the duty i n contract i s always s t r i c t and 
negligence i s only relevant when tha t duty i s one under the common 
duty of care (Frost v Aylesbury)» Thus to exclude l i a b i l i t y 
generally w i l l not be s u f f i c i e n t , f o r on the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 
Denning"s decision;, t h i s w i l l apply to s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y o Conversely 
to mention negligence alone w i l l not cover the c o n t r a c t u a l duty 
unless presumably the duty of care i n contracto 
B e n e f i t to t h i r d parties;, p r i v i t y and considerations 
I n Dunlop v S e l f r i d g e ^ ^ Lord Haldane said t h a t English law 
knows nothing of j u s quaesitum t e r t i o a r i s i n g by tisy of contract end 
th a t f o r a person with whom no contract under seal has been made 
to be able to enforce i t he must show that he has given consideration 
and i s a party to the contracto These two requirements have been 
echoed by judges and academic w r i t e r s without question but i n 
recent years t h e i r v a l i d i t y has been questioned i n two respects; 
1o I n the f i r s t place i t has been objected t h a t s t r i c t l y the turo 
requirements are not separate but j u s t v a r i a t i o n s of one r u l e , that i s , 
t h a t f o r a person to sue under a contract he must give considerationo 
The urard "sue" i a used advisedly i n preference to the phrase "take 
b e n e f i t " under a contracto English law idea of contract i s based 
on bargain and thus requires r e c i p r o c a l promises between the con= 
t r a c t i n g partieso The exceptions to t h i s requirement of mut u a l i t y 
are clearo I t i s submitted t h a t those s i t u a t i o n s where a person 
merely seeks to take a b e n e f i t under a contract sre not r e a l l y 
a p p l i c a t i o n s of the r u l e and the requirement of consideration has 
no a p p l i c a t i o n hereo Consideration only appliea to s i t u a t i o n s where 
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a person seeks to sue on a c o n t r a c t u a l promiseo Where the promise 
r e l a t e s to t o r t i o u s l i a b i l i t y a d i f f e r e n t issue i s i n question and 
mu t u a l i t y or consideration has no applicationo 
The second c r i t i c l s n i s t h a t even on the hypothesis t h a t both 
requirements are separate the requirement of p r i v i t y of contract 
was never a p a r t of English law and was introduced i n t o English law 
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by a m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the C E ^ o f Tweddle v Afekinaono F o E o 
Oowrick p o i n t s out; 
"But looking to the various reports of Twaddle v 
Atkinson i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t j according to 
fo u r versions of the judgments (Best & Smithy 
3uri8tp Law TimeSj UJeekly Reporters e l i t e r Law 
Journal) a l l the Judges^ Uightmsnp Crompton and 
Blackburn J o J o , based t h e i r judgements squarely 
on the p r i n c i p l e t h a t no action can be maintained 
on a promise by a stranger to the consideration 
and held t h a t even a son i s a stranger to considers^ 
t i o n provided by h i s fathero The court c l e a r l y 
r e l i e d on the o l d r u l e of Assumpsit th a t considera-
t i o n must feaove from the p l a i n t i f f o Again i t 
t r a n s p i r e s t h a t the p r i n c i p e l obstacle to t h i r d 
party r i g h t s d octrine i s not that the leading 
cases preclude the p o s s i b i l i t y of Jus quaesitym 
t e r t i o by way of contract„ but t h a t on the a u t h o r i t i e s 
even a t e r t i u s must provide consideration to acquire 
a c o n t r a c t u a l ri g h t o "1** 
I t i s submitted t h a t t h i s i s the correct i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Twaddle v 
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Atkinson snd t h a t support can be found i n the ol d cases on t h i S o 
Thus the only obstacle to t h i r d party r i g h t s i s the requirement 
of consideration and as already submitted t h i s requirement only 
applies where a person seeks to sue he must show consideration but 
need not do so where he merely seeks to take a b e n e f i t under the 
contracto 
UQLEMTI AMD THIRD PARTIES; 
I t has already been seen t h a t an exemption clause may play 
two r o l e s i n on action between c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s and t h a t i n the 
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second r o l e of defence to t o r t action the existence of contract 
between the p a r t i e s i s merely incidentals Thus v o l e n t i i s not a 
c o n t r a c t u a l term r e q u i r i n g considerationo Uolenti i n t h i s second 
r o l e has more a f f i n i t y to the doctrine of promissory estoppsl than 
the contSBctusl exemption clause from which i t may be inferredo 
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Thus Smith a Thomas Casebook on Contract states t h a t the defence 
of quasi-estoppelj (which i n essence i s t h a t i n Hughes v l^etropolitan 
R^ (1877) whereby one p a r t y , having intimated to the other t h a t 
he w i l l not i n s i s t upon h i s s t r i c t l e g a l r i g h t s under a contract, 
he cannot t h e r e a f t e r b r i n g an action against the other party f o r 
breach of contracts, i f t h a t other has acted upon the i n t i m a t i o n , 
u£]uld seem t o be i n essence an a p p l i c a t i o n i n the law of contract 
the defence of v o l e n t i non f i t i n j u r i a which i s l i S l l established i n 
the law of t o r t ; having agreed not to i n s i s t upon h i s r i g h t s , the 
p l a i n t i f f cannot complain i f they are not f o r t h comingo Both defences 
are very much similaro 
l o Promissory estoppel does not require consideration and 
t h e r e f o r e a c o n t r a c t , f o r the promise to be bindingo 
Promissory estoppel i s a s h i e l d and not a swordo V o l e n t i 
as seen above i s s i m i l a r , 
2. Both defences apply to s i t u a t i o n s where a person f r e e l y 
consents to l i m i t h i s s t r i c t l e g a l r i g h t S o 
Therefore i n action i n t o r t a r i s i n g out of contractual r e l a t i o n s i t 
i s possible f o r a party to the contract to plead v o l e n t i or promissory 
estoppel with equal successo The defence w i l l be "you promised me 
t h a t you w i l l not i n s i s t on your s t r i c t l e g a l r i g h t s , I acted on the 
strength of t h i s p r o m i s S o You were therefore volenSo I t would be 
i n e q u i t a b l e f o r you to go back on the consento" 
THIRD PARTY PARTICIPATIOI\l 
Quite o f t e n a contract a n t i c i p a t e s the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of a t h i r d 
p a r t y . For example i n a contract of carriage of goods ( o r persons) 
i t i s a n t i c i p a t e d by owners and c a r r i e r s that the servants of the 
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c a r r i e r s may p a r t i c i p a t e i n the performanceo The issue then i s 
where the contract purports to exempt the servants from c e r t a i n 
l i a b i l i t i e s can they r e l y on i t i n view of the f a c t that they had 
o f f e r e d no considerationo There i s no doubt t h a t by naming them 
they are p a r t i e s to the contract although strangers to the consi= 
derationo The ansuer to th i S p i t i s submitted, w i l l depend on 
nature and a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the defence of v o l e n t i non f i t i n j u r i a . 
I t has already been stated above th a t v o l e n t i a i s not the same as 
c o n t r a c t , and i t i s therefore submitted that the answer must be 
i n the a f f i r m a t i v e and i t i s t h a t the servants can re l y on the 
clausso The issue i s one of consent to be i n f e r r e d by the 
circumstanceSo 
The House of Lord's decision i n Elder Dempster v Paterson 
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Zochonis i s r e l i e d upon to support t h i s contentiono Under a B i l l 
of Lading the p l a i n t i f f s shipped a quantity of palm o i l i n casks 
f o r carriage from liJest A f r i c a to H u l l o The usual method adopted 
f o r t h i s was to have 'tween decks to r e l i e v e pressure from cargo 
on topo This was not done with the r e s u l t t h a t when extra cargo 
was received the pressure on the casks broke them causing a heavy 
loss of o i l o The cargo owners sued the ^ ip-owners i n tort„ 
The argument proceeded on two grounds: ° 
1 o Was the loss due to unseaworthiness or bad stowage? 
The B i l l s of Lading exempted l i a b i l i t y " f o r any damage 
( t o the goods shipped) a r i s i n g from other goods by bad 
stowage or contact with the gooda shipped hereunder,° 
2 o I f damage result e d from bad stowage, were the owners of 
the ship protected by the exemption clause? They were 
not p a r t i e s to the contract between the charterers and 
the owners of the gaods. 
Both a t f i r s t instance and i n the Court of Appeal (by majority 
decision) i t was held t h a t the damage resulted from unseaworthiness 
and t h e r e f o r e the defendants were l i a b l e . This was s u f f i c i e n t to 
dismiss the appealo 
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Scruttora LoJo dissented and held that the damage bma due to 
bad stowage. On t h i s f i n d i n g he proceeded to consider whether the 
ship-owners were e n t i t l e d to the p r o t e c t i o n of the b i l l s of lading. 
His l o r d s h i p was of the view t h a t the shipowners are to be regarded 
as being i n possession of the goods as the agent of the charterer 
with whom the goods owner made 0 contract d e f i n i n g h i s l i a b i l i t y . 
He stated t h a t the r e a l answer to the claim i a tha t the shipowner 
IJBS not i n possession as a b a i l e e , but as the agent of a person, 
t h a t i s the char t e r e r , with whom the owner of the goods had made a 
cont r a c t d e f i n i n g h i s l i a b i l i t y , and that the owner as servant or 
agent of the charterer can claim the same pr o t e c t i o n as the charterer. 
I n the House of Lords Scrutton L o J , decision t h a t damage resulted 
from bad stowage was aff i r m e d . They alao agreed that the ship-owners 
were e n t i t l e d to the p r o t e c t i o n i n the b i l l s of l a d i n g o This par t 
of the judgment was §0 compressed and as they d i d not a r r i v e at 
t h i s conclusion by the same reasoning the r a t i o of t h i s decision has 
been d i f f i c u l t to asce r t a i n . 
Lord Cave and Lord Finlay (who dissented on the f i n d i n g of the 
manner of damage) attached importance to the f a c t t h a t the b i l l s of 
la d i n g exempted the "ship-owners" from l i a b i l i t y f o r bad stowage. 
Under the terms of the b i l l s of lading r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r bad stowage 
was on the master and o f f i c e r a of the ship and to hold t h a t i t did not 
exempt these would be tantamount to declaring i t redundant. Lord 
Finl a y pointed t h a t the chart e r e r s p e c i f i c a l l y agreed th a t the ship-
owner would not be l i a b l e f o r bad stowage and stressed the point that 
the negligence of the shipowner was committed i n the course of rendering 
the very services provided f o r i n the con t r a c t u a l document^ namely, 
the b i l l s of la d i n g . Lord Summer w h i l s t being sympathetic to the 
theory t h a t the ship-owners must be taken t o be acting as agents 
f o r c o n t r a c t u a l d u t i e s ere also clearo D i f f i c u l t y houiaver e x i s t s 
with the common duty of careo The d i f f i c u l t y i s iiEhether the duty i s 
to be regarded as exc l u s i v e l y t o r t i o u s or contractual or i s i t 
possibly t o r t i o u s and contractual? The ansiiiar to t h i s question i s 
very important f o r d i f f e r e n t r u l e s apply to t o r t and contracto For 
example, i f the duty i s t o r t i o u s then negligence w i l l be the deter-
mining f a c t o r and such maxims as res ipse l o q u i t u r w i l l apply» On 
the other hand where the duty i s con t r a c t u a l the l i a b i l i t y i n contract 
being s t r i c t except i n so f a r as a duty to take care e x i s t s , rsegligence 
w i l l not be relevanto The determination of nature of the duty w i l l 
also be c r u c i a l isihere t h e duty of the master i s to maintain equipmento 
Despite the provis i o n s of Employer's L i a b i l i t y (Defective Equipment) 
Act, 1 9 6 9 , the common law duty of care s t i l l applies where the breach 
complained of r e l a t e s to the maintenance as opposed to supply of 
equipmento I t has already been pointed out tha t the damages recoverablg 
i n t o r t are generally wider than i n contracto The f o r e s e e a b i l i t y t e x t 
i n t o r t s t i l l admits c e r t a i n glosses of the directness t e s t S o g o the 
B g g = s h e l l s k u l l cases on personal i n j u r i e S o ^ I t would also seem t h a t 
i f the d u t y i s i n t o r t v i c a r i o u s l i a b i l i t y w i l l apply but t h i s i s not 
t h e case i f i t i s contractualo This i s i m p l i c i t i n t h e scope of 
l i a b i l i t y f o r independent .contractorso I n contract an obvious 
advantage i s t h e serving of w r i t out of j u r i s d i c t i o n under R o S „ C o D r d o 
I I r u l e 1 o 
MATURE OF DUTY OF CARE 
Three possible answers e x i s t as to the nature of the common duty 
of care: 
l o The duty i s i n t o r t 
I t h a d been generally assumed t h a t the employers d u t y of care 
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however p r e f e r r e d the view t h a t they were not l i a b l e because they 
took the goods upon an implied bailment on the terms of the b i l l s 
of l a d i n g , 
Whatever i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t may be given t o these judgments 
whatever the c o n f l i c t s t h a t may e x i a t between them, c e r t a i n p o i n t s 
are c l e a r . I n the f i r s t place, t h i s case l i s s not decided as f a l l i n g 
on one of the accepted exceptions to the r u l e of consideration. The 
pr o p o s i t i o n of agency does not f i t i n t o the general law of agency. 
Secondly, the concept of bailment r e l i e d upon by Lord Summer i s too 
wide f o r i t covers any s i t u a t i o n where a t h i r d person receives 
another's property without knowledge of the exemption clause. The 
fundamental issue decided by t h i s case was whether the shipowners 
who were not party t o the contract can take the be n e f i t intended f o r 
them i n the co n t r a c t . The House of Lords answered t h i s i n the 
a f f i r m a t i v e . This i s the r a t i o of the case and on analysis i s an 
a p p l i c a t i o n of the defence of v o l e n t i non f i t i n j u r i a . The shipowneips 
could not e s t a b l i s h a contract but they could use the contract to 
show t h a t the p l a i n t i f f consented to the r i s k which m a t e r i a l i s e d , 
Scrutton L o J , i n a l a t e r case Mersey Shipping £ Transport Co, 
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L t d , V Rea L t d , gave a very wide i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Elder Dempster"a 
casej tjjfert'Tio'jsaid . t h a t the reasoning of the Houae of Lords 
i n the Elder Dempster case shows t h a t where there i s a contract which 
i n e f f e c t means t h a t once an exemption clause has been found to e x i s t 
between the owner of goods and the c a r r i e r s any person who a i t s an 
behalf of the c a r r i e r ^ gets the p r o t e c t i o n of the exemption which 
containedfIn'feha cgntractg: :. the servants or agents who act under 
t h a t c o n t r a c t have the b e n e f i t of the exemption clause. They cannot 
be sued i n t o r t as independent people, but they can claim the pr o t e c t i o n 
of the con t r a c t made with t h e i r employers on whose behalf they are 
a c t i n g , " l t h i n k t h a t i s the r e s u l t of the second point i n the judgments 
3 i * 
of Lord Cave and Lord Summer with whom Lord Dunedin concurs i n 
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the Elder Dempster c a s B o " Thus i f the master i s immune the 
servant who performs the duty i s immune and i t would seen t h a t 
t h i s w i l l be so even whare the servant i s a volunteer who acts 
without any knowledge of the contract between the owner of the 
goods and the c a r r i e r s This i s v i c a r i o u s immunity and i t i s 
submitted i t i s too wide f o r i t has nothing to do with the 
consent o f the p l a i n t i f f o The thsory of v i c a r i o u s immunity 
was r e j e c t e d at f i r s t instance by Diplock Jo i n Midland Silicones 
20 21 Ltdo V Scrutton and by the House of Lorcteon appealo I t has 
been suggested t h a t i t i s possible t h a t ScrusSon L o J o did not con-
template such a wide a p p l i c a t i o n and i n h i s enthusiasm may have 
omitted h i s p r o p o s i t i o n i n complete languagBo I t i s arguable t h a t 
h i s Lordships p r o p o s i t i o n i s r e a d i l y i n t e l l i g i b l e i n the context 
i n which i t was o f f e r e d and, at l e a s t i n i t s simpler instances, i s , 
as one might expect e v i d e n t l y correcto For exsmpls, i f an owner 
of b a r r s l a agree t h a t they should be unloaded by being r o l l e d down 
an i n c l i n e and the Stevedores applied such a method, the owner 
cannot sue f o r damages caused by applying the very method spe c i f i e d , 
uihether or not t h i s i s dangerous i n the abstract or contrary to 
good stevedoring p r a c t i c B o I f t h i s i s correct then whatever 
metaphysical c o n s t r u c t i o n , i f any, i s to be used to j u s t i f y t h e 
conclusion - implied bailment upon terms, implied agency, t r a n s f e r r e d 
l i c e n c B or other l a r g e l y f i c t i t i o u s device on the l e v e l of p l a i n 
sense i t i s both exact and s u f f i c i e n t to use Scrutton L o J o ° s own 
words i o B o the stevedores "cannot be sued i n t o r t as independent 
people, but they can claim the p r o t e c t i o n of t h e contract made with 
t h e i r employers on whose behalf they are a c t i n g o " I f t h i s i s to 
be r e ^ a r d B d as amounting to v i c a r i o u s immunity t h a t i s j u s t too 
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and to such a sense there i s at least v i c a r i o u s immunityo 
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23 I n Adler v Dickson the issue urns argued again but t h i s time 
w i t h i n the scope of personal i n i j u r i e s . The p l a i n t i f f was a passenger 
i n a shipo The c©nts>act provided t h a t "passengers are c a r r i e d at 
passengers" e n t i r e r i s k and "the Company w i l l not be responsible 
f o r and s h a l l be exempt from a l l l i a b i l i t y i n respect of any ,,, i n j u r y 
liiatsoever ,,, whether the same s h a l l arise from or be occasioned 
by the negligence of the company"s servants i n the discharge of 
t h e i r d u t i e s , " 
The p l a i n t i f f was i n j u r e d by the negligence of the servants and 
sued the Captain and boatswain. They pleaded i n defence the 
exemption clause and r e l i e d upon Elder Dempsters^^ case. Both at 
f i r s t instance and i n the Court of Appeal i t was held t h a t the 
contract d i d not expressly or by necessary i m p l i c a t i o n deny the 
p l a i n t i f f of any r i g h t to sue the defendants. I t i s d i f f i c u l t 
to see how the decision can be otherwise f o r on the wordings of 
the exemption clause the shipowners were the only party exempt. 
The Court of Appeal went on to consider o b i t e r whether the defendants 
could have r e l i e d on the exemption clause i f i t purported to exempt 
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them. On t h i s p o i n t the decision i n Elder Dempster's case 
became re l e v a n t , 
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I t i s obvious t h a t some judgments i n Elder Dempster's case are 
i n a p p l i c a b l e . Thus Lord Summer's implied bailment theory i s inapplica= 
ble to c o n t r a c t of carriage of persons and the very phrase "bailment 
of person" i s so inelegant t h a t t h i s p oint i s not worth pursuing 
any f u r t h e r , 
Morris LoJ, p r e f e r r e d the agency theory, Where the company 
con t r a c t s as agents f o r i t s servants, the servants can claim immunity 
under the contract f o r t h e i r personal t o r t s . I t has already been 
objected t h a t t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n does not f i t with the general law of 
agency. Some reasons may now be givens I n the f i r s t place, no 
sontract esn be gpglled out bg-^usen the aervante fcfiio are the 
^ ' p r i n G i p a l Q " and the p l a i n t i f f s and how esn the eorspany s e t as agento 
isihgn naaraifestly m e o n t r a c t u i l r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t s betwaen the 
" p r i n c i p a l " and the p l i i i n t i f f o This ssiauld be becauee the " p r i n e i p a l i " 
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brauld have given i n s u f f i e i e n t considerationo 
Irs the seeond place, uhern the contract was made before the 
defendant i i i d e n t i f i e d , f o r e j t w p l e , A and B enter i n t o contrast 
p u r p o r t i n g to e^erapt X tsiho i s not i d e n t i f i e d a t the time af the 
Bontractp i t would be g t r e t c h i n g the e o n e e p t of ageney beyond i t s 
lisiaits 1^ 0 say t h a t B i t corotractiing a© X°s g g e n t o More i i i p o r t e n t 
i s t h a t you cannot have (sonsent i n vacuo and to t h i s e x t e n t a eon^ 
iasn©y@ @d idem i s required bettoeen the p r i n c i p a l snd the agent dio 
must both be i d e n t l f i a b l e o 
Jenkin L o J o uncomproraisingo He seid, t h a t even i f the 
clause had purported t o exclude the l i a b i l i t y of the CBfKp@!!niy''@ 
ssrvsnts they could not have oucceasfully pleaded the exclusion 
slauae i n t h e action againgt them f o r t h e i r t o r t i o u s conducto The 
2 8 
reason i a t h a t the ^ r v o n t s as-e not p a r t i e s to the c a n t r a c t o I t 
i s conceded th a t the exclusion c l Q u s e did not purport to exempt t h e 
s e r v a n t S o Presumably by " p a r t y to the coirotraGt' he a B e n t peE-eona 
g i v i n g consideration fej? i t i s d i f f i c u l t to be psrty withoiut being 
p r i v y t o the cont5?acto Consideration by t h e servants tms therefore 
e s s e n t i s l o Sych a requirement i s against p r i n c i p l e and i s a l i e n 
t o the IsM of t o r t under l i ^ i i c h a f t e r a l l the action bias b r o u g h t o 
I t has already been argued t h a t thi© i s a question of p r i v i t y and 
not congiderationo 
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I n Idintertaottora v idright i t was held t h a t a t h i r d party 
oannot sue EI pmty t o a osntraet i n contract f o r i n j u r y sustained 
as a r e s u l t of breach of eontract between the eontracting p a r t i e s o 
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Thia decision i s c o r r e c t but i t introduced some misconception t h a t 
because there i s p r i v i t y of contract between A and B, C cannot sue 
i n t o r t against A i f the f a c t discloses a breach of contract between 
A and a,^ *^  The argument smounta to thiss 
(1) A has committed a t o r t on C 
(2) A has broken a contract with B 
(3) C cannot sue A, 
This r e s u l t confuses two d i s t i n c t and consistent r u l e s . There i s 
no reason why the existence of a contract between A and B should 
determine the r e l a t i o n s h i p between A and C, To do so i s to impose 
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a c o n t r a c t on C, Donoghue v Stevenson i s i n p o i n t . 
To consider some h y p o t h e t i c a l s i t u a t i o n s ? -
1 o C i s an i n f a n t , B who i s C's f a t h e r contracts with 
A t o re p a i r C's car, A does i t n e g l i g e n t l y t h a t the 
brake f a i l s and C i s i n j u r e d . On Donoghue v 
Stevenson32 C can recover, 
2 o The p o s i t i o n i s the eame as above but C informs A 
to hurry the job and consents to run r i s k of a 
temporary r e p a i r and C i s i n j u r e d . 
The r e l a t i o n ^ i p between C and A i s the same as i n one and the 
consent w i l l apply to the t o r t a c t i o n . The contract between A and B 
cannot b e n e f i t i and there i s no reason why i t should hinder C, 
I n Adlers case Jenkin L,J, canvassed the idea on how the 
master i f he uere so minded can exempt the servant, Hs said t h a t ; 
"The answer i s simple. He should have seen th a t the 
con t r a c t uas so framed as to exempt h i s servant from 
l i a b i l i t y as w e l l as himself,«33 
Ce r t a i n l y the only way to do KJ i s by making the servant's party to 
the exempting clause without ftira g i v i n g any consideration. To 
require consideration w i l l s t r e t c h the doctrine beyond i t s l i m i t s 
because there cannot be s u f f i c i e n t consideration. 
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Holmes has stated i n "The Common Law", " i n many cases a 
promisee may inc u r a detriment without thereby f u r n i s h i n g 
considerstiono The detriment may be nothing but co n d i t i o n precedent 
t o performance of the promisso" This i s the r u l e with promissory 
estoppel and should apply to t h i r d party r i g h t S o V o l e n t i i s of 
the same a p p l i c a t i o n and ^ o u l d also applyo I f the p l a i n t i f f i n 
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Adlsr V Dickson had w r i t t e n t o the defendants accepting to run 
the r i s k of i n j u r y p v o l e n t i ttiauld have a p p l i e d o Why should i t then 
make any d i f f e r e n c e t h a t t h i s consent i s given i n a contract with 
a t h i r d p a rty except t h a t the contract produces a b e t t e r e v i d e n c e o 
To deny t h i s i s t o say tha t the more a person enshrines h i s consent 
i n l e g a l form the less he i s bound by it„ 
G l a s v i l l e Williams c o r r e c t l y states t h a t there may bs an 
e f f e c t i v e consent to the r i s k of negligence without consideration 
requirad f o r c o n t r a c t , ThB datermination of t h i s i a a question of 
f a c t to be i n f e r r e d from tha wordings of the c l a u s B o 
3S 
I n Hsdley Byrne v H e l l a r the p l a i n t i f f s action f a i l e d beeausQ 
of tha disclaimero There i a nothing to suggest that the outcome 
would have bean d i f f e r e n t i f the disclaimer was part af a contracto 
S i m i l a r l y i f the defandants had baan a t h i r d party advising con-
t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s Sogo a e a l i c i t o r or a r c h i t e c t the contract betwaen 
the p a r t i e s would not have made any diffeeencs to the t h i r d party 
l i a b i l i t y o r o t h e r w i s B c I n Adler's case Danning, LoJo was of the 
opinion t h a t b a s i c a l l y no d i s t i n c t i o n should be drawn between 
c o n t r a c t s o f carriage of goods and those f o r carriage of persono 
I f the Exemption clause included the defendant he should take the 
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b e n e f i t o I n support he c i t e d the case of H a l l v l\)oEo Railway COo 
I n t h i s ease a drover obtained a f r e e t i c k e t to take some sheep frora 
Scotland to England, The t i c k e t was issued by a S c o t t i s h company 
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the North B r i t i s h COo This free t i c k e t provided that the droves' 
" t r a v e l l e d at h i s own r i s k " o While on the l i n e of the North 
Eastern Railway he was i n j u r e d by t h e negligence of the servants 
of the English Company and brought an action against t h e Company, 
Blackburn, J, held t h a t the action must f a i l . The drover 
"must be taken to have assented t h a t the t i c k e t should p r o t e s t 
the North Eastern Company j u s t as much as the Nosth B r i t i s h , 0 0 0 0 " 
The only possible explanation to t h i s statement i s t h a t the p l a i n t i f f 
consented to the r i s k t h a t may fl o w from the t h i r d party operation 
and t h i s i s consistent with the view advanced above. Adherents to 
the contrary view may argue t h a t no contract existed between the 
p l a i n t i f f and the f i r s t Company i o S , Scottish Railway Company, 
Therefore the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between the p l a i n t i f f end both companiGS 
must be one i n t o r t and t h a t such a decision i s i n e v i t a b l e and 
l o g i c a l o The answer i s t h a t , even admitting t h a t no conts-actual 
r e l a t i o n s h i p existed the p e r t i n e n t question i s why s h o u l d the 
existence of a contract with a t h i r d party make a l l the difference? 
To quote Stephenson, J, i n Buckpitt v Dates " I t i s a question of 
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f a c t and not of law whether he has assented," 
The decision o f the House o f Lords i n Scrutton v Midland 
38 
S i l i c o n e s may seem to oppose the conclusion reachado i n g contract 
between the p l a i n t i f f s and the shipowners s,**(5) of the United States 
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1936 was incorporated. This l i m i t e d 
the l i a b i l i t y of the " c a r r i e r s " f o r loss or damage to the goods, to 
500 d o l l a r s . The b i l l provided that "carries?" included the s h i p , 0 0 0 0 
her owner, operator and demise charterer, and also any person to the 
b i l l of lading and provided t h a t the terra " c a r r i e r " included the 
owner or charterer who entered i n t o a contract of carriage with the 
s h i p p e r o The shipowners f o r some years employed the defendant 
stevedores to discharge t h e i r vessels i n the port of London, The 
con t r a c t hetween them provided t h a t the defendants should have 
"such p r o t e c t i o n as i s afforded by the terms o o o , of the b i l l s of 
l a d i n g " . The p l a i n t i f f d i d not know of t h i a contracto The 
defendants damaged the p l a i n t i f f ' s goods, and they brought on actloa. 
The defendants sought to r e l y on the clause l i m i t i n g l i a b i l i t y to 
500 dollarso 
Twa issues were involved i n the judgment; 
(1) Were the defendants " c a r r i e r s " under the b i l l s 
of lading? 
(2) I f the answer to the f i r s t i s i n the a f f i r i D a t i v e , 
were the defendants e n t i t l e d to seek the protec-
t i o n o f the l i m i t i n g clause? 
They unanimously answered the f i r s t question i n the negative. 
Their Lordships however considered the second questiono Uiscount 
Simmonds c i t e d the "fundamental" p r i n c i p l e stated by Viscount 
Haldane L o C o i n Dunlop Pneutaatic Tyre Co,, Lt d , v Self ridge & Co, 
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Ltd, and concluded t h a t t h i s i s s e t t l e d law which only 
Parliament can change. He stated that the question whether 
there i s to be extracted from Elder Dempster's ease a p a r t i c u l a r 
exception to the fundamental r u l e i n favour of a l l persons 
i n c l u d i n g stevedores and presumably other independent contractors 
must c l e a r l y , be answered i n the negative. His Lordship howaver 
agreed with the Elder Dempster case^Q "that the shipowner, when 
he receives the goods i n t o h i s possession, receives them on 
the terms of the b i l l of l a d i n g " . With due respect there i s 
some s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t i o n here. To require the so-called 
"fundamental" p r i n c i p l e where a t h i r d party seeks to take a 
b e n e f i t under a contract and to admit t h a t the exemption clause 
i>1 
a p plies u i t h o u t conts-act betuiaen cargo ouirses's and the ship 
owners i s spt to confuse the issuBo Lord Denning dissented 
fronj t h i s judgmento He rsfused to accept the proposition 
t h a t Elder Dempster"a^^ case laas an instance uihen Homer f o r 
once nodded and the House of Lord's oysrlooked the "fundamental 
p r i n c i p l e ^ o This p r i n c i p l e uias a discovery of the nineteenth 
century uihich Lord Mansfield and B u l l e r J o knew nothing ofo 
I t was austained because i n the i g t h century an independent 
law of negligence was not evolved and accordingly uitiare a duty 
of care arose by my of contract no ..one cars sue or be sued i f 
he i s a strangero He c i t e d Uinterbotton) v Uright^"^ and 
Alton V Midland R a i j y £ p x J £ i ° p r e s e n t case ujsrQ 
brought thenj, he aaidp the p l a i n t i f f uiauld be required to ahou 
a sp e c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p c r e a t i n g a duty of carBo As none ijjauld 
e x i s t the defendant umuld not be l i a b l e at s i l o I f the p l a i n t i f f 
can show a r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t i n g by other means Sog defendant 
i n v i t i n g him to defendant's premises then he may sue i n t o r t o 
•PThe through t r a n s i t " cases developed on t h i s l i n e of reasoniRgo 
Thus the defendant uiho escaped l i a b i l i t y because no r e l a t i o n ^ 
ship e x i s t e d between him and the p l a i n t i f f was noiu l i a b l e f o r 
some r e l a t i o n s h i p uihich the court r e a d i l y ^ e l t outo But the 
courts s t i l l l e f t the defendant with the power to exempt himself 
and the courts did nothing to t h i s powero The r e s u l t was tha t 
i f goods ware c a r r i e d e n t i r e l y at "owners r i s k " the t h i r d party 
may escape l i a b i l i t y o This ues not by uay of contract as none 
conceivably existed between the t h i r d party and the p l a i n t i f f o 
He concluded t h a t the means of escaping l i e b i l i t v " i s that the 
second ceffs-iey f a l l o w i t h i n Scrutton LoJ^'s ps-opositionp being 
m "sgenf^j, t h a t i S j a subcontsaetoE' employed to eap?y out the 
c o n t r a c t of f i r s t c o r s i e ^ j and m e n t i t l e d to the b e n e f i t of the 
conditionso" As submitted above t h i s theory of v i c a r i o u s immunity 
i a too wide and too much reliance on i t may have to m extent 
c o n t r i b u t e d to the f a i l u r e of defendants i n subsequent casesc 
I t i o submitted t h a t h i s second l i n e of reasoning i s more 
consistent with the contention advocated. He said "even though 
negligence i s an independent t o r t ^ nevertheless i t i s en accepted 
p r i n c i p l e of the law of t o r t t h a t no man can complain of i n j u r y 
i f he has v o l u n t a r i l y conaented to take the r i s k of i t on himselfo 
The consent need not be embodied i n contracto Nor does i t need 
consideration to support i t , " 
I t i© r e g r e t t a b l y admitted t h a t f o r the time being the scale 
i a h e a v i l y t i l t e d against the defendant. This i g d i f f i c u l t to 
j u s t i f y on p r i n c i p l e . Policy considerations are also d i f f i c u l t 
to j u s t i f y . For B«©npleB i t i s said t h a t as between an innocent 
pa r t y and a careless one, the party at f a u l t should bear the loss. 
This i a persuaiiiwe p r i n c i p l e by i t s f o r c e , but only go i f the 
defendant can bear the burden. I t i s observed that the law of 
t o r t i s assuming a d i f f e r e n t r o l e , Coapensation of a v i c t i m i s 
besoming more prominent with the e f f e c t t h a t p r i n c i p l e i a becoming 
secondary to p o l i c y . Thus more and morEj, the r u l e i a becoming, 
who can best bear the loss or who can d i s t r i b u t e the 
loss more evenly? This trend hoksver does not compel the 
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answer t h a t the courts have provided. The obvious reason being t h a t 
normally the p l a i n t i f f i s b e t t e r equipped to take out the necessary 
insurancBo He hsB the knawladge of the r i s k i n case of gsodi. 
The Law Reform (Contributory Wegligence) Act 19^ 45 has also 
c o n t r i b u t e d to the reluctance of the courts to i n f e r consent, 
A c o u r t w i l l more l i k e l y apportion the loss then put a t o t a l ban on 
recovery. Thus i n the American case of Texas Tunneling v City of 
Chatanooga^^ the defendants were consultant engineers under a contract 
with the C i t y of Chatanooga, The defendants as part of the per= 
formance of t h e i r contract produced a geological report tiihich was 
d i s t r i b u t e d to prospective bidders f o r the construction of a sewage 
syetemo This rep o r t omitted p e r t i n e n t geological information. The 
p l a i n t i f f c a tunneling subcontractor, had no dealings with the defendant? 
but d i d r e l y on t h e i r report i n making h i s b i d . I t took p l a i n t i f f 
three weeks longer to complete the work then had been a n t i c i p a t e d 
and he sued the defendant f o r the loss suffered. The defendant sought 
to escape l i a b i l i t y by pleading the disclaimer which provided t h a t , 
" t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n i a furnished f o r the convenience of bidders and i e 
not a p a r t of c o n t r a c t . This Information i s not guaranteed and any 
bids submitted must be based on the bidders own i n v e s t i g a t i o n and 
determination," I t was shown t h a t i t was customary to r e l y on such 
survey and Wilson, J, held t h a t : "the disclaimer uauld not operate 
to e l i m i n a t e a duty of due care as between the defendants and the 
p l a i n t i f f , but r a t h e r would go to the issue as to whether the 
p l a i n t i f f himself exercised due care i n r e l y i n g upon the drawing and 
the disclaimer w i l l be considered f u r t h e r with regard to the issue of 
k5 
c o n t r i b u t o r y negligence,^ 
I n S n e l l i n g v S n e l l i n q L t d , the p l a i n t i f f and h i s two brothers 
the second defendants ware co=directors of John S n e l l i n g L t d , , the 
f i r s t defendantSo The company was i n d i f f i c u l t i e s and e f f o r t s were 
made to rai s e a loaOo At t h i s time dissension developed between 
the p l a i n t i f f and the two brotherSo To raise the money they covenanted 
wi t h the mortgagees of the company t h a t so long es any p a r t of the 
loan advanced to the eompany was unpaid they would not reduce t h e i r 
respective loans to the company below the amount shown i n the accounts 
of the company on March 31, igSSo The p l a i n t i f f s loan to the 
company at tha t date uas I n another agreement the brother© 
agreed betwsen themselves t h a t " i n the event of any d i r e c t o r v o l u n t a r i l y 
r e s i g n i n g or u i t h o u t reasonable cause neglecting h i s duty he wnuld 
immediately f o r i f s l i a l l moneys due to him from an^ of the companies 
by way of loan account "or sim^^laro" 
I t was also provided t h a t on such an event the remaining d i r e c t o r s 
might use the moneys " i n furtherance of the i n t e n t i o n ooo but not 
i n such a way as to b e n e f i t themselves personallyo" 
The p l a i n t i f f subsequently resigned and sued the company 
claiming payment of £ 1 S p 2 6 8 as due to him at the date of h i s 
r e s i g n a t i o n o To quote the t r i a l judge„ "the r e s u l t i n g s i t u a t i o n 
i s at once simple and complexo To the layman the p o s i t i o n i s tha t 
the p l a i n t i f f having agreed to f o r f e i t h i s loan account i o B o to 
forego the debt due to him by the companyp i f he resigned o o ^ i s 
now suing the company to obtain payment of the debt which he had 
agreed to foregoo" To the lawyerg however the d i f f i c u l t i e s are 
formidable f o r i f the agreement between the brothers i s capable 
of enforcement at law can the company " f o r whose benefit i t UHS made 
r e l y upon i t o " The p l a i n t i f f claimed t h a t the company cannot r e l y 
upon the agreement and c i t e d Midland Silicones v Scrutton Ltd,^*^ 
i n supporto The defendants argued i n reply t h a t some of the broad 
statements of p r i n c i p l e i n t h a t case went too f a r and r e l i e d upon the 
l a t e r case of Beswick v Beswick Omrods, J o distinguished the two 
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esses s t a t i n g t h a t the c r i t i c a l d i f f e rence between them i s the status 
of the person seeking to enforce the promisee Thus i s he a promisee 
i n a contract or i a he a beneficiary? I n Beswick v 3eswiek where 
the action succeeded the p l a i n t i f f was acting as a promisee and the 
f a c t t h a t she ma the benef i c i a r y was merely incidentalo I n Midland 
S i l i c o n e s case the party seeking to enforce the promise was merely 
doing so as a b e n e f i c i a r y . I n e f f e c t a contract i s e s s e n t i a l . 
Nevertheless h i s Lordship was of the opinion t h a t the action against 
the company must f a i l , 
1o To give judgnent f o r the p l a i n t i f f against the defendant company 
f o r the Enount claimed i n the statement of cla^m and judgment f o r 
the second and t h i r d defendants ( i , e , the p a r t i e s to the contract) 
on the counterclaim would be absurd. Such a soluti o n though e f f e c t i v e 
would however acknowledge a r u l e against t h i r d party r i g h t s and 
uould favour the wide i n t e r p r e t a t i o n given to i^lidland S i l i cones case^^ 
2, To enter a speculation, i f the contract had been stated i n 
p o s i t i v e terms on the a u t h o r i t y of Beswick's case^^ p a c i f i c performance 
would have been ordered. This s t i l l leaves a f u r t h e r speculation 
and t h a t i s , at whose instance would i t be ordered? I f i t i s at 
the instance of the promisee no d i s t i n c t i o n may be made between t h i s 
case and Beswick's case^^ and the broad i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Midland 
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S i l i c o n e s case applies. 
I f on the other hand i t i s at the instance of the benefidiiary 
the requirement of existence of a contract f o r t h i r d party reliance 
i s not e s s e n t i a l . The only requirement presumably i s t h a t there i s 
an enforceable promise against the promisor. P r i v i t y and not con-
s i d e r a t i o n w i l l be the requirement, 
3, A t h i r d s o l u t i o n was the inherent j u r i s d i c t i o n of the court to 
p r o t e c t i t s process from abuse. Had the second and t h i r d defendants 
taken ac t i o n to prevent the a n t i c i p a t e d breach they would have been 
e n t i t l e d t o an i n j u n c t i o n r e s t r a i n i n g the p l a i n t i f f from demanding 
payment by the company of h i s loan accounto "Had he subsequently 
s t a r t e d en action against the company i t uould presumably have beein 
as an abuse of the process of the courto" By combining the f i r s t 
and t h i r d s i t u a t i o n s the court held against the p l a i n t i f f o 
One p o i n t emerges then and i t i s tha t to a c e r t a i n extent 
at l e a s t where there i s an enforceable promise between the promisor 
and the promisee the promisor cannot break the promise by suing 
a b e n e f i c i a r y named i n the promisBo This w i l l be the case where 
a l l the p a r t i e s are i n the court as i n the pressnt case or the 
promisee i s w i l l i n g to enforce the promisBo On t h i s analysis 
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Midland S i l i c o n e s case was therefore c o r r e c t l y decidedo I n tha t 
case i t w i l l be r e c a l l e d the promise was not given by the p l a i n t i f f o 
I n f a c t he knew nothing of the promisB„ I t i s therefore d i f f i c u l t 
to see any binding promisBo I t i s therefore submitted t h a t t r u s t 
and agency are not the only means u^iereby a t h i r d party can r e l y 
on promisBo A t h i r d party can r e l y on a promise where the promisee 
i s w i l l i n g to enforce the promisSo A d i f f i c u l t y however arises 
where the promisee i s o n w i l l i n g to enforce the promisBo I t i s 
submitted t h a t t h i s should not make any difference and t h a t the 
important requirement should be tsJiether the promise i s enforceable 
against the promisaro^ There seems no reason why a promise should 
be made binding or not binding depending on the presence i n court 
or otherwise of the promiseeo I t i s f u r t h e r submitted t h a t where 
the promise i s given i n a c o n t r a c t j i t should make no dif f e r e n c e 
except t h a t the contract i s the best evidence of the promisBo 
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I n West Yorkshire Darracq Agency Ltdo v Colleridge s l l the 
d i r e c t o r s of company i n l i q u i d a t i o n agreed to forego t h e i r claims 
to outstanding d i r e c t o r s feeso The l i q u i d a t o r was a party to the 
o r a l agreemento Horridge, Jo held that the company can r e l y upon 
the agreement i n an action by one of the d i r e c t o r s f o r h i s feeSo 
His reasoning was t h a t the company through the l i q u i d a t o r wss a 
p a r t y to the agreement although i t had given no consideration to 
the p l a i n t i f f . There i s nothing esoteric between t h i s reliance on 
the consent of the promisor and the defence of v o l e n t i nan f i t i n j u r i a . 
The d e f i n i t i o n and c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of such fundamental terms as r i g h t 
and duty depend upon r e s u l t s reached and not upon the f o r m a l i t i e s 
of procedure used i n a s s e r t i n g them. The problem i s whether a 
t h i r d party can take a b e n e f i t , Whenever he succeeds i n doing so 
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h i s r i g h t i s recognised and enforced. In Onelling v S n e l l i n g the 
common law recognised such r i g h t . 
The Privy Council has faced t h i s problem i n the f\!eu Zealand 
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case of l\i,Zo Shipping Co, v Sattenthwaite L t d , and while the 
r e s u l t i s welcome i t i s re g r e t t e d t h a t the court adopted a 
c i r c u i t o u s - reasoning to a r r i v e at the majority decision. The f a c t s 
of the case are:= 
An expensive d r i l l i n g machine was transported from Liverpool 
to Wellington, The b i l l of lading uas issued by the c a r r i e r and 
clause 1 on which the case turns provided i n t e r a l i a t h a t : 
" I t i s hereby expressly agreed th a t no servant 
or agent of the c a r r i e r ( i n c l u d i n g every independent 
c o n t r a c t o r from time to time employed by the c a r r i e r ) 
s h a l l i n any circumstances whatsoever be under any 
l i a b i l i t y whatsoever to the shipper, consignee or owner 
of the goods or to any holder of t h i s b i l l of lading 
f o r any loss or damage or delay of whatsoever k i n d , " 
I t f u r t h e r provided t h a t : 
" o o o the c a r r i e r i s or s h a l l be deemed to be acting 
as agent or tr u s t e e on behalf of and f o r the b e n e f i t 
of a l l persona who are or might be h i s servants," 
The question before the court was whether the stevedores can 
take the b e n e f i t of the l i m i t i n g clause. Lord U i l b e r f o r c e who 
d e l i v e r e d the m a j o r i t y decision r e f e r r e d to Midland Silicones case 
as the s t a r t i n g p oint i n the d i s c u s s i o n of t h i s question. That 
case cannot be questioned i n so f a r i t a f f i r m s the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t 
ka 
a t h i r d party cannot sue on a contract between two p a r t i e s . This 
p r o p o s i t i o n however d i d not a f f e c t the s i t u a t i o n where one of the 
p a r t i e s was c o n t r a c t i n g as agent f o r the t h i r d partyo Lord Reid's 
judgment i n Midland S i l i c o n e s case^^ usjuld be relevant i n such 
situatiORo The learned Lord had epelt out i n four propoaitionss 
the p r e r e q u i s i t e s of the v a l i d i t y of such agency contract;= 
1 o The b i l l of lading makes i t c l e a r that the stevedore i s 
intended to be protected by the l i m i t i n g clause, 
2 o The b i l l ma&es i t c l e a r t h a t the c a r r i e r while c o n t r a c t i n g 
on h i s own behalf i s also contaacting as agent f o r the stevedorBo 
3 o That the c a r r i e r has a u t h o r i t y by the stevedore to contract 
f o r him or the stevedore r a t i f i e d the contract, 
i^„ That any d i f f i c u l t i e a of consideration i s overcomBo 
I n the present case there i s no doubt t h a t the f i r s t three 
requirements ware f u l f i l l e d . The d i f f i c u l t y was whether there 
was consideration moving from the stevedore to the consignee. The 
m a j o r i t y decision evoked the idea of commercial r e a l i t y of ths 
t r a n s a c t i o n and hsld t h a t there was consideration and therefore 
the stevedorB could taks tha b a n e f i t of the l i m i t i n g clausBo 
I t i s r e g r e t t e d t h a t the m a j o r i t y had to resort to the f o u r t h 
p r o p o s i t i o n i n order to a r r i v e at t h e i r decision. The r e s u l t i s 
t h a t there must e x i s t a contract before the stevedores can r e l y on 
the l i m i t i n g clause. Their Lordship did not consider whether Lord 
Reid's f i r s t , t h r e e p r o p o s i t i o n s ware s u f f i c i e n t f o r a consent i n 
t o r t and p r e f e r r e d "to express no opinion upon t h i s argument: to 
evaluate i t requires elaborate discussion," This i s regretted f o r 
i t must be confessed t h a t t h e i r Lordship i n t h e i r enthusiasm f o r 
the f o u r t h p r o p o s i t i o n may have stretched the doctrine of consideratiosi 
to a breaking p o i n t . To t h e i r lordships "the b i l l of lading brought 
i n t o existence a bargain i n i t i a l l y u n i l a t e r a l but capable of 
becoming mutual between the shipper and the appellant„ made through 
the c a r r i e r as agent , 0 0 , 0 the performance of these services f o r 
the b e b e f i t of the shipper uss the consideration f o r the agreement 
by the shipper t h a t the appellant should have the b e n a f i t of the 
exemptions and l i m i t a t i o n s contained i n the b i l l of l a d i n g " . 
I t i s submitted t h a t t h i s approach creatss much conceptual 
d i f f i c u l t y between executory and executed type of consideration 
c o n t r a c t s . I t s r e s u l t i s t h a t the sama terms may give r i s e to 
executory or executed consideration depending on the pa r t y . 
There i s no doubt t h a t the contract betwean the c a r r i e r and tfje 
consignee i s executory and therefore bS-ateralo I t i s d i f f i c u l t 
t o accept t h a t the same terms have given r i s s to a u n i l a t e r a l 
o f f e r to the stevedores. This product i s l i t e r a l and not 
substantive and as Lord Simon of Glaisdale stated i n h i s 
di s s e n t i n g judgement "would seam to provide a revolutionary short 
cut to a j u s quassitum t e r t i o < , " The general formulation of 
u n i l a t e r a l o f f e r s i s t h a t performance should be i n responas to 
an o f f e r but ths analysis adopted i n t h i s case i s that of a 
promise i n return f o r an acto Although t h i s may appear to be 
the same p r i n c i p l e i t i s submitted that the l a t e r analysis i s tKore 
of b i l a t e r a l c o ntracts than u n i l a t e r a l . These apart the ma j o r i t y 
glossed the issue of s u f f i c i e n c y of consideration and approved 
Scotson V Pegg^^ as good law without f u r t h e r discussion on i t , 
yiscount Dilhome i n h i s d i s s e n t i n g judgment depreciated 
the attempt to give the Elder Dempster case^^ a wider i n t e r p r e t a -
t i o n than i t was supposed to have and approved F'ullagar J, 
judgement i n y i l s o n v D a r l i n g Island Stevedoring a Lighterage Co 
Ltd 
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With respect Fullager J, confused two issues i n tha t judgements= 
( 1 ) the question of consent; 
( i i ) the contra proferentem r u l e . 
He had assumed erroneou&ly t h a t the a p p l i c a t i o n of the contra 
proferentem r u l e was such t h a t i t can be equated to the ru l e of 
law t h a t the promisee must show consideration. This i n e f f e c t 
made the ru l e a r u l e of law and not one of construction based on 
p u b l i c p o l i c y . 
Thus Fullager J, r e f e r r e d to Peek v l\iorth S t a f f o r d s h i r e Ry Co,^^ 
and said t h a t the court held " t h a t a co n d i t i o n r e l i e v i n g a 
c a r r i e r from a l l l i a b i l i t y f o r the neglect or de f a u l t of h i s 
servants urns n e i t h e r j u s t nor reasonable w i t h i n the meaning of a 
s t a t u t e , " 
Such consideration i s based on p o l i c y and i t should be borne 
i n mind t h a t the same p o l i c y allows f u l l i y grouDi adults to make 
what arrangements they would to govern t h e i r r e l a t i o n e h i p . Thus 
the contra proferentem r u l e cannot be used to re=write a contract 
between partieso I t i s therefore submitted t h a t Fullager 3 , 
judgement does not a f f e c t the proposition t h a t a t h i r d party may 
plead a l i m i t i n g clause by l i ^ y of v o l e n t i non f i t i n j u r i a i n a 
t o r t a c t i o n . 
Section k^ of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) 
Act, mb — — —-
Most judges w i l l no doubt continue to f o l l o w the ol d fashioned 
p r i n c i p l e and require consideration i n a l l instances. Few on 
the other hand w i l l from time to time appeal to the older 
p r i n c i p l e and seek to abolish t h i s requirement of co n t r a c t . 
Probably, h o p e f u l l y , some middle ground w i l l be found. Such i n q u i r y 
ensued i n the case of Gore v l/an der Lann^^ where the above section 
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isffls discussed. The section forbade the old p r a c t i c e of r e s t r a i n t of 
a c t i o n by p r o h i b i t i o n and injunction„ subject to the proviso that 
any i n t e r s a t e d person may by summary motion apply to the High Court 
f o r stay of proceedings i n an a c t i o n . Section 103 of the County 
Courts Act, 1959 extends t h i s p r o v i sion to the County Courts, 
I n the e a r l i e r c^se of Cosgrove v Horsfall^Q an smployee was 
issued a pass to t r a v e l on the employers omnibus. The ^ass wag 
subject to the c o n d i t i o n t h a t n e i t h e r the employers nor t h e i r 
servants w i l l be l i a b l e to the holder of tha pass f o r , i n t e r a l i a , 
personal i n j u r y , however caused. The p l a i n t i f f uss i n j u r e d by 
the negligence of another servant uiio was d r i v i n g the omnibus. 
The p l a i n t i f f sued the servanto 
The Court of Appeal held t h a t the action must succeedo The 
defendant was not a party to the licencB or contract and had no 
r i g h t undsr themo Du Parcq L o J o i n h i s judgsment stated; " I w i l l 
express no opinion on the question which counsel f o r the defendant 
t o l d us he had considersd, whether the board could have applied 
successfully to stay the present action under S, of the Supreme 
Court of Judicature (Conaolidation) Act, 1925, lile are not now 
concerned with the r i g h t s of the board, but i t must not be 
assumed t h a t i f the p l a i n t i f f caused them to s u f f e r loss by 
breach of the c o n d i t i o n , they were without remedy and are now 
necessarily without redresSo I doubt, howsvar, whsther the 
board are i n any way a f f e c t e d by what the p l a i n t i f f has chosen 
to do,"^'' 
I n Gore v l/an der Lann^^ t h i s remark was taken up by the 
L i v e r p o o l Corporation i n t e r v e n i n g i n an action against t h e i r 
employBBo The p l a i n t i f f Mrs, Margaret Gore applied and was issued 
a f r e e pass by the L i v e i p o o l Corporation, The a p p l i c a t i o n form 
contained as f o l l o w s ; 
52 
" I n consideration of my being granted a free pass f o r use on the 
buses of L i v e r p o o l Corporation, I undertake and agree that the use 
of such pass by me s h a l l be subject to the conditions overleaf, 
u^iich have been read to or by me p r i o r to signing," The conditions 
overleaf provided t h a t n e i t h e r the Corporation nor any of i t s 
servants s h a l l be l i a b l e to the holder f o r i n t e r a l i a , loss of l i f S j , 
i n j u r y however caused. The pass included a s i m i l a r p r o v i s i o n . 
While the p l a i n t i f f was boarSing the Corporation bus, i t 
moved, causing her to f a l l and being dragged along the ground. 
She no doubt sustained i n j u r y and sued the bus Conductor a l l e g i n g 
negligence by him i n r i n g i n g the b e l l and causing the bus to 
move while she uas i n the act of boarding. The defendant denied 
negligence end r e l i e d i n the a l t e r n a t i v e on the conditions subject 
to which the p l a i n t i f f had received her free pass. The Corporation 
now intervened and applied f o r a stay of proceeding under S o klo 
This was refused by the Registrar at Liverpool County Court and 
t h e i r appeal against the r e f u s a l uas dismissed by h i s Honour 
Judge Stansfied, The Corporation appealed to the Court of Appeal, 
The Court of Appeal was unanimous i n holding t h a t the 
appeal must f a i l , Harman, L,J, was of the opinion t h a t the 
Corporation had no i n t e r e s t which e n t i t l e d them to r e l i e f under 
Section k'io They were not obliged to pay the damages awarded to 
the p l a i n t i f f and t h e r e f o r e no fraud was committed by the 
p l a i n t i f f ' s aGtion, 
Salmon, L,J° was of the same view. Had there been a 
contract with the p l a i n t i f f the Corporation could have stayed 
the proceedings. This i s mere speculation f o r the contract 
would have been v o i d , ^ ^ The f a c t however remains th a t at least to 
them wherever the promise between the p l a i n t i f f and the promisee 
i s binding i t i s capable of c o n f e r r i n g a b e n e f i t on t h i r d p arty. 
I n the present case i t would have done so by means of Section 'il. 
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Uilmer L , J o held t h a t on the true construction of the 
documsnt the p l a i n t i f f had not undertaken not to sue the employee. 
Thus a l l the judges i n the Court of Appeal ware of the view t h a t 
the p l a i n t i f f s a c t i o n would have f a i l e d i f there was a binding 
agreement. 
I n the e a r l i e r case of Genys v Mathew^^ the presiding Judge 
i n L i v e r p o o l Court of Passage adopted the Court of Appsal dacision 
t t l i l k i e V L o P o T o B o ^ S ^^-^^ ^ ^ ^ ^ pggg create 
a c o n t r a c t but a mere l i c e n c e . I t issa held t h a t although the 
Corporation was protected by the licenca, tha dafendant was not 
a p a r t y t o i t and there f o r e could not take any b e n e f i t under i t . 
There i s no a u t h o r i t y as t o whethar a atrangsr to a licence can 
enforce any of the terms of the licsnca or whathsr a stay can be 
granted i n an action a r i a i n g out of a licence, 
With due respect t h i s decision i s unfortunate. I t has been 
shown supra t h a t the r e l a t i o n s h i p must necessarily be t o r t i o u s . 
I t i s d i f f i c u l t to see how consent given i n a s i t u a t i o n a n t i r e l y 
dependent on t o r t can be made to depend on the r u l e s of contract. 
I t cannot be argued against t h i s contention by s t a t i n g t h a t 
the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the l i c e n s o r and the licensee i s a 
personal and therefore cannot admit a t h i r d partyo I n reply 
i t may be said t h a t the f a c t s t i l l remains that the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
bBtwean the t h i r d p a rty and the promisor can always be i n t o r t 
and nothing elsSo The promisor's action must be one i n t o r t . 
To take an example from the French system, an action that can be 
framed i n t o r t or i n contract must be framed i n c o n t r a c t , Where the 
cause of action does not evidence contract then the action must of 




Osmages may be defined as the monetary earapengation given 
f o r loss or haw which the law sjeGgignisea, This d e f i n i t i s n implies 
m SBSBntlml poirat iwhiish In nany regpects i s overlQoksdo I t i s 
t h a t the ewsrd of dsraages i i i p l i e g the existence of l i a b i l i t y f o r a 
8y5?0inig itthiBh the lais) reeogniseso Therefore i f i n t o r t this p l e i n t i f f 
can recover f o r a heed of damages but cannot do m in contract then 
the inference i s t h a t the l i a b i l i t y i n t o r t i s liiidBr than i n contract 
i n t h a t sespeet, 
aes i n Tort snd Contraet 
The general coneersn of the law of t o r t i i to give ssdress to 
the p l a i n t i f f f o r dsmege caused by the defendant not leaving him 
slone. Although the Gaapgnsatien i s calculated i n raonetasv terms 
the law of t o r t i s generally d i s i n c l i n e d t o eompensate f o r mere 
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economic losa. Tort i s concerned with a c t u a l physical daiaage eithej? 
to persora or to propertyo T r e ^ a a s , nyisancii or the r u l e i n Rylands y 
Fletcher eonfirHi) t h i a m l B o Even w i t h i n the t o r t of negligenee the 
Goncept of f o r e s i g h t i s demongtrably l i o i t e d t o p r o t e c t i n g a e t u s l 
p h y s i c a l damage than raere eosniOBiiiG loaso The reason i a g i n e r ^ l l y 
one ef p o l i e y . 
The laiaj of contract on the ether hand i g concerned with msnetur^ 
loaso Agtions f o r p h y s i c s l daraagB are rare and dEinagea are esldora 
given f o r i n j u r y t o reputation even where the loss i s pecuniary 
and where they have bean allotaisd f o r exanple, the wrongful dimissal 
of an aetor f a i l u r e t o advertise properly f o r the p l a i n t i f f s 
buaineaa,^ the loss has been one t h a t was p a r t i c u l a r l y contemplated 
by the c o n t r a c t , Thia 'eontempletion" has e se l f - e v i d e n t i m p l i c a t i o n 
itihen soBipared with f o r e s i g h t i n t o r t f o r i t shobs t h a t the nsle t h a t 
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the defenden^ rays'fe tak® ths pl0lr3i!;iff ss he f i n d s hira ha® raase 
yelevariieig t o •Sort "fehsini to eontract and IShis in^s^olwes a tsAder 
l i s b i l i t y in tawt thami eoiritg'Beto 
I t may now bg asCied to what extent i f any do damages d i f f e r . 
i n t o r t an£3 eoFstrsct i n my given set of faets? Generally there 
i s no l i m i t i n g f a e t o r pseulias' t o e i t h e r law on sasessing cQtspenaatory 
d ^ a g e S o The gulgs r e l a t i n g to raitigation, c e r t a i n t y of pmu? snd 
to what extsinit past and prospeGtive demsges are reeoversiblii evidence 
no differencoo JhuB the Court ©f flppssl i n Eiao PBtrolsun Co L t d , 
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Vo Merdan d i d not dray sny d i s t i n c t i o n betwsen the dsroages reeovereblQ 
by the defendant i n tcsrt or i n c o n t r a c t , Lord Denning C^oRo said, 
" o o o ths demsgei i n eithej? case are t@ be measured by ths loss he 
suffered,"' D e b i t s t h i s j y d i e i s l spinions have d i f f e r e d end sams 
have stated t h a t damages gi3?a wider i n t o r t and ganas that they are 
wider i n eontracto 
I t i s submitted t h a t the eleareat d i s t i n c t i o r i l i e e i n thoag 
s i t u a t i o n s bihere cosipensation i s not the basis of damages as i n Eges 
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Petrol@uni''a case , Thu§ l i q u i d a t e d damages being based on agreement 
applies t o conts-act and not t@ t o r t . On the other hand, exsfsplary 
demages are sonfined t@ t o r t byt i t i s guggeated th a t Roskes y Barnard 
has spangd t h i s type of damage to the law of contrast» Also ngminsil 
damages h@@ i t s a p p l i e a t i o n to t o r t and not to eontract. 
Apart fr®tfj these the general r u l e f o r assessing damages i s 
wide enough to cover t o r t and contract equally. This i s t h a t the 
p l a i n t i f f diQuld be put i n SBTIB p o s i t i o n , as f a r as mongy can do i t j 
as he would have been but f o r the defendants breach of duty tsihethe? 
or not the duty i s t o r t i o u s or eont r a c t u a l . But the o r i g i n 0f the 
respectivis d u t i e s i s d i a t i n e t o Contraet l a baaed on egreeREnt End 0 
claifu i n c o n t r a s t i s therefore a elaira f o r f a i l u r e to perforfn the 
Qgreemsnto Tho eonsensy®! nature therefore meana t h a t l i a b i l i t y i a 
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l i m i t e d to the contemplation of the p a r t i e s and the r u l e that yoy 
take the p l a i n t i f f aa you f i n d him i s s i t a t , Thg r u l e i n contract i s 
you take the p l a i n t i f f as you know him and the evidencs i s the con-
s i d e r a t i o n eg promised by the defendant. I n t h i s my i t i s arguable 
whether s t r i c t l y remoteness of damage hae any relevanee i n contrast. 
I f the basis of damages i a the f a i l u r e to perform the consideration 
promised and t h i s i n t u r n i s basgd on agreement then the scope of the 
dsmages i s the agreement y i i c h in t u r n centres on the considerationo 
f\)(3 party to a contract can sue on e prsraise t h a t i s not @ tera of 
the c o n t r a c t and t h i s i a i n p l i e i t on the r u l g r e l a t i n g to paat igon<= 
s i d e r a t i o n . The determining f a c t o r i s therefore the agfsement as 
E<i?ideneed by the Gonaideration, 
I n t o r t on the other hand no such agreement e x i s t a and the duty 
i s created by law. The p l a i n t i f f s eomplaint i a tha t the defendant 
has not l e f t h i u alone and h i s eompensation i s therefore the dia= 
turbancB caused by the difendant. The repsreuseiona may be l i m i t e d 
t o same extent by applying the f o r e s e e a b i l i t y t e s t nevertheless t h i s 
l i m i t i n g f a c t o r i s not as r e s t r i c t i v e as i n the contract ru l e taihieh 
i s based on agreement. Quite o f t e n the defendant doea not know the 
p l a i n t i f f before the event, Thia t o r t r u l e therefore evidences a 
aider ssopa of l i a b i l i t y then c o n t r a c t . 
These divergent role© between t o r t and contract apply separately 
i n a large number of Gases, I n aorae hociiever they bscorae soneurrent 
snd the question i a Etihat r u l e or r u l e s ^ o u l d ^ p l y . For exesiplB 
apsst from contract i prafesaional person mmy bg l i a b l e i n t o r t o 
Becsuae of the d i f f e r e n c e i n demagss san a p l a i n t i f f impose a greater 
l i a b i l i t y on the profesaionial person? Conversely ihould the pro° 
f e a s i o n i i l person escape the bjider l i a b i l i t y merely becauss he has 
s o w i t t e d tbm wrong© instead of one? 
1 o The mis o f e o n t s a c t should supe?ven@o The Fssrseh system 
adopt© thl® sKud jjundes' i t (i!nem aspsffBte EGtions e n i s t the p l a i n t i f f 
raust sue in santsaeto English l a y adopts t h i a t o saras iKtento 
FQT smmpls in CQmsTsien flsisiing fmm b?eash s f eont5?aet t h e dBmages 
a?e ealeulated on the basis of the loss s u f f e r e d by the bs-eaeh o f 
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eQirit5?Beto The^e i s hewsves' a l i i n s of authoritlB© bhibh fnaintiaiini 
t h a t 88 the basia of dEBjages i n oonvex'sion i s to sestose t o t h e 
otaUDBj? the value @f t h e goods eonvested the damages must be c a l e u l a t e d 
on t h e v a l u e even though t h e ouines''8 a c t u a l losa may have been leaso 
Again cjiJteffe Gontsraot e j t i a t a between e p l a i n t i f f and ^ l i e i t o ^ t h en 
t h e GBuse of a e t i o n must be i n eontract gvsn thaugh i t msy sound i n 
torto®^ 
2 o The l i a b i l i t y e x i s t s i n t o r t onlyo This BT)B\dss has no f o l l o a i n g o 
One argument againgt i t i s i t s Bonts-adiatieno Thys beeaui® the Gon>= 
t s a c t c r e a t e s t h e j e l a t i s n s h i p i t i s isjsong to adopt the t o i r t t o 
i t s exeiysiarao 
3 o The l i a b i l i t y e x i s t s i n tos-t and i n oont^acto This 5?ule applias 
i n English lata! e e p g c i g i l y w i t h p r o f e s s i o n a l n e g l i g e n c e end s a l s of 
Relevanee of Contract to Tos-t L i a b i l i t 
I t has been show above t h a t t o y t i s mainly Goncesned w i t h 
p h y s i c a l damage than eeonoraic Isaso One of the eas'liest eases to 
g 
lay the pyfensiple on BGonoraic loss i s Cattle v Stockton» The 
p l a i n t i f f s i n the case f a i l e d to X'BCOVBE' economie loss suffssed (^Bn 
the defendant flooded the s i t e of s tunnel they liS^e undex" eontsact 
t o c o n s t r u c t o But ufhegg the eeonoraiG loss i s immBdiately consequential 
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upon p h y s i c a l damage the economic loss i s ?ecovB?ablEo I t has been 
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urged but denied t h a t i n t h i s tijay economic loss i s pa3?asitieo This 
noo^reeoves^ fo? eeonoraie loss i s hoisJsvBr confined to pure t o s t 
s i t u a t i o n o The existence of a contract can tr a n s f a r a the pure econoBJie 
loss i n t o © ^ecoverebld head of damage i n t o r t o 
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1 o Hise Pujfchsse 
The e f f e c t of m him py^ehase i s to c s s e t e s bailment bEtutaen 
the p e f f t i e s o The sesult o f t h i s i s to confer the r i g h t of b a i l s ? 
OP b a i l e g to sue fo? the damage to the goods. Therefore i f A h i s ^ s 
a cajf t o B fo? £ 1 0 0 0 S has paid a dgposit of S 5 0 Q o The gespsctiwe 
i n t e y e a t of A and B i n the ca? i s S 5 0 0 „ I? i n the ciSGiiRsatanees 
•the sag i s damaged as s r e s u l t of She n e g l i g e n c e of C p A o r 8 ean 
sue end recoves? fmm C the iiihQle ©nount o f the cas ev/en theugh aa 
fa? as A o? B i s conce?ned t h e i ? i n t e s e s t i s h a l f t h e enount ?BCQVB?ed 
and the yest i s pu?e eeonomic loss of the o t h e ? o 
Another vas-iatian tihieh does not depend on h i r e puyohase and 
bailment i s isihepe a eontsaet de t e s i n i n B i biho i s to beas the loss i n 
the event of damage t o the subject-mattey o f t h e eont^aeto I f A 
h i ^ e s a ship to B and C damageii the d i i p and i t i s l a i d i d l e the 
1 2 
extent of seGOvesy w i l l depend on the chestes' party,, I n t h e Mergus 
an addenduni to a c h a r t e r party p r o v i d e d t h a t ; 
i^notfejithatanding anything to the contrary c o n t a i n e d 
i n t h i s charter party,, i n t h e event of loss s f time 
a r i s i n g from c o l l i s i o n p n e i t h e r h i r e o o o s© tsould 
otherwise be payable fey the charterer under t h i s 
c h a r t e r party s h a l l be payable by the c h a r t e r e r to 
the extent to tsihich t h e owner issjuld have a r i g h t to 
r e c o v e r o " 
The d e f e n d a n t s n e g l i g e n t l y demaged the ship and the c h a r t e r e r s paid 
ype i n f u l l b u t litsre l a t e r reimbursed by t h e oisiners of t h e vessel 
feiho now sued the defendants claiming the re^imbursemento The defendantg 
i n d e n y i n g l i a b i l i t y f o r th@ re-iroburserosnt argued t h a t t h e loss 
f e l l on t h e charterers tjJhen they paid y p o Th@y contended t h a t t h e 
l08@ en t h e c h a r t e r e r s tiss pure eoDnoroic loss and was i r r e c B v e r a b l e o 
Thus i f th e c h a r t e r e r s had sued f o r the loss they muld have been 
met isiith the argument t h a t t h e i r l e s s tass pure eeeniamie Issa and 
t h e r e f o r e i r r e c o v e r a b l e o The p l a i n t i f f s isiDuld have o f f e r e d no loss 
i n t h e circura stance a and ijere therefore wrong i n re i t s i b u r s i n g the 
c h a r t e r e r s t h e los© s u f f e r e d by theiTJo 
£ 0 
The defendants argument jjjas r e j e c t e d on the ground that the eharter 
party had s h i f t e d the loss from the charterers to the p l a i n t i f f 
oumerso Because they had su f f e r s d the physical damage they could 
rscover the seonomic losso Had tha charter party not so providad 
the defendants argument bauld have succeededo 
Fr u s t r a t e d Contracts 
T.r\i im l i r a jr r • PIT:—iLL.u: ,.,. L \. • i. it.' i-'Ji—> 
Wegligence by a t h i r d party ism i n t e r f a r e with the e o n t r a c t u s l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between A end B with the r e s u l t t h a t the oontraet i s 
fr u s t r a t e d o The damages reeoverable by the p a r t i e s may dspgnd on 
the precise terras of the eontracto 
For example5 i f A employs B to perforra at a eanesrto A Expands 
money to make the nBcessary arrangemento B i s i n j u r e d by the negligence 
of Co Thg loss l i e s i^ism i t f a l l s @nd B cannot f o r the mon@y 
expended f o r he has suffersd no f i n a n c i f a l demagso A cannot rseovBr 
bBcauae he has suffered meri§ economic losso Byt i f the sontract 
between A and B provides t h a t B should indemnify A to the extent of 
h i s loss i f B i s unable to ^ p e a r than A"@ loss i a rseoversble i n 
an ac t i o n by Ao Thus ths contract has latched^on ths f i n a n c i a l 
damage to the physical damage to B and these w i l l be recoverablis i n 
t o r t o 
The Law Reform (FrMstrated Contracts) 
Act 1 i g t » 3 ; 
Suppose A h i r e s a h a l l f o r a concert from B end A psys B £ 1 Q Q 
as deposito I f B having incurred expenses to adapt the haSl tiihich 
i s then burnt dawn by the negligance of C o The r e s u l t i s t h a t the 
contract i s f r u s t r a t e d and A can apply to recover the £ 1 0 0 advanced 
to Bo 8 may also ask the court t o exercise d i s c r e t i o n and allow him 
to set o f f against £ 1 0 0 p a r t or a l l h i s expenseso The court can 
refuss t h i s i f i t i s convinced t h a t there i s a good chance of B 
recovering a l l h i s expenses from C o I n t h i s way the f i n a n c i a l loss 
i s thrown on the negligent party despits the f r u s t r a t i o n o This 
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p f f i n c i p l s however has l i r a i t a d a p p l i c a t i o n f o r i t operates only 
isjhere the "iSkl Act applies snd has no relevance to the hypatheticel 
s i t u a t i o n advanced before i o S o of the perforsaer. 
This r e s u l t can be a r b i t r a r y and i t i s suggested t h a t the t e s t 
f o r recovery f o r econoRiic loss should be the occurrence of physical 
damageo The d i f f i c u l t y with t h i s i s ujhere to draw the l i n e f o r 
Another i l l u s t r a t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e i s B r i t i a h Trensport 
CoBiimiasion v Gouirlevo I f A i s i n j u r e d by X and euffera l o i s of 
earning w i t h the r e s u l t t h a t he pays no tax the inland revenue has 
suffered pyre eeonoraic loss and cannot recover because of t h i s (and 
the loss i s very i n d i r e c t ) o I f A i s bound to pay ta« on the Enount 
he recovers as i a the ease f o r damages over fiSpOQO under sno 3 7 ° 3 8 
Finance Act 1 9 6 0 then the loss i s A's and he can recover i n f u l l o 
The r e s u l t i s t h a t the f i n a n c i a l loss does not vary with the amount 
but the defendant K'B l i a b i l i t y v a r i e s with the amounto Thg p r i n s i p l a 
applies equally t o contract of employmento Apart from the l i m i t e d 
scape of the a p p l i c a t i o n s f the r u l e of a c t i o per queid aervitum amisit 
the general r u l e i s t h a t a master cannot recover f o r loss of services 
or loss r e s u l t i n g from i n j u r y to the servanto I f the master con° 
tin u e s t o pay the servant bages ufhile the servant i s B^y, be i t as 
a good employer or because the contract of employment s t i p u l a t e s 
so the los s l i e s where i t f a l l s and the ejnployer cannot rscover the 
sum from the t a r t f e s s a r o The servant cannot sue f o r i t because he 
has suffered no damage alEOo 
But i f the employer i a astute enough to provide t h a t the servant 
i s to reimburse hirai from h i s damages the loss i a s h i f t e d and the wages 
are recoverable @n behalf of the ejnployer., This r e s u l t has been 
c r i t i c i s e d as a r b i t r a r y because i t postulates that the precise temB 
of a co n t r a c t which are designed to a l l o c a t e r i s k s between the contractiin 
p a r t i B S should govern the l i a b i l i t y of a t h i r d partyo I t has bsen 
suggested above t h a t the basis o f l i a b i l i t y should be the occurrence 
of damage and not f o r s e e a b i l i t y o f physical damagBo liihile the ideas 
and f a c t o r s conveyed by f o r e s i g h t are cle a r enough the d e t e r m i n a t i o n 
of whether a damage i s t o o remote or not i s not an exact aciencBo 
The search f o r such an e l u s i v e q u a n t i t y as a person f o r s e e a b l e damage 
can s c a r c e l y be governed by t h a t p a r t i c u l a r formulao For example 
suppose the p l a i n t i f f i n Donoghue v Stevensan had bought thB ginger 
beer and had not s u f f e r s d any p h y s i c a l damage but f i n a n c i a l loss by 
expending money to put t h i n g s r i g h t , c-an she recover f o r her expengeo? 
I n the Diamantis Peteras^^ Lawrenca J o tsaa of the opinion t h a t i n 
some cases a ma n u f a c t u r e r may be l i a b l e f o r purs f i n a n c i a l loss i f 
they are negligent @nd he obaerved t h a t " f o r e s i g h t may not be the 
sole c r i t e r i o n o " Another reason why the occurrence of damage i s 
pr e f e r r e d i s th a t as the r u l e stands the c o n t r a c t widening the l i Q b i l i t y 
of t h i r d party seems i n c o n s i s t e n t with the d o c t r i n e of p r i v i t y and 
G o n s i d e r a t i o n o I t allows c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s to impose an obligatioin) 
on a t h i r d partyo 
Bankers Card 
A new and widespread feature of modem economic l i f e i s the 
use o f Bankers C a r d o Under t h i s s person issued with one can o b t a i n 
c r e d i t from the bank e i t h e r by cash o r by the purehass of a materialo 
The usual c o n d i t i o n o f issue of the card i s t h a t the issue of ths card 
does not c r e a t e a c o n t r a c t u n t i l i t i s signedo 
Suppose A i s issued a card and f a i l s to sign i t before he 
n e g l i g s n t l y loa@is i t o c I f i n the cir c u m s t a n c s s Xj, m f r a u d p comes 
i n t o possession o f the cardp the l i a b i l i t y o f A f o r c r e d i t o b t a i n e d 
by X w i l l depend on whether a c o n t r a c t e x i s t s or noto I f a c o n t r a c t 
e x i s t s (Shen A san con t e m p l a t s ths consequences o f h i s act end w i l l 
t h e r e f o r e be l i a b l e f o r the c r e d i t o b t a i n e d by Xo I f on the other 
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no centraet e x i s t s then the bank's action can only be i n negligensso 
I t has already been seen t h a t t h i s loss being pure esonoraie loss 
w i l l not be recoverablOo 
Again suppose the card was aignedo Another condition of issue 
of the card i a t h a t the holder remains l i a b l e f o r any c r e d i t u n t i l 
he r e p o r t s the losso Suppose the bank gives the wrong addreee to 
repor t the losso Aj, r e p o r t s to t h i s address and before the bank or 
A discovers the mistake a f u r t h e r c r e d i t has been dra^n by X, The 
question of c o n t r i b u t o r y negligence becomes relevant and there again 
the d i f f e r e n c e between t o r t and contract w i l l becorae c r i t i e a l o 
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I f as already stated e a r l i e r t h a t c o n t r i b u t o r y negligence 
i s i n a p p l i c a b l e to contracts the r e s u l t w i l l be one of causation and 
on t h i s A"a conduct w i l l be the cause of the fraud and he wauld be 
l i a b l e f o r a l l the consequenceso I n t o r t on the other hand5 there 
i s no doubt t h a t the f a u l t of the bank w i l l break the chain of caus 
CHAPTER 5 
REMOTEWESS DP DAMAGE AWD 
MEASURE OF DAMAGES 
I n t o r t twa views compete f o r the r u l e t h a t dhould govern 
remoteness of damageo To a varied extent both have 
reciSived acceptanceo 
1 o The directness p r i n c i p l e 
Under t h i s i f a defendant can foresee i n j u r y t o the 
p l a i n t i f f he i s l i a b l e f o r a l l the damages tha t flow d i r e c t l y 
from the acto The leading case i s The Re PoleraiSo'' 
2 o F o r e s e e a b i l i t y 
Under t h i s a person may only be l i a b l e f o r the kind of 
damage he can foreiiee as l i k e l y t o r e s u l t from h i s acto Thus 
f o r e s i g h t of i n j y r y i s not enoughpf the damage must be 
foreseeno The leading case i s The Wagon Moundo^ 
I n contract although remoteness of damage has been the 
subject of judgments the ru l e s have occasioned much leas 
conceptual d i f f i c u l t y as the t o r t ruleso 
The r u l e i n contract i s stated i n two p a r t 3 s = 
Dsnages are recoverable f o r breach of contract i f they are; 
(a) Those damages which might cisaturally and usually arise 
from breach or 
(b) damages t ^ i c h may reasonably be supposed to have been 
i n contemplation of the p a r t i e s at the time they made the 
con t r a c t as being the probable r e s u l t of i t s braacho 
Test (a) provides an ax post facto determination end i s 
objectiveo Test (b) i s subjective and s t r i c t l y p e a k i n g has no 
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relevance to remoteness of damagSo The reason i a t h a t the 
basis of l i a b i l i t y i n contract i s the breach by one party of 
the consideration he undertook to provide under the contracto 
This i s normally concemBd with the dstBrmination of tha tsrms 
of the contract i o B o what the p a r t i e s agreed upon and the 
answer a r r i v e d at by g i v i n g evidence of such matters ass= 
(1) s t a t u t o r y or other r u l e of law; 
( 2 ) express or implied terms in the contract^ custom 
or other usage of t h e i r common trade; 
( 3 ) Previous course of business dealings betwsen them, 
and otherwise oniy i f ; 
ik) there has been an exprsss communication of the 
r s l e v a n t knowledge and i n t s n t i o n s of one party to the other 
p r i o r to or when the contract was madSo 
I t has already been argued above th a t t h i s has no relevance 
to remoteness f o r i t a l l hinges on the doctrine of consideration 
and i s i m p l i c i t on the r u l e on past considerationo^ E o g o i f 
Heron 11^ the c h a r t e r party had only provided that the ship 
should ga to Jeddah and the p l a i n t i f f a f t e r the chartar party 
had besn signsd intimated t h a t tha defendant may unload at 
Basrah such a raquBSt would havB been based on past considers^ 
t i o n and would not have been actionablBo I t w i l l f o l l o w 
t h e r e f o r e t h a t where damage has been calculatad on t h i s hypo° 
t h e s i s ioBo contsmplation of tha p a r t i s s j i t i s wrong to regard 
i t as baing based on remoteness of damagSo Thus i n Hsron I l 5 
both McWair J o at f i r s t i n s t a n c B and S e l l e r s L o J o i n ths Court of 
Appeal emphasised t e s t (b) and held that the shipowner ms not 
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l i a b l e f o r the loss claimedo The t e s t adopted by t h e i r 
l o r d s h i p s was the p r e v i s i o n of the p a r t i e s and t h i s worked i n 
favour of the shipouffierSo The maj o r i t y i n the Court of 
Appesl and a unaninous House of Lords adapting t e s t (a) found 
i n favour of the p l a i n t i f f o This i s the ob j e c t i v e t e s t of 
the h y p o t h e t i c a l reasonable mano \^at the House of Lords 
d i d isma to impute the subjective i n t e n t i o n of the p l a i n t i f f 
upon the defendanto This i n e f f e c t meant t h a t t e s t (b) i s 
absorbed i n t o (a) and i t haa been regarded as widening the 
scope of remoteness i n contracto 
Scope of remoteness of damage i n Tort aid Contract 
T h i s issue haa raised a l l the discussions and a l l the 
d i f f i c u l t i e s o Dicta are not unanimous on the issuso I n The 
c 
Motting H i l l Bret M o R o said t h a t they are precisely the same 
and t h a t t h i s i s s e t t l e d lawo There are d i c t a that remoteness 
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of damage i s wider i n t o r t than i n contract and d i e t s t h a t 
l i a b i l i t y i s wider i n contract®^ These may now be consideredo 
L i a b i l i t y i s wider i n Contract than i n Tort 
This p o i n t of view has i t s o r i g i n i n the adoption of 
q 
second t e s t under Hadley v BaxendalBo jhua where a party CQm° 
municates h i s i n t e n t i o n before hand t h i s widens the scope of 
l i a b i l i t y of the defendant f o r t h i s communication can include 
damage uihich from p o i n t of t o r t may be indireoto I n t o r t there 
i s no such communication and the t e s t s f o r remoteness whether 
the directness or f o r e s e e a b i l i t y t e s t may produce a marrower 
l i a b i l i t y o ^or example i n the Lieabosch Dredger v S o S o Bdison'^Q 
67 
the p l a i n t i f f s ware unable to recover f o r extra expenses caused 
by t h e i r impscuniosity. But i n contract loss a r i s i n g from 
impecuniosity i s recoverable i f the f a c t i s communicatsd to the 
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defendant at the time of the contracto Thus i n Muhammad v A l i 
damages r e s u l t i n g i n part from irapecuniosity ware allowedo 
because they were held to be i n contemplation of the p a r t i e s and 
th e r e f o r e not a separate and concurrent causSo 
I " The ARPAd''^ i t was held t h a t the p l a i n t i f f cannot recover 
i n conversion f o r the loss of exceptionally high p r o f i t he made 
by s a i l i n g to a t h i r d partyo Hs could not also racovBr t h i s i n 
contracto This conclusion would have been d i f f e r e n t , but 
d i f f e r s n t i n contract ot\lyg i f ths p l a i n t i f f had communicatBd 
t h i s information to tha dafsndant at tha tims of the contract and 
thus b r i n g i t w i t h i n ths contamplation of the partisso 
I n Trans Trust S o P o R o L o v Danubian Trading Coo'^ ^ ^^B p l a i n = 
t i f f contractsd to s e l l to the defendants steelo The p l a i n t i f f s 
were to buy the s t e e l from X o Both defendants and p l a i n t i f f s were 
impecunious and i t was agreed between them t h a t the defendants 
were t o pay by cash against ^ p p i n g documents from a confirmed 
c r e d i t to be opened i n favour o f X by F o The defendants f a i l e d 
to do t h i S o I f the p l a i n t i f f s had money and had p a i d f o r the 
s t e e l thsy would havB auffsred no loss, f o r the market p r i c e at 
the time of the defendants breach was higher than the contract pricBo 
I t was held t h a t the p l a i n t i f f s can recover f o r loss i n p r o f i t 
they had f a i l e d to make under the contracto "The r e a l question 
i s what was the loss contemplated by the p a r t i e s rather than the 
reason f o r i t o ' ' 
The conclusion i s t h a t w i t h i n the second rul e of Hadlsy v 
Baxsndale''^ the p r i n c i p l e s of remotsnBss i s widar i n contract than 
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i n t o r t o This i a because the contemplation of the p a r t i e s can 
extend the scope of recoverable damage to an extent which i n 
t o r t cannot be regarded as forweeabls or d i r e c t consequences of 
the breacho I t should however be added that although t h i s 
"contemplation" generally works to the b e n e f i t of the p l a i n t i f f 
i n some cases i t can work to h i s d i a a d v a n t a g e o F o r example, 
where the "special circumstances' evidence a aub=sale then; t h i s 
sub-sale i a the measure of damages whether i t works i n favour or 
against the p l a i n t i f f o Thus i n France v Gaudet'^S j^^^ p l a i n t i f f 
recovered h i s resale p r i c e which was wel l i n excess of the 
market pricBo I f the resale p r i c e had been lower the p l a i n t i f f 
would have losto 
Remoteness i s wider i n t o r t than i n contract 
This view o r i g i n a t e s from the decision i n Re PBlemiSo"**^ The 
p r o p o s i t i o n i s l a r g e l y true but i t has been suggested that i n 
practifBj i t creates much less divergence between t o r t and 
contract than i s assumedo The a l l important issue i a whether i n 
cont r a c t the damage was w i t h i n the contemplation of the partieso 
I f the exceptional p h y s i c a l e u s c e p t i b i l i t y of the egg s h e l l s k u l l 
p l a i n t i f f i s known or th a t the p l a i n t i f f i a an eccentric m i l l i o n a i r e 
who dresses shabbily t h i s w i l l be w i t h i n such contemplation and 
w i l l be recoverablBo This apart i t i s submitted t h a t no basic 
d i f f e r e n c e e x i s t s between remotenass i n t o r t from ramoteness i n 
contracto This i s so despite d i c t a to the contrary contained 
i n Heron Wo, l l o'iQ Lord Raid i n t h a t case stated t h a t "^the modem 
r u l e of t o r t i s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t and i t imposes a much wider 
l i a b i l i t y o ' " ' ' 5 
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I t has been shown t h a t the members of the House of Lords r e l i e d 
on the f i r s t r u l e t o a r r i v e at t h e i r deciaiono I t may therefore 
be asked what esot e r i c d i f f e r s n c e s x i s t s betwsen ths f o r a s s a a b i l i t y 
t e s t i n t o r t and the contemplation of the p a r t i e s i n contract? 
This i s very importanto For example although mere delivery duB 
to dslay sounds i n contract only5 a daisy dus to negligent 
handling by the masters servant can make the master v i c a r i o u s l y 
l i a b l e i n t o r t o S i m i l a r l y a misdelivery or loss or non-delivery 
would normally amount to conversiono Itould tha modem Baxsndale 
theref o r e be l i a b l e f o r the stoppage of Hadley's m i l l i f he 
l o s t the shaft i n t r a n s i t or i f h i s servant damaged i t by 
dropping i t ? Lord Reid answered i n the a f f i r m a t i v e and so d i d 
the r e s t of t h e i r Lordshipso The d i s t i n c t i o n was stated to be 
ons o f degrsBo The reaaonabls man doss not "contemplate" 
l i a b i l i t i B S i n the svent of a brsach of contract which are as 
extensive as those "foreseen"" by the reasonabls man i n t o r t o 
Thus f o r e a e e a b i l i t y should be confined to t o r t end contemplation 
of the p a r t i B S to contracto With respsct t h i s msrsly begs the 
question and cannot i n p r a c t i c e be o f help i n border l i n e cesBSo 
Lord Upjohn acknowledged thiSo^"^ How would Baxendale's p r e v i s i o n 
vary i f h i s servants l o s t the ^ a f t i n t r a n s i t according t o 
whether t h e action i s i n t o r t o r contrsct? 
This play on words i s l a r g e l y the r e s u l t of expressing the r u l e i n 
2 1 
Hadley v Baxendale i n two termso I t has been shown above th a t 
s t r i c t l y the second r u l e can only be applied to what the p a r t i e s 
said or agreed at the time of tha contracto An i n q u i r y along 
t h i s l i n s has no rslevance to remoteness of damagSo An analysis 
2 2 of Heron I I u i n show t h a t t h e i r Lordships d i d not apply any 
of these two ru l e s f o r by imputing knowledge of the p l a i n t i f f s 
i n t e n t i o n which i s e f f e c t i s the second r u l e ^ on the defendants 
the pretence of adopting the f i r s t r u l e was reduced to a 
vanishing pointo McWairp Jo applied exclusively the second 
r u l e and a r r i v e d at opposite decision and from h i s view point 
i t i s submitted t h a t h i s decision i s impeccablBo 
I n concluaion therefore the f o r B s e a a b i l i t y t e s t i n t o r t 
w i l l produce the same r e s u l t as the contemplation t e s t i n 
contracto I t i a submitted t h a t difference i n degree i s merely 
p o l i c y rather than p r i n c i p l B o I n t o r t the main obstacle to 
a p l a i n t i f f i s the causation hurdlSo Dnce t h i s i s overcome 
the courts award damagea t h a t f l o w from i t o In contract on 
the other hand the agreement between the p a r t i e s i s a l i m i t i n g 
f a c t o r on the scope of l i a b i l i t y o 
MEASURE OF DAMAGES 
From the argument above i t has been shown that the r u l a i s 
the same i n t o r t end i n contracto The only exception being 
where directness p r i n c i p l e applies to t o r t o There i s however 
another exception and t h i s applies to measure of damages f o r 
conversiono S i t u a t i o n s may e x i s t u^iere the c a r r i e r of goods may 
be l i a b l e i n conversion as we l l as f o r breach of contractc I n 
t o r t the measure of damages f o r conversion i s generally the value 
of the goodSo I n contract the measure i a th@ loss suffered by 
the p l a i n t i f f , and t h i s i n many respect may be less than the t o r t 
awsrdo l a therefore the p l a i n t i f f to be denied the higher award 
7 1 
of damages simply because he has alleged a l t e r n a t i v e l y i n h i s 
act i o n a breach of contract? The answer may be considered under 
two headingso 
1 o (Jhere the action i s between ths p a r t i e s to the contracts 
2 3 
Ira France v Baudet the p l a i n t i f f purchased champagne 
l y i n g at the defendant's wharf at fourteen s h i l l i n g s per dozen 
and r e s o l d them at twanty°four s h i l l i n g s per dozen to the captain 
of a ahip about to leave f o r Englando The defendants refused 
to d e l i v e r the champagne with the r e s u l t t h a t the p l a i n t i f f 
l o s t a favourable marketo 
The p l a i n t i f f sued f o r the loss of p r s f i t o I t was held t h a t 
the measure of damages i n conversion i s the market value at the 
time of the conversion and the p l a i n t i f f ' s resale at twHnty=four 
s h i l l i n g s isss taken ss the reference to determine t h i s raarket 
valuBo I n The Arpad^^ the action was f o r misappropriation by 
conversion which deprivBd the p l a i n t i f f of the exceptional high 
p r o f i t he would have made by resalSo The Court of Appeal held 
by m a j o r i t y t h a t i n contract the p l a i n t i f f a measure of damages 
uflDuld be the market value at the date of non=daliveryo Also i n 
t o r t the measure of damages has to be calculated on the contract 
p r i n c i p l B o The court d i s t i n g u i s h e d France v Gaudet*'-' by holding 
t h a t i n t h a t case the measure uss the market value and tha t the 
resale p r i c e waa taken to represent the market valuso I t may be 
asked why should t h a t not apply hereo Uhat the Court of Appeal 
therefore d id i n t h i s case was to absorb the t o r t r u l e i n t o the 
contracto I f the p l a i n t i f f had communicated the special circum= 
stancesp i t was not doubted t h a t the exceptional p r o f i t would 
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have baen recovarable i n contract end prasusjably i n t o r t o 
Scrutton L o J o disssntadp holding t h a t whare thsr s i s u n j u s t i f i a s 
braach of contract^ and t h s t o r t of conversion the good owner 
can sue i n conversion and b r i n g tha loss i n t h e contract of 
r s s a l s without proving n o t i c s of i t to the c s r r i s r ; unless 
thera i s some f e c i a l f s a t u r s i n the c o n t r a c t o I t i s submitted 
t h a t t h i s judgment i s to be p r e f e r r s d to tha m a j o r i t y d s c i s i o n o 
I n thB f i r s t piece i t may bs asked why should a dsfsndant 
p r o f i t by thB f a c t t h a t ha has committed two wrongs i n s t e a d of 
onso ThB m a j o r i t y decision i s i n a f f e c t t h a t whers ths two 
ssparatB causaa of action e x i s t thB p l a i n t i f f must sue i n 
c o n t r a c t o 
Secondly at the tima when t h i s case was dscidsd Rs Polsmis 
was thB rulB r a l a t i n g to damagBS and i n view of t h i s tha 
argumsnt of ths m a j o r i t y was not sound f o r ths r u l e s r e l a t i n g 
to remoteness i n contract had no a p p l i c a t i o n to the Re Polemis 
d o c t r i n S o 
T h i r d l y Bvan though thB UJagon Mound may be regarded as 
confirming the m a j o r i t y decision i n one senss i t has l e f t the 
decision untouched i n another sensBo This i s because l i a b i l i t y 
i n conversion i s s t r i c t and i a not baaed on f a u l t o The fora° 
s B B Q b i l i t y t s s t a p p l i e s to n e g l i g e n c e i n p a r t i c u l a r and not to 
t o r t s where the l i a b i l i t y i s s t r i c t as i n conversion., 
F i n a l l y 8 i t i s s u b m i t t a d t h a t Haren I I has o v e r r u l s d the 
Arpad f o r as already seen the House of Lords imputed the f e c i a l 
knowledgB of tha re-sale on the defendant when m a n i f e s t l y he 
d i d not knowo This r e s u l t i s to make the l i a b i l i t y the same as 
i n t o r t and t h i s goes tha othar way to The Arpado^^ The Arpad^*^ 
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may the r e f o r e be regarded as overruled by ^Heron II» 
2 o bihere ths action i s bstwagn one party to contract and 3rd party 
This i a generally encountered i n h i r e purchase agresmentSo 
Thus i f the h i r e r contrary to t h e h i r e purchase agreeraent s e l l s 
ths goods to X5 X i s l i a b l e f o r conversion. As there cannot 
be any contract between X and the owner the only cause of 
ac t i o n w i l l be i n t o r t o W i l l the f e c i a l value be the msasura 
of damage or w i l l i t be the market value. The answar w i l l 
depend on whether the contract or the t o r t viBw p a i n t i s pre f e r r e d . 
I n Belsize Motor Supply Co, v Cox clause of a h i r e 
purchase agreement provii^ed t h a t "Tha h i r a r s h a l l not r e - l e t 
s e l l or p a r t with the possession o f the said motor-taxi^cab 0 0 0 
without the previous consent i n w r i t i n g o f the ownerso" The 
h i r e r pledged the cab without the ownas's consent. 
The owners sued the pledgee i n conversion. I t uss held 
t h a t the pledge whether wrongful or r i g h t f u l a pledgee or purchaser 
takes what i n t e r a s t the pledgor or vendor has i n goods and 
accordingly the p l a i n t i f f s were e n t i t l s d to tha outstanding 
payments. The method by which t h i s conclusion was ar r i v e d at 
was not sp e l t out i n the Judgment but presumably the h i r e r s 
breach d i d not terminata the h i r s purchase and he eould assign 
h i s c o n t r a c t u a l r i g h t t o ths defendant. 
Prompted by t h i s d e c i s i o n draftsmen sought t o make a 
p r o h i b i t i o n on assignmant o f tha option to purchass by axprsss 
agreement. 
United Dominions Trust (Commercial) Ltd, v Parkway lectors L t d , ^ ^ 
The f a c t s are t h a t the t o t a l h i r e purchase p r i e s f o r a van 
was £ 6 2 6 , 1 3 8 , The owners had r s c B i v e d £530,3^0 by way o f instalments 
sa t h a t only £9So1Da use outstandingo The hises said the 
to the defendants i n bs-eaeh of the clause uihich provided t h a t 
"the hires' ooo s h a l l not s e l l j o f f e r f o r salSp assign or change 
the goods or the b e n e f i t of t h i s agreemento" 
^he ofefjuera sued the defendant f o r the value a? the vano 
They recovered £350 isjhich mn the value of the van end thus made 
a p r o f i t of £250o Wow hou d i d the t r i a l judge a r r i v e at t h i s 
conelusion i n view of Belzize Motors Cage?^^ Thg d i a t i n c t i o n lay 
on whether the b e n e f i t of the contract was asaignablg or noto 
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The Belzig® Motora Case created en assignsble r i g h t buttSiis 
mn not so i n the present easBo The defendant bias therefore 
a pereon without any i n t e r e s t i n the property and accordingly 
uas l i a b l e f o r the f u l l value of the vano 
This reasoiming can be e r i t i c i s e d on the grounde t h a t i t 
concludes th a t because a contract states t h a t the r i g h t s are 
non^assignabls they cannot be aasignedo There are d i c t a to 
support t h a t t h i s i s not necessarily aoo I n Spellman v Spellman 
Danckuisrta LoJo stated " I t i s p l a i n ooo t h a t the f a c t t h a t there 
i s p r o h i b i t i o n i n the document c r e a t i n g the chose i n action 
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against assignment i s not necessarily f a t a l o " Uhy should not 
an assignment be made i n equity or by t r u s t ? This apart the 
Judgnent i n p r i n c i p l e i a impeccable although the r e s u l t eennat 
be said to be f a i r o 
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I n yiekham Holdings L t d , v Brooke HQUBB Motors L t d , the 
Court of Appeal returned to the issue. The defendants before 
they bought the car from h i r e r phoned the p l a i n t i f f s t o ask f o r 
the "settlement f i g u r e " . The p l a i n t i f f t o l d them i t ma 227tjo10s 
but they i«iDuld accept £270 i f paid w i t h i n seven days. The defendants 
f a i l e d to do sOp apparently they f o r g o t , Tuslve weeks l a t e r the 
p l a i n t i f f s want to c o l l e c t t h e i r car. The defendants o f f e r e d 
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£290 ujhich the p l a i n t i f f s refusedo 
The p l a i n t i f f s brought the action f o r the r e t u r n of the 
car or i t s value ushieh uaa Bsaessed at £3S5o At f i r s t instance 
they recovered t h i S o The defendants appealed. The Court of Appeal 
held t h a t the p l a i n t i f f s uisre e n t i t l e d to ZZlk, Lord Denning MoRo 
stated t h a t the United Oominion case was wrongly decidedo Winn Lo3o 
d i d not go t h i s f a r but p r e f e r r e d to rest h i s decision on "the 
business r e a l i t y " of the transactiono Denning H<,Ro f e l t t hat 
the United Dominion case uaa inconsistent with the Belsize [^stora 
casBo^^ The only d i s t i n c t i o n uss the United Dominion's case^^ 
included the e«tra uiords °or the b e n e f i t of the agreemento" He 
d i d not agree t h a t t h i s should make a l l the d i f f e r e n c e to the 
caseso i i i i t h due respect i t i s f a n c i f u l to impeach the l o g i c of 
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the United Dominions case by merely r e f e r r i n g to the d i s t i n c t i o n 
as "too f i n e " without didearding the pretence t h a t p a r t i e s are 
bound by the terms of t h e i r contracto 
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Denning MoRo r e l i e d on Mayne and McGregor on Damageso The 
learned authors agree t h a t tcihere the defendant i s the person holding 
the remaining i n t e r e s t i n the goods the p l a i n t i f f i s ent^itled t o 
compensation f o r loss of h i s l i m i t e d interesto This much i s 
agreed but yiere the defendant holds no i n t e r e s t at the time of 
the conversion i t becomes necessary to i n v e s t i g a t e the contract 
to see uihether there has been an assignmento I f there im none 
then on p r i n c i p l e the p l a i n t i f f should recover a l l and United 
Dominions case i s eonsistent with p r i n c i p l S o Mayne I McGregor 
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admit t h i s p r i n c i p l e but deal u i t h the United Dominion case under 
the wrong heading,, They deal with i t under the heading "Ulhere 
the defendant i s the person holding the remaining i n t e r e s t i n the 
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goods" instead of "Uhere the defendant i s a stranger with no 
i n t e r e s t i n the goodSo" For t h i s reason Denninga reliance on 
the G r i t i c i g j n of the United Dominion^^ case by Mayne a McGregor 
i s u n j u s t i f i e d o 
Most of the conceptual d i f f i c u l t i e s encountered here have 
r e s u l t e d from concentrating on the contract or t o r t aspect 
without recourse to the f i r s t p r i n c i p l e s on damages uihich i s to 
put the p l a i n t i f f " i n the same p o s i t i o n as he would have been 
i n i f he had not sustained the wrong f o r which he i s now g e t t i n g 
h i s compensation or reparationo" I n the i n s t a n t case the mm 
of £27'»o10s " i s a l l t h a t the finance company has l o s t and a l l 
t h a t i t should recover^® This reasoning i s not inconsistent 
with the r u l e t h a t the value of the goods i s the measure of 
dsmageso I t i s merely the guideline to quantify the p l a i n t i f f s 
l oss which i s the i n t e r e s t he has i n the goodSo The t o r t or 
contract analysis i s to be regarded as merely a step i n the enquiry 
f o r the damages suffered by the p l a i n t i f f o 
CHAPTER S 
LIMITATI0I\1 OF ACTIONS 
Bsfora July I s t j 1%0p feha general 1@H r e l a t i n g to liraitetieini 
of c i v i l astian§ was easbadied i n a series of atatyteso A f t e r t h a t 
date alraoat a l l the law i a to be found i n the L i r a i t s t i o n Act 1939, 
Thi® Act ( w i t h i t s snandment 195^^ L i m i t a t i o n Aet) applies to 
'^sGtion©° isihieh are defined to include any proceedings i n a court 
of law i n c l u d i n g an a@elegiaatie§l courto Fmm QUS p o i n t of view 
the important provisiions Br@s = 
So2(1)(@) which provides t h a t actions founded on siriplg 
c o n t r a c t or on t o r t i h a l l not be brought e f t e r the e x p i r a t i o n of 
sijs years f5?Qm the date on which the cause of action accrsjed. By 
Law Refornj ( L i m i t a t i e n ) Aet 195^ 5,2(1) the period i s three yeara 
i f damagsa are claimed f o r personal i n j u r i e s caused by negligences 
nuisance or breach of duty whether the duty ariagg out of contract 
or t o r t o 
By the L i m i t a t i o n Aet 19S3 So2 t h i g period mny be ©Ktended 
i f c e r t a i n eonditions are f u l f i l l e d . 
Accrual o f cause of action 
This l a i n p r a c t i c e the most important f a c t o r f o r the 
l i m i t a t i o n period Jadll begin to run from t h i s moment. For e^emple 
although the r e l a t i o n s h i p betwsen profeaaionsil men end t h e i r e l i g n t i 
generally w r i n g s out of p r i v i t y of contract i t may give risQ to 
m a c t i o n i n case upon t o r t . Because the accrual of cause of 
may be d i f f e r e n t i n torS frera contract w i t h i n the same ast of 
f a c t s the l i m i t a t i o n period may expire i n one and not the other 
depending on accrual of cauas of actiono 
SimilEirly bdiere the s-elationahip i n qu®si°eontraet i s 
delictusal then i t wauld mm t h a t the running gf time may not 
eoRiimence at the same t i B S o I n Letang v Cooper sicsrual of 
eauas of action isias defined aa the f a c t u s l s i t u a t i o n stated 
by the p l a i n t i f f ijjhioh i f i t i s substantiated, e n t i t l e s him 
to a remedy agsinst She defsndanto I t may be added that t h i s 
should not be takan t h a t the action must succeed f o r a l l that 
i s required i s t h a t a s t a t e of a f f a i r s e u i s t frora which the 
p l a i n t i f f can aus the defendanto 
What i s required therefore i s the eKistence of a p l a i n t i f l P 
iiiho can sue and a defendant against whom he may succeedo The 
f a c t howaver t h a t the p l a i n t i f f eould not at the f i r s t possible 
mement idemitify h i s appsnant does not prevent the CBUSE of 
a c t i o n accryingo For personal i n j u r i e s the 1963 L i m i t a t i o n Act 
So 1(3) has made i d e n t i t y of the defendant e g s e n t i a l f o r time to 
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run against the p l a i n t i f f o 
Running af Time 
I t i s w a l l s e t t l e d t h a t once tirae hag s t a r t e d to runj, i t 
does so continuously and matters which might have prevented 
i t from accruing i n the f i r s t place i f they subsequently ar i s e 
w i l l not eperate to prevent time running. I n PridenauK v tiisbbeg 
i t was held t h a t the c l o a i n g of the courts during the e i w i l t a r 
d i d not suspend the running of tiraQo 
I n Rhodeg v Sfoethurst^ the cayse of action had secrued i n 
1829 against ® peraoini liiho died i n 1830o His pergonal representstii^o 
mB not c o n s t i t u t e d u n t i l 1835 due to dispute over h i s w i l l o The 
court deslined to sceept the suggestion t h a t the i n t e r v a l betwsan 
ia3Q and 1835 should be omitted i n c a l c u l a t i n g timeo 
Therg are howswer ejteeptions = some s t a t u t o r y and eorae 
ease law => I n Seagrem v Knight i t u®8 held t h a t where s persona 
e n t i t l e d to a r i g h t of action dies before the action i s brought 
and the pereon to be sued under the r i g h t i s made the deceased°a 
administratorp the running of time i s thereypon suspended so long 
as t h i s dual ri capacity eontinues. This ease has been c r i t i c i s e d 
but the contrary opinion can only lead to fraudo I t bsiuld howsver 
appear from Bowring Hanbury'a Trustee v Sowring Hanbury^ t h a t t h i s 
exception i s only l i m i t e d to administrators and ha© no a p p l i c a t i o n 
to where the t e r t f e a s a r i s made an executor of deeeasedo 
Ceasing of Running of Time 
This w i l l occur when proceedings i n which the s t a t u t e i a 
m a t e r i a l have been commencedo The law's delays i n b r i n g i n g 
proceedings to a conclusion n e i t h e r prejudice nor a s s i s t the 
p a r t i e s . Time w i l l normally cease on the date of the issue 
of w r i t but as " a c t i o n " i s defined under So31(c) of the Act 
to include any proceeding i n a court of laWj i n c l u d i n g e c e l e a i a s t i e e l 
courto time w i l l cease to run from the datg of the apprapriate 
o r i g i n a t i n g proeesgo The o r i g i n a t i n g process must howsver not be 
a n u l l i t y f o r t h i s w i l l not prevent time from Sunningo 
Finallys, time w i l l only cease to run i n connection with the 
cause of action to be enforced i n the proceeding© and fejill not 
operate i n other causes of action against the defendant. 
E f f l u x i o n s f the l i m i t a t i o n period 
Statute has i n dome eases provided t h a t the e f f e c t of e f f l u x i o n 
of time i@ to extinguish the righto Thus So3 of 1939 L i m i t a t i o n 
Act provides t h a t t i t l e to p e r s o n a l i t y may be extinguished a f t e r 
the l i m i t a t i o n period has expired. This apart the general e f f e c t 
of the L i m i t a t i o n Act i s merely proeedural and therefore only 
a f f e c t s the remedy and not the r i g h t o Thus a defendant who wishes 
to r e l y on the l i m i t a t i o n period must g p e c i f i e a l l y plead ito The 
c o u r t s fiasy by i t s r u l e s under ao 99(1)(a) of the Suprame Court of 
Judicature (Conseolidation) Act 1925 allow a p l a i n t i f f tsiha issued 
a d e f e c t i v e w r i t w i t h i n timg to emend i t a f t e r the e x p i r a t i o n of 
timso 
Accrual of Cause of Action ° T o r t and Contract 
Isn Gibbs V Guild i t was stated t h a t i t i s s e t t l e d t h a t i n 
assumpsit t h a t "^time ran from the breach of contractj, f o r t h a t 
was the g i s t of the a c t i o n , and t h a t subsequent damags ooo d i d 
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not prevent the a p p l i c a t i o n of the statutSo" Thus i n B a t t l s y v 
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Faulkner the p i s i i n t i f f contracted to buy i ^ r i n g wheat i n 1810 
from the defendanto The defendant delivered winter wheat which 
the p l a i n t i f f without knowing of t h i s sold to t h i r d party as 
^ r i n g wheato This f a c t d i d not anerge u n t i l 1811 when the t h i r d 
party sowed the wheat. The t h i r d party brought an action against 
the p l a i n t i f f and obtained judgment against him i n 1818, The 
p l a i n t i f f then s t a r t e d proceedings against She defendento I t was 
held t h a t as the breach to d e l i v e r ^ r i n g wheat oeGurred i n 1810 
t h i s t!^s the date t h a t the cause of action accrued. The f a c t 
t h a t the p l a i n t i f f was "damaged" i n 1818 was not the date of accaaslo 
I t may be questioned here whether a c t u a l l y a separation csn 
possibly e x i s t between the date of the breach and the damage i n @ 
c o n t r a c t action? Can i t not be argued t h a t here the dsJTsega 
occurred at the same time as the breach and t h a t no d i s t i n c t i o n GEH 
be drawn between the breach which ^ives r i s e to cause of action 
and damage which i s mere q u a n t i f i c a t i o n of the p l a i n t i f f ' s loss 
from the breachoia Thus wherever the consideration i n contrasts 
i s t a n g i b l e then the breach and damage always occur the seme 
time, Te b u i l d a defect i v e house i s a breach of contract and thys 
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s damage t@ the party and t h i s i s so whether he knowe i t or not. 
I n c o n t r a c t the cause of ac t i o n i s breach of duty, Thie point 
i a e s s e n t i a l f o r i t has introduced mush of the confusion i n the 
law as to running of time i n t o r t and contract especially where 
the defendant i s a pr o f e s s i o n a l person. 
I t i s therefore suggested t h a t i n moat contracts breach and 
damage occur the same time. Thus i n executory contracts the breach 
and necessarily the damage occur; when the defendant f S i l s to 
perform h i e o b l i g a t i o n . This i s also the case with u n i l a t e r a l 
c o n t r a c t s f o r unless the p l a i n t i f f performs h i s o b l i g a t i o n there 
can be no breach and necesearily no damage u n t i l the defendant f a i l a 
t o perform h i s . 
I n t o r t on the other hand apart from those actionable per 
se damage i s e s s e n t i a l f o r the cause of action t o accrue. There 
can be no question of an occupier of premises being l i a b l e f o r 
the s t a t e of hi@ premises or by v i r t u e of the rule i n Rylsnds v 
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Fle t c h e r unless damage i s proved. S i m i l a r l y there cannot be 
negligence i n vacuo and s p l a i n t i f f to succeed has to show damags. 
Consequently i n these t o r t s damage determines the time from u^iich 
a cause of action accruesj The l e g i s l a t u r e has Jfltpliedly approved 
t h i s view by SOICIJ) of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Act 193ij which provides thats 
"Where damage has been suffered by reason of sny act 
or omission i n respect of which a cause of action 
would have subsisted against any person i f th a t person 
had not died before or at the same time as the damage 
tjiffls suffered,, there s h a l l be deemedj f o r the purposes 
of t h i s Aet5 t o have been subsisting against him before 
h i s death sueh cause of action i n respect of t h a t act or 
omission as wauld have eubsiated i f he had died a f t e r the 
damage was suff e r e d , " 
There i s eminent support f o r t h i s by Clerk 6 L i n d s e l l on Torts!^ 
They stated; »Uhen the t o r t i s actionable only on proof of damage„ 
then there i s no cause of a c t i o n , and time does not begin to 
run iS u n t i l some damage a c t u a l l y occurs," They ©upport t h i s by 
s t a t i n g t h a t i n eases of withdrawal of ©jpport each subsidence gives 
an independent cause of action which may be sued f o r w i t h i n the 
12 
s i n years f o l l o w i n g the occurrence. S i m i l a r l y where negligence 
i s the cause of action a person i n j u r e d by n e g l i g e n t l y manufactured 
c h a t t e l may sue the manufacturer w i t h i n three years of sustaining 
the i n j u r y even though more than three years have elapsed since 
13 
the c h a t t e l l e f t the manufacturers. 
There i s however respectable a u t h o r i t y which take a contrary 
viewo Charleswnrth on Wegligence^** states t h a t " i n an action of 
negligences, the cause of action accrues at the time of the negligence 
because i t i s then t h a t the damage i s caused,, even though i t s 
consequences may not be apparent u n t i l l a t e r , " The question raised 
may be tr e a t e d under two headings i n accordance with the nature 
of the damage;° 
1o Where the i n j u r y occurred outside the L i m i t a t i o n period but 
i s discovered w i t h i n the L i m i t a t i o n period 
15 
I n Archer v Cetton Sts-eatfield J, s i t e d t h i s paaaaga with 
approval. The p l a i n t i f f uras employed by the defendants between 
1923 and WO, The work e n t a i l e d the casting o f f of f i n e dust and 
i n October 19«*3 the p l a i n t i f f f o r f i r s t time found himself to be 
s u f f e r i n g from chest c o n d i t i o n which he alleged had been caused by 
the f i n e dust. On September 27, 'iSkS he issued & w r i t against the 
defendants claiming damages f o r negligence and breach of statutory 
duty. 
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16 I t was held applying Howgll v Young t h a t the p l a i n t i f f s 
cause of action accrued up to 194>Q and the w r i t not having been 
issued u n t i l more than s i x years t h e r e a f t e r h i s claim must f a i l . 
The d i f f i c u l t y always encountered i n these cases was stated 
by Lord Reid i n Cart ledge ^ Jo^Mn'''^ when he said t h a t ; 
°it appears ooo unreasonable and u n j u s t i f i a b l e i n p r i n c i p l e 
t h a t a cause of action should be held t o accrue before i t 
i a possible t o diesover any i n j u r y and, therefore^ before 
i t i s possible to rai s e any a c t i o n , " 
Lord Reid however want on to explain why he WBB unable to help 
an i n j u r e d p l a i n t i f f t o escape the f e t t e r s of the L i m i t a t i o n Act 
1939, Thus he went ons 
' ' i f t h i s were a matter governed by the common law I would 
hold t h a t a cause of action ought not to be held to accrue 
u n t i l e i t h e r the injjured person has discovered the 
i n j u r y or i t wauld be possible f o r him to discover i t 
i f he took such steps as t?sre reasonable i n the 
circumatancBSo The common law ought never to produce 
a wholly unreasonable r e s u l t , " 
As the question before the court depended on i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 
statutep the L i m i t a t i o n Act 1939„ i t use impossible f o r the learned 
Lord to reach the r e s u l t he wished. 
Lord PearcB i n Cartledge v Joplin'e case^^ c i t e d Lard Halsbury 
19 
i n Parley Main C o l l i e r y Co v M i t c h e l l where i t was ©aids 
"^Ws3 one w i l l t h i n k of di s p u t i n g the pro p o s i t i o n t h a t 
f o r one cause gf action you must recover e l l damages 
i n c i d e n t to i t by law once and forever, A house t h a t 
has received a shock may not at once show s l l the 
damage done to i t ^ but i t i a damaged nonetheleas to the 
extent t h a t i t i s damaged, and the f a c t that the damage 
only manifests i t s e l f l a t e r on by stages does not a l t e r 
the f a c t t h a t the damage i s there; and so of the more 
complex mechanism of human frame„ the damage i s done i n a 
railway accident„ the whole machinery i s injured» though 
i t may escape the eye or even the conaeiousnass of the 
s u f f e r e r at the time 5 the l a t e r stages of s u f f e r i n g are 
but the raa^nitfeatatioos of the damage donBj, and consequent 
upon the i n j u r y suatainedo" 
Following t h i s reasoning h i s lordship held t h a t the time 
began to run at the time of damage and not at the time of 
knowledge of the damage. I t i s submitted t h a t the learned Lord 
i n h i s r u l i n g may have confused the issues. E a r l i e r i n h i s 
judgment he c i t e d the case of F i t t e r v Uesl or F e t t e r v Beale or 
20 
Ferrer v Beale bihere the p l a i n t i f f a f t e r recovering damages 
f o r assault and ba t t e r y discovered that a f t e r a l l h i s i n j u r i e s 
ware more serious than he supposed them to be. He then sought 
to b r i n g a second action f o r the discovered damage. I t was held 
t h a t he had one cause of action isihich had been extinguished by 
the judgnent i n the former easBo This p r i n c i p l e has never been 
doubted and Lord Halsbury's dictum must be confined to where a 
p l a i n t i f f seeks to b r i n g a second action. The issue before the 
House of Lords i n Cartledge w J o p l i n uas separate and distinguishablQ 
because the appellant d i d not seek to br i n g a second action f o r 
fr e s h damage but UBS suing to recover f o r damage which was 
discovered long a f t e r i t s i n c e p t i o n . On t h i s basis Lord Raid's 
judgment by t r e a t i n g the issue as based on the L i m i t a t i o n Act 
i s t o be p r e f e r r e d to t h a t of Lord Pearce who treated i t as 
e s s e n t i a l l y a consnon law questions, but r e l i e d on the a u t h o r i t i e s 
on where the p l a i n t i f f a f t e r b r i n g i n g h i s f i r s t action subsequently 
discovered t h a t he uas damaged more than he thought and seeks 
to sue f o r t h i s newly discovered damage. I t i s submitted that 
i f Lord Reid had viewed the issue i n Cartledge v Jo p l i n ' s case 
as governed by the common law he would have held t h a t time can 
only begin to run when the damage u^s discovered. This i s 
expressed i n h i s judgment c i t e d above. 
2o Where the breach of duty occurred outside the L i m i t a t i o n 
p e r i o d but the damage occurs w i t h i n the L i m i t a t i o n period 
Lord Reid i n Cartledge v J o p l i n c i t e d 
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Davie v Mew Merton Board as r a i s i n g the problem and 
answered t h a t accrual i s at time of damage. He saids 
"Such cases as Davie v New Merton Board show tha t under the law ,,o several years may not i n f r e q u e n t l y elapse between the l a s t negligent o r wrongful act of the 
defendant and the date when the cause of action f i r s t 
accrues. I n Dawies case the period was seven years. 
That i s because i n those cases the danger created by 
the defendant only causes damage to the p l a i n t i f f at a 
mush l a t e r date," 
There was no doubt to him tha t accrual ms the l a t e r date. 
Much confusion as to accrual i n t o r t has undoubtedly arisen 
from use of '^negligent^ to describe breaches of contract at a 
time idien no independent t o r t of negligence had been recognised 
and the tendency to r e l y on those cases where the duty has 
always been regarded iss c o n t r a c t u a l , Howell v Voung^^ which 
was r e l i e d b y S t r e a t f i e l i J^was an action against a s o l i c i t o r 
and thus one i n contract even though sounding i n t o r t . I t i s 
th e r e f o r e submitted t h a t where a sepasate cause of action e x i s t s 
independent of the contract but a r i s i n g out of the ssme f a c t s as 
the breach of contract the cause of action w i l l not accrue i n 
con t r a c t snd i n t o r t at the btaie time. The breach w i l l bs the 
accrual i n contract and the damage the accrual i n t o r t . 
I t has never been denied t h a t as under Donoghue v Stevenson^^ 
a manufacturer owes a duty of care to ul t i m a t g consumer of 
h i s goods q u i t e apart from the duty owed to the purchaser. 
Time w i l l only run against the consumer from the date of damage 
although the breach of contract and accrual i n contract may 
have taken place e a r l i e r o Wow the ult i m a t e consumer may also 
be the purchaser and i t i s d i f f i c u l t how i f he has a separate 
a c t i o n i n t o r t time would begin to run against him i n t o r t from 
the time of breach of c o n t r a c t . Such a conclusion wauld be to 
apply yinterbottom v U r i q h t ^ ^ i n reverse and w i l l have no more 
me r i t i n modern law than would t h a t case i n i t s e l f o 
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I n Bagot v Stevens Scanlan £ Co, the defendant 
a r c h i t e c t s ware employed i n 1955 by the p l a i n t i f f to supervise 
the c o n s t r u c t i o n of drainso The supervision continued u n t i l 
February 1957, I n or about the end of 1961 as a r e s u l t of 
various f a i l u r e s i n the const r u c t i o n of the drainagp several 
pipes burst and damaged the premises, 
A w r i t was issued on A p r i l 2p 1963 more than s i x years 
a f t e r the date of the l a s t supervision. The defendants 
pleaded the L i m i t a t i o n Act 1939, I t i s important to note 
t h a t i n the preliminary question as to accrual of cause of 
a c t i o n the argument centred on whether the cause of action 
was i n ; 
(1) contract alonei 
(2) t o r t alone; 
(3) t o r t o r c o n t r a c t , 
Diplock LoJ, held t h a t the duty here was purely a c o n t r a c t u a l 
duty and t h a t the cause of action was purely i n conts'act. On 
t h i s f i n d i n g the l i m i t a t i o n period began to run from the date 
of the l a s t Inspectiono He said; 
"Having regard to the nature of the duty which 
i s alleged to have been breached i n t h i s casSp 
i n effect;, to see t h a t the drains were properly 
designed and b u i l t j the damage from any breach 
of t h a t duty must have occurred at the time when 
the drains were improperly b u i l t , because the 
p l a i n t i f f at t h a t time was landed with property 
which had bad drains when he ought to have 
been provided with property which had good drains, 
Ulhat happened i n 1961 was merely a consequence 
of the damage r e s u l t i n g from the o r i g i n a l breach," 
This case has been c r i t i c i s e d not on the r u l i n g on contract 
but f o r not i n f e r r i n g t h a t a cause of action may e x i s t i n t o r t . 
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27 I t hag Eilready been pointed i n an e a r l i e r chapter t h a t Hedley^ 
28 
Byrne v H e l l e r layst have opened l i a b i l i t y i n negligence independent 
of c o n t r a c t 5 f o r ©uch pr o f e s s i o n a l negligence. 
More m i t has been c r i t i c i s e d on the holding t h a t even i f 
a cause of action existed i n t o r t the damage and hence the accruQl 
of cause of action i n t o r t was at the same time as i n contract, 
bJith due respect t h i s i s wrong. To supply a defective ^ o d can 
o o n s t i t u t e E breach of contract tJithout c o n s t i t u t i n g physical damage 
f o r an ac t i o n i n t o r t by the p l a i n t i f f . I f physical damage then 
occurs there aeemg no reason why t h i i happening ehould not be 
a d d i t i o n a l cause of action i n t o r t . Also to consider the damage 
to the property = as d i s t i n c t from raerely the breaking of the drain° 
eg thasisBlvegi was to t r e a t the p l a i n t i f f a© i f the House of 
29 
Lords said i n Donoghye v Stevenson that the p l a i n t i f f ' s complaint 
i s t h a t her ginger beer was less good than i t ought to be. Her 
subsequent i l l n e s g i was merely a consequent of t h a t and as she had 
no c o n t r a c t with the defendant her action f a i l s . That exactly i s 
what the HOUSQ of Lorda did not say and i t i s therefore submitted 
t h a t DiploGk bss wrong i n not i n f e r r i n g m independent t o r t and 
the r e f o r e a d i f f e r e n t accrual of action i n t o r t . I t i s c l e a r t h a t 
the c o n t r a c t cannot a f f e c t a t h i r d party r i g h t of action i n t o r t . 
Thus i f the neighbour of the p l a i n t i f f i n BQgot Q y Stevens to GBSG 
had been damaged by the f l o o d i n g he can maintain m a c t i o n i n t o r t , 
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I f the r u l i n g i n Bagot v Stevens i s correct t h i s M i l l create soEa 
g t e r t l i n g reoylt®. Because the damage and therefore the eccruQl 
of cause 0f sction ms said to be the same i n t o r t and i n contract 
the r e s u l t wauld be th a t the t h i r d party would b@ i n m b e t t e r 
p o s i t i o n thsn the p l a i n t i f f 
i n Bagot v S t e v e n s , T o hold otherwise wauld sanount to the 
mechanical jurisprudence t h a t i r r e s p e c t i v e of occurrence of damage 
the accrual of cause of action w i l l nevertheless depend on the 
c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between the p l a i n t i f f and the defendant. 
The more proximate the p a r t i e s are by contract the more re a d i l y 
the causes of action w i l l be fused i n t o the breach. E i t h e r CQn= 
e l u s i o n i s wrong and i t i s submitted t h a t the correct view i a 
t h a t damage and not breach of duty i a the cause of action i n t o r t . 
This problem received considerable a t t e n t i o n i n the Court 
of Appeal i n the case of Sparham^Souter v Town Developments (Essex) 
I n IS&k Toum and Country Developments (Essex) L t d , wished to 
b u i l d a new housing estate i n Benfleetj, Essex, They applied t o 
the l o c a l authorityp the Benfleet Urban D i s t r i c t Councilp f o r 
planning permission and the Council passed the plana t] a j b j e c t to 
the b u i l d e r s complying with the b u i l d i n g byelaws. 
On May Sp 19S5 the developers s t a r t e d work and the cou n c i l 
surveyor inspected the wark and passed i t . On September 30, 19S5, 
the houses were completed and passed by the c o u n c i l , Qn October°23 
and November 29 19S5 the developers agreed to s e l l one property 
to Mr, and Mrs, Sparham-Souther and one to MFO Rysn, Qn Deoember 
15p 1965s ^he l o c a l c o u n c i l c e r t i f i e d t h a t the properties had been 
inspected and they found no reason to question the l e g a l i t y of 
the work c a r r i e d out under the b u i l d i n g byelaws. On November 12p 
19S5p and January 25 , 19S6p the conveyances to the purchasers werg 
completed. 
Two or three years l a t e r cracks appeared on the b r i c k work 
and the houses became uninhabitable. The cause of these was tha t 
the foundations were inadequate to support the load. 
On October 22p 1971p the plaintiff© issued the w r i t i n t h i s 
a c t i o n f o r damages a l l e g i n g negligence of the developers and slso 
of the surveyor of the c o u n c i l i n passing the work as s a t i s f a c t o r y 
uiien he ought not to have done so. The p l a i n t i f f s r e l i e d on 
the decision of Cusaek J, i n Dutton v Bognor Regis Urban D i s t r i c t 
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Council which was af f i r m e d by the Court of Appeal, 
The Council denied l i a b i l i t y and pleaded th a t the action 
was barred under the S,2(1) of the L i m i t a t i o n Act 1939, This 
provides t h a t : 
"The f o l l o w i n g actions s h a l l not be brought a f t e r the 
e x p i r a t i o n of six years from the date on which the cause 
of action accrued t h a t i s to 8ay;= (a) actions founded on 
simple contract or on t o r t ; 
audge Worman RichardSp at f i r s t instancBp a f t e r considering 
the j u d p i e n t s i n Dutton v Bognor Regis Urbsn t ) i a t r i c t Council^^ 
which decided t h a t damage a r i s i n g from breach of duty by the 
l o c a l a u t h o r i t y i n the circumstances was actionable i n negligencSp 
heldp t h a t time began to run from the l a s t negligent act gi v i n g 
r i s e to the s i t u a t i o n from which the damage flowed. He stateds 
t'The WDrds ^ i n section 2(1) of the Act of 1939 7 
"cause of aFtion' are used to c o n s t i t u t e and deFine 
d i f f e r e n t situationSp such as the doing of the negligent 
act complained of and the occasion when damage enauBE), 
But eo f a r as the st a t u t e i s concerned i t must connote 
a s i t u a t i o n where f o r the f i r s t time there i s a p o t e n t i a l 
p l a i n t i f f p and i n the i n s t a n t case t h a t date i s i n my 
judgment when these p l a i n t i f f s took possession of t h e i r 
p l o t s J namelyp i n December 1965 and January 1966p when 
CDmpletion took place„ both of which are w i t h i n the six° 
year period, as indeed are the dates when they reepEctively 
entered i n t o t h e i r c o n t r a c t t o purchases and the question 
before ros must theref o r e be resolved i n favour of the 
p l a i n t i f f s , " 
The l o c a l a u t h o r i t y appealed on the ground that the judge 
had erred i n law by holding t h a t the cause of action could not 
and d i d not accrue u n t i l the f i r s t purchasers took possession 
of the relevant premises. 
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To pesolve t h i s issue as to isihen the cauag of action 
accrued and thus time began to sun against the p l a i n t i f f s i t 
i s necessary to go bask to f i r s t p r i n c i p l e s as to liJhat i s cause 
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of a c t i o n , f o r negligencBo I n Cartledge v J o p l i n Lord Pearce 
said: 
"ooo no cause of action arises unless and u n t i l the 
p l a i n t i f f can show some ac t u a l injuryo l\!or?nally the i n j u r y 
i s contemporaneous with the wrongful act, but i t i s not 
necessarily SD„ I n the present casSj, t h e r e f o r e , the 
causes of act i o n d i d not accrue u n t i l some actionable 
i n j u r y ms caused to the p l a i n t i f f s by the defendants 
breach of duty,." 
I t i s f o r t h e r important to r e i t e r a t e a point made e a r l i e r t h a t 
a cause of action cannot e x i s t i n vacuOo There must be s pl e i c D t i f f 
before a breach of duty can mature i n t o a cause of action f o r 
the L i m i t a t i o n t o begiOo Thus Uanghan Williams L o J o i n Thoraaaon v 
Lord ClanfBsrris^^ said; 
"A s t a t u t e of L i n j i t a t i o n s cannot begin to run unless 
there are tm things present = a party capable of 
suing and e party - l i a b l e t o be suedo°" 
Applying these tfcio p r o p o s i t i o n s to the present esse Lord Denning 
MoRo held t h a t the cause of action accrues, not at the time ef 
the negligent making or passing of the foundations, nor at the 
time when the l a t e s t owner bought the houae, but at the time the 
house began to sink and the cracks eppearedo This would be 
the time tjhen the owner of the house can reasonably be expected 
to know t h a t he may hav/e a cause of action» 
Having adopted t h i s view Lord Denning MoRo attempted to 
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reconcile i t with Cartledge y 3oplino He said "there the damags 
to the man ms i n f a c t done when the dust was inhaled = even 
i t was not discovered t i l l latere Here there was no damags to any purchaser of the house u n t i l i t began to sink and cracks 
.3S 
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This i n e f f e c t i s s question of f a c t end the t i a ^ et what 
time d i d the damage Qceus" and Lord Denning MoRo explanation of 
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Cartledge v J o p l i n is eonaiatent with the ts-eatment given to 
i t i n the preeeeding heading i o B o tihe^e the damage occurred 
Qutaide the L i m i t a t i o n period but i s discovered u i t h i n the 
L i m i t a t i o n periodo 
There i s hoiisver @ po i n t of divergence betusen the views 
advanced and the judgment o f Lord Denning MoRo He j u s t i f i e d the 
d i f f e r e n t accrual of cause of action i n Sparhesn-Sou her'a ease 
by s t a t i n g t h a t " i t would be most u n f a i r t h a t time ^ o u l d run 
against him before he knows = or has any p o s s i b i l i t y of knowing = 
th a t he has a cause of actions'^ and added th a t t h i s i s uihat Lord 
Raid said i n Castledge w J o p l i n u^ien speaking of cases governed 
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by the common lawo This explanation i s not acceptableo 
I n the f i r s t place i t i s not convincing t h a t Cartledge y Joplin^ 
was governed e n t i r e l y by Statute ujhile the issue before the Court 
of Appeal i n Sparham°Soute? ma one based on the common lauo 
I n both cases the issue UBS the same and t h a t i a at uihat time 
should the cause of action accrue f o r tins to begin to run? To 
determine t h i s depended on ujhen the p l a i n t i f f suffered the damagSo 
Secondly Lord Denning MoRo explanation aeem§ to regard the 
r u l i n g i n BaQot v Stevens as s t i l l good law even though l a t e r , 
i n h i s judgment he recamted h i s e a r l i e r approval of t h a t r u l i n g 
in Dutton v Bogi-nor Regis UoDoCo Dnce the pretext t h a t Sparhem= 
Souter^^ and Cartledge v J o p l i n ^ ^ are not governed by the same 
issue i s removed and i t i s admitted t h a t at the bottom of the 
issue i s when d i d damage occur f o r time to begin to run i t becomes 
d i f f i c u l t to see fjihy the same p o l i c y considerationa that aided 
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the p l a i n t i f f i n Sparham=Souter''s^^ case should not have aided 
the p l a i n t i f f i n Cartledge v Joplin^'^o I n t h i s chapter the 
submission has been th a t the damages occurred at d i f f e r e n t timeso 
While i n Cartledge v J o p l i n ^ ^ the p l a i n t i f f suffered damage 
udien he inhaled the dust i n Sparham-Sou=her the negligence d i d 
not give r i s e to damage u n t i l the cracks sppearedo That i s when 
to a l l i n t e n t s and purposes the house was less than what i t 
ought to bSo Therefore, to say t h a t time begins to accrue when 
the p l a i n t i f f s knows or ought to know of the defect i s to imply 
t h a t the damage occurred at an e a r l i e r tiraSo I f t h i s i s when 
the p l a i n t i f f uas landed with a house with defective foundation 
the r e s u l t i s to adopt the decision i n Bagot v Stevens which i s 
already discreditedo I t i s therefore submitted t h a t SparhEra°Soyter°@^ 
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case should be tre a t e d as separate from Cartledge v Joplin„ I t 
should be tr e a t e d as coming under where the breach of duty occurred 
outside the l i m i t a t i o n p eriod but the damags occurred w i t h i n the 
l i m i t a t i o n periodo This i s consistent with what Lord Raid said 
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t h a t i n such cases as Davie v Wew Merton Board H i l l s , "the 
danger created by the defendant only causes damage to the p l a i n t i f f 
at a mueh l a t e r d a t S o " 
I t would appear t h a t most of the d i f f i c u l t y encountered as 
to accrual of cause of action i s a t t r i b u t a b l e to r e f e r r i n g damage 
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as meaning both actu a l and contingento I n Sparhsm=Souter's case 
the damage was merely contingent and t h i s should make a l l the 
diffBrencSo Geoffrey Lane L o J o said t h a t i n Cartledge v J o p l i n 
damage was done to the p l a i n t i f f and the cause of action accrues 
from the moment of the f i r s t i n j u r y a l b e i t undetected and undetect-
able. "That i s not so where the negligence has caused unobservable 
damage not to the p l a i n t i f f ' s body hut to h i s hausso He can get 
r i d of h i a house before any damage i s aufferedo Wot so with 
h i s body"^^ Thus i f X buys a car with defective brakes t h i s 
may give r i s e to breach of contract and thus time w i l l begin to 
run at purchasSo But u n t i l X i s damaged or s u f f e r s physical 
damage as r e s u l t of the f a u l t y brakes h i s cause of action i n 
t o r t does not accrueo 
L i m i t a t i o n period i n Bailment £ Conversion 
Action i n t o r t l i e s f o r the wrongful detention or the 
wrongful conversion of the c h a t t e l s of snothero Conversion 
takes e f f e c t when the defendant deals with the property i n a 
way amounting to d e n i a l of Oimershipo This therefore w i l l be 
the accrual of cause of action and as knowledge of t h i s i s not 
e s s e n t i a l i t i a possible t h a t time may run out before the 
p l a i n t i f f knowso Beaman v AoRoToSo^^ 
Section 3 of the L i m i t a t i o n Act 1939 adopts the Roman Law 
concept of usucapion to c h a t t e l s and accordingly provides t h a t 
on the e f f l u x i o n of time c a l c u l a t e d from the f i r s t act of con-
version the t i t l e to property w i l l be extinguishedo I t f u r t h e r 
provided J thus o v e r r u l i n g Itlilkinson v Werity^^ which was never 
regarded as good laWp t h a t time w i l l not begin to run and there= 
f o r e there i s no new accruals, i f w i t h i n the L i m i t a t i o n period 
a f u r t h e r act of conversion of the same c h a t t e l takes placHo 
Bailment on the other hand generally re s t s on contract 
express or i m p l i e d o The r e l a t i o n s h i p consists of one party 
depositing a r t i c l e with another c a l l e d b a i l e s to be redelivered 
on demando The r e f u s a l to r e - d e l i v e r w i l l therefore consist 
breach of bailment and time w i l l begin to run from the rafusalo 
Therefore demand i s e s s e n t i a l f o r breach of bailmento 
Wow t h i s breach of bailment may give r i s e to en actien 
i n conversion or detinuso SUppose therefore that X b a i l s 
a r t i c l e s to Y f o r 1D yearSo A f t e r two years V s e l l s the a r t i c l S o 
Eight years l a t e r X makes h i s demando This s i t u a t i o n arose i n 
Beaman v A o R o T o S o L t d o ^ ' ^ 
I n 1935 the p l a i n t i f f deposited goods with the defendantSo 
I n ISkD because of conditions i t became d i f f i c u l t to get 
i n touch with the p l a i n t i f f or continue with the b a i l m & i t o 
The defendants a f t e r i nspecting the goods gave them away to 
the Salvation Army i n August of t h a t yearo This amounted to 
conversiono I n 19^6 the p l a i n t i f f made her demand f o r the goods 
and i n November issued w r i t 5 s i x years a f t e r the act of con^-
version b^ the defendantSo 
At f i r s t instances, Denning Jo had no doubt on the preliminary 
question as to running of time t h a t the action was barred i n torto 
This i s because as the act of conversion i s the accrual of cause 
of a c t i o n t h i s ma i n August "iSkQ and i t was immaterial that 
the p l a i n t i f f d i d not know of i t o But as to running of t i n e i f 
the action uss brought i n contract f o r breach of bailment he had 
t h i s to sayo The eontract uss "to store the goods and to re= 
d e l i v e r on demand^ the period of l i m i t a t i o n i n respect of that 
breach would only begin to run from the date t h a t the cause of 
act i o n accruedp i o E o from the e a r l i e s t date on which the defendants 
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f a i l e d to d e l i v e r on demand;, tiihich was Augusts, 19^*So" 
He was reversed i n the Court of Appeal but not on t h i s 
p o i n t and i t i s submitted t h a t h i s reasoning cannot be irapeachedc 
Demand i s the essence f o r breach of bailment and time can only 
begin t o run from r e f u s a l to delivero This r e s u l t produces on 
i n t e r e s t i n g double v i s i o n f o r i t acknowledges c e r t a i n r i g h t of 
act i o n by the p l a i n t i f f i n bailment when i n conversion So3 of 
the 1939 Act provides t h a t the p l a i n t i f f has none,. 
Agsinst t h i s view i t nsy be argued t h a t why should the 
bresch of eontrsct not oecyr at the sarag l^irae as the eonversion? 
A f t e r a l l , the r e f u s a l to thg dGmand i@ mgrely the consequence 
of the conversiono Thias whera the bailee deals with a r t i c l e 
i n a mannir amQunting t o eonversisn ha broke the contract and 
the breach i s the accrual of cause of actioHo Knowledge a f t e r 
a l l i e not gssentialo Thi@ i s powsrful argument but i t f a i l s on 
the e s s e n t i a l requirement t h a t dimand i s e s s e n t i a l . Again i t 
was argued above t h a t the contract should fesat l i m i t the t o r t and 
t h a t the same reaBsning should apply here m that the t o r t may 
not hinder the contract aetiono Therefore the rules of contract 
should be separate from t o r t actionso To attempt a conformity 
w i l l only lead to r i g i d i t y i n the law as witnessed already i n 
the chapter on t h i r d p a rty rightSo I t i s healthy t h a t a p l a i n t i f f 
may have h i s a c t i o n s t a t y t e •= barred i n t o r t when i n contract he 
can s t i l l b r i n g an act i o n o 
A1§Q p o l i c y should apply t o help the owner of goods to 
as f a r as possible recover the goods or the valyeo The p r i n c i p l e 
supported here w i l l not adversely a f f e c t t h i r d party r i g h t i a f t e r 
the l i m i t a t i o n period has expired f o r t h i r d party seSatioiniohip 
w i t h p l a i n f i f f w i l l always be t o r t i o u s and therofore governed 
fey the r u l e f e ^ conversion under which the afition wsuld be 
statutg=barr@do 
I n cenclusion the cases so f a r e s t a b l i s h the f o l l o w i n g 
(1) Where the duty i s baaed i n contract alone the breach 
i s the cause of actiono The use of the word "negligent" i n t h i s 
context confuses rather than elucidates f o r i t i s merely i n a 
n o t i o n a l sense t o describe a manner of the breech of contracto^^ 
(2) Certain status create independent r e l a t i o n s h i p i n 
t o r t apart from contract eogo common car r i e r p common inkeepeSj, 
b a i l o r and bailee and dentisto The p l a i n t i f f may sue e i t h e r i n 
t o r t or i n contract and here the accrual of cause of action may 
be d i f f e r e n t timeSo^^ 
(3) Where no contract e x i s t s between the p a r t i e s the 
damage i s th® cause of action and therefore the accrual of the 
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cause of actiono 
Ulhere an action may be found i n contract and i n t o r t 
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the decision of the Court of Appeal i n Esse v Mardon confirms 
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the view advocated and r e j e c t s d i c t a i n Bagot v Stevens that 
time begins to run i n t o r t as i n contract from the breach of duty. 
Damage i s e s s e n t i a l fbr time to begin to run i n t o r t o 
§7 
CHAPTER 7 
TORT OR C0I\1TRACT I(\) PRIVATE H\ITER[\!ATIQl\iAL LAld 
I t has already been seen t h a t i n municipal law the 
h i s t o r i c a l o r i g i n s of t o r t end contract have l e f t some 
t e c h n i c a l r u l e s which separate them and may make i t edvantagsous 
f o r ©plaintiff to sua i n t o r t or i n contraeto For example 
i n a con t r a c t f o r carriage of goods, apart from the express 
and i m p l i e d d u t i e s there may e x i s t a duty i n the genersl law 
of negligencBo 
I n p r i v a t e i n t e r n a t i o n a l law t h i s separation has been 
c a r r i e d on and while attempts have been made i n municipal law 
f o r eonsistensy i n a p p l i c a t i o n of p r i n c i p l e s the c o n f l i c t of 
laws r u l e have lagged behindo Thus where d i f f e r e n t systems 
reveal concurrence of r i g h t s of action i n one f a c t s i t u a t i o n 
a co u r t fcjill have to decide whether to give prlmasy to one or 
the other or to nongo For example, a duty may e x i s t i n t o r t 
which i s RiSdifiBd by contract betwaen the partieso The place 
of the contract and of the t o r t are not the ssmeo One l e g a l 
system may allow the m o d i f i c a t i o n and another may not allow i t o 
The question of choice of law becomes relsvanto The action 
may be brought i n another l e g a l systemo To what extent should 
the l e x f o r i apply? Lord Simonds i n L i s t e r v Romford Ice & 
Gold Storage EOo Ltdo said t h a t "where the queotions of the 
c o n f l i c t of laws a r i s e , the courts, as might be expected, have 
gone o f f i n a l l d i r e c t i o n s , and the character of the astion as 
t o r t or contract has become entangled with other ruleso" 
I n Matthew v Kuwait Betehul the p l u i n t i f f was i n j u r e d when 
he f e l l i n t o a trench i n order to avoid a crane which swung 
touards hira. The accident took place i n Kuisfflito The contract 
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of (smployment iisis signed i n England and provided t h a t English 
law should govemo The gmployers uere resident I n Panamao The 
question here was not one of proper law of t o r t or contract but 
whether the p l a i n t i f f f o r the purpose of the Rules of Suprome 
Court Ordo I I ro 1 ( f ) can b r i n g h i s action i n contracto The Court 
of Appeal held he couldo I t may however be asked tj^iat law should 
apply once the persansl j u r i s d i c t i o n i s eppliedo The snswsr 
w i l l depend on whether English law i s the lex l o c i d e l i c t i 5 or 
the proper law of the contract or the lex f o r i o 
Proper law of Contract 
I n c o n tract the English law r u l e f o r determining the 
proper law i s i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y o r i e n t a t e d and f l e x i b l B o The 
cou r t s w i l l apply the law t h a t e s s e n t i a l l y governs the contracto 
This may be i n f e r r e d from the express provision of the p a r t i e s 
or the law uJiich they must be presumed to have submitted themselves 
or the law yhich the contract has i t s most s u b s t a n t i a l eonnectiorjo 
Thus i n RE Missouri Steamship Company^ ii contract MBS made i n 
Massaehussets betwsen an American c i t i z e n and English ehipot^uugra 
to c a r r y c a t t l e frofs Boston to England i n an Engliah shipo The 
cont r a c t exempted the shipowners from l i a b i l i t y f o r negligence 
of the master or the crewo This provision was v a l i d under 
English law but not so under Massachusset"s law as being 
contrary t o publ i c polisyo The c a t t l e Cisrs l o s t owing to 
negligence of the master and crew and the p l a i n t i f f sued the 
shipownerso 
I t was held t h a t the proper law of the contract was governed 
by Engliah law f o r i t had the most s u b s t a n t i a l connections 
with the contracto The exemption clause was therefore appliedo 
I f Massechusset"8 lew had applied the exemption clsuss would 
have been declared voido 
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Proper l^w i n Tort 
I n t o r t the e f f e c t of the judgment i n P h i l l i p a v Eyre 
i s a d i s t i n c t "homeward tre n d " because to be actionable the 
alleged act must be; 
(1) actionabla i f eommitted i n England? and 
(2) "not j u s t i f i a b l e " according to the lex 
l o c i d e l i c t i o 
This dual t e s t has been c r i t i c i s e d and Eupported and when 
the Housg of Lords considered i t i n Chaplin v Boys^ they refused 
to s u b s t i t u t e i t with a proper law of t o r t along the ssme l i n e 
as i n Gontracto There ti®@ however a d i s t i n c t preference f o r 
the use of "actionable" instead of " j u a t i f i s b l e " under the 
second branch of the rul@o 
C o n f l i c t betwsen Tort and Contract 
This may be discussed under the f o l l o w i n g headings?•= 
( 3 ) Ulhere English law i s the proper law of the contract 
and the t o r t i s committed out of j u r i s d i c t i o n o 
(2) yjhere the t o r t i s committed w i t h i n j u r i s d i c t i o n 
but the proper law of the contract i s out of j y r i s d i c t i o n o 
(3) Where Engliah law i s the lex f o r i and the t o r t 
and the contract take place out of j u r i a d i c t i o n o 
I t should be pointed out t h a t under the f i r s t and the 
second the actions are brought i n Englsndo 
Generally provided a p l a i n t i f f has a s u f f i c i e n t cause of actioim 
i n t o r t or eontract he may b r i n g h i s action i n sny snd i t i s no 
business of the court to force him on to the othero Thus the 
choice of the relevant action w i l l depand more on the p l a i n t i f f 
than on the judgSo 
1o lilhere English Law i s the proper law of the Contract 
and the t o r t i s committed out o f ^ J u r i s d i c t i o n 
The r u l e here i s th a t where a t o r t or contract action i s 
brought under a contract governed by English law the r i g h t s and 
o b l i g a t i o n s of the p a r t i e s w i l l be determined by the contracto 
I n Re Missouri's case the p l a i n t i f f ' s action f a i l e d because 
English law being the proper law of the contract allowed the 
exemption clause to deternjine the extent of the o b l i g a t i o n i n 
i t s c o n t r a c t and t o r t aspecto I t would have not aided the 
p l a i n t i f f s case i f he sued i n t o r t , f o r although he may have 
overcome the second branch of the r u l e i n P h i l l i p s v Eyre^ i o S o 
the defendants set was not • j y s t i f i a b l s under the lex d s l i c t i 
he would have f a i l e d to cross the f i r s t hurdle under the f i r s t 
branch of the r u l e which requires t h a t the act should be aetionsblo 
i n Englando I f the t o r t had been committed i n England the 
exemption clause wauld render i t not actionablEo There i s 
' 7 American a u t h o r i t y to su p o r t t h i s i n Scott v Amegiean AirlineSo 
The f a c t s are t h a t the decsesed ums t r a v e l l i n g i n a plane from 
D e t r o i t i s B u f f a l o when the plan crashed i n DntariOo His wife 
accepted compensation i n Michigan under which she f o r f e i t e d her 
common law r i g h t to sue i n t o r t o i t h e r i n Michigan or OntariCo 
The court held t h a t she could not aie i n Ontarioo 
2o Uihere the t o r t i s committed i n England but the proper 
law i s out of j u r i s d i c t i o n 
Here again the conclusion to be drawn from the eases i s 
t h a t the proper law of the contract governs the t o r t aetiono 
English lew recognises a f o r e i g n contract as a defence to a t o r t 
aetiono 
s 
I n Zivnostenska Banks v Frankman the p l a i n t i f f s action 
f o r detinye was defeated because according to the proper Ish) 
of the contract between him and the defendant the p l a i n t i f f 
had no immediate r i g h t to poasesaiono I n Hahler v Midland Bmk^ 
the p l a i n t i f f had shares deposited on h i s behalf i n a London Bank 
by a Czech banko The London bank refused to hand over the 
c e r t i f i c a t e s because the Czechoslovakian exchange c o n t r o l 
r e g u l a t i o n s d i d not permit ^ e Czech bank to i n s t r u c t the Englieh 
bank to hand over the shareso 
The House of Lords held t h a t the claim i n detinue was 
defeated by the proper law of the contraeto Although the cases 
above r e f e r to p r o p r i e t a r y r i g h t s i t does not make any difference 
whether the action was one i n negligence a r i s i n g out of contracto 
The conclusion to be drawn from these asses i s t h a t where English 
law i s the lex f o r i ; , the proper law of the contract w i l l determine 
the extent of l i a b i l i t y i n t o r t and the lex l o c i d e l i c t i doea 
not applyo The Privy Council decision i n Canadian P a c i f i c Ry v 
ID 
Parent appears however to c o n t r a d i c t t h i s conclusiono I n t h a t 
case the deceased was t r a v e l l i n g from Menitoba to QuebeCo I n 
Ontario he was k i l l e d i n an accident Hia passenger t i c k e t 
had been issued at less than f u l l f a r e and i n return f o r t h i s 
the deceased uraived h i s r i g h t to c l a i m f o r any personal in^urieSo 
This clause was not v a l i d according to the laws of Quebec or 
Manitoba which governed the contract but ma v a l i d eccording 
to Ontario law which i s the lex l o c i d e l i c t i o The Privy Council 
upheld the v a l i d i t y of the Ontario law which wae the lex l o c i 
d e l i c t i and refused to consider the Manitobs or Quebec Law = 
the proper law of the contracto The temptation i s to conclude 
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t h a t the lex f o r i and the lex contractus are i r r e l e v a n t i f the 
lex l o c i d e l i c t i recognises the defencso But i n t h i s case one 
of the main hurdles against applying the proper law of the con-= 
t r a c t waa whether the Quebec law should be given e x t r a - t e r r i t o r i a l 
a p p licationo The Privy Council did not f i n d any s u f f i c i e n t 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n ta do soo 
3 o yihere English law i s the lex f o r i 
Here the i n c l i n a t i o n i s to state t h a t as English law 
recognises a f o r e i g n c o ntract as l i m i t i n g a t o r t committed 
i n England i t should make no difference when the t o r t i s 
committed out of j u r i s d i c t i o n o Thus where A and B have by 
co n t r a c t l i m i t e d t h e i r l i a b i l i t i e s the lex l o c i d e l i c t i 
should not modify t h a t o b l i g a t i o n f o r to do so i s to 
f r u s t r a t e the expectation of the partieso This conclusion 
creates no d i f f i c u l t y where the exculpatory clause i s v a l i d 
or void according to the proper law of the contract and 
according to the lex l o c i d e l i c t i o C o n f l i c t w i l l however 
e x i s t biheris i t i s v a l i d i n one but void i n another or vice 
versso The learned e d i t o r s of Dicey on C o n f l i c t of laws 
have stated t h a t i n such s i t u a t i o n the proper law of the 
co n t r a c t should be ollowed even though "according to the 
lex l o c i d e l i c t i the term i s void, or i f v a l i d , not s v a i l a b l e 
1 1 
as a defence to a d e l i c t u a l actlono" 
The j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h i s conclusion w i l l be t h a t as 
English law allows a f o r e i g n contract as a defence to a 
t o r t i n England the court w i l l v i s u a l i s e the t o r t as having 
been committed i n England and then by n o t i n g t h a t f o r e i g n 
c o n t r a c t s a f f o r d defence i t would then extend t h i s concept 
to the f o r e i g n t o r t o The i m p l i c a t i o n of t h i s i s t h a t the 
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proper law of the contract i s applied to determine the 
a c t i o n a b i l i t y or otherwise of the p l a i n t i f f complaint i n 
t o r t under the f i r s t branch of the ru l e i n P h i l l i p s v E y r s o ^ ^ 
I f the p l a i n t i f f s f a i l to cross t h i s hurdle i t matters not 
whether undsr the lex l o c i d e l i c t i the t o r t i s not j u s t i f i a b l B o 
The c r i t i c i f f i n against such a r e s u l t i s t h a t i t extends 
the scope of the f i r s t branch of the r u l e which as the 
learned e d i t o r s state " l i t t l e can be adduced i n i t s favour 
from p o i n t of view of j u s t i c e or conveniencBo" S i m i l a r l y 
where the clause i s void according to the lex l o c i d e l i c t i 5 
i f the proper law i s allowed to determine the t o r t o b l i g a t i o n 
the r e s u l t wauld be to allow a p l a i n t i f f to sue f o r a t o r t 
which according to the lex l o c i d e l i c t i i s j u s t i f i a b l e o 
This r e s u l t goes against the second branch of the ru l e i n 
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P h i l l i p s V Eyre under which the act must hot have been 
j u s t i f i a b l e according to the lex l o c i d e l i c t i o 
Thus on p r i n c i p l e the submission that the contract should 
determine creates d i f f i c u l t i e s o But i t i s arguable t h a t 
a u n i v e r s a l and u n c r i t i c a l adherence to the lex l o c i d e l i c t i 
can lead to b i z a r r e r e s u l t and t h a t the contract i s 
p r e f e r r e d to the t o r t because of the basic difference betwsen 
t h e i r dutieso The contract a f f o r d s the best i n d i c a t i o n of 
the expectation of the p a r t i e s and that there i s hardly any 
reason why a Seotanan who i a t r a v e l l i n g i n h i s employers 
ve h i c l e with another Scotsman and i s i n j u r e d through the 
negligence of the other should have the exculpatory clause 
declared void because the accident happened south of the 
border and English law does not allow mch a clausSo Such 
an a p p l i c a t i o n of the lex l o c i d e l i c t i i s j u s t as f o r t u i t o u s 
as the locus contractus doctrine which has been abandoned 
f o r the more f l e x i b l e r u l e of the proper law of the contracto 
But i t may be asked t h a t , i f the j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s the 
expectation of the p a r t i e s why should t h i s not be relevant 
where the exculpatory clause i s void according to the proper 
law of the contract but v a l i d according to the lex l o c i d e l i c t i < 
Uhere such a concurrence e x i s t s the lex l o c i d e l i c t i should 
apply and not the proper law of the contracto 
These contentions serve to show that the ru l e i n 
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P h i l l i p s V Eyre i s unfortunate and that i n i t s place should 
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be a proper law of t o r t o I n Babcock v Jackson the 
p l a i n t i f f a g r a t u i t o u s passenger i n the defendant's car uas 
i n j u r e d i n an accident i n Ontario due to the defendant's 
negligenceo Both p a r t i e s were resident i n Wew Yo^ -k State 
liSiere the car waa licensed, garaged and insuredo 
An Ontario s t a t u t e absolved d r i v e r s f o r l i a b i l i t y f o r 
g r a t u i t o u s passengers but there uras no s i m i l a r p r o v i s i o n 
under Wew Vork lawo 
Fuld Jo asked; "Shall the place of the t o r t i n v a r i a b l y 
govern the a v a i l a b i l i t y of r e l i e f f o r the t o r t or s h a l l the 
applicable choice of law r u l e also r e f l e c t s consideration 
of other f a c t o r s which are relevant to the purposes served 
by the enforeement or d e n i a l of the reroedy?^ 
The a l t e r n a t i v e was accepted and IMew York law was adopted 
as having the most connection with the t o r t o This approach 
removes most of the conceptual d i f f i c u l t i e s of the r u l e i n 
P h i l l i p s V E y r B o ^ ^ I n doing ®3 the Court d e l i b e r a t e l y preferrfed 
105 
the d r a f t of the Second Reatatament on C o n f l i c t of Laws 
according to which "the l o c a l law of the state which has 
the most s i g n i f i c a n t r e l a t i o n s h i p with the occurrence and 
with the p a r t i e s determines t h e i r r i g h t s snd l i a b i l i t i e S o " 
Another r e l a t e d aspect of d i f f i c u l t y i s whsre the lex 
l o c i d e l i c t i f o r b i d s claims by g r a t u i t o u s passengers but 
the l ex f o r i allows such a claimo There are no Englieh 
a u t h o r i t i e s but some Canadian cases have showm an escape 
route by s t r a i n i n g the concept of contract beyond i t s l i m i t s o 
15 
^ i " ^sy V Hey the Court suggested t h a t by invoking 
an implied contract between the d r i v e r and the passenger the 
paaeenger can sue the d r i v e r f o r breach of the contract 
and thus avoid the law f o r b i d d i n g action by a guest passenger 
and which i s the lea l o c i d e l i c t i o 
With due respect i-g i s d i f f i c u l t to see what eonsideration 
e x i s t s i n such a s i t u a t i o n to support a contrast end i t i s 
conceivable t h a t i f English law i s the forum such ED 
outcome would have been avoidedo 
I n Maclean v Pettigrew'^^ t h i s r e s u l t was rejected but 
the court proceeded to introduce a more bizzare escape routeo 
By r e l y i n g on a number of Fs-ench cases i t held t h a t there 
was no contracto Turning to the t o r t i t acknowledged t h a t 
under the f i r s t r u l e i n P h i l l i p s v Eyre the defendants act 
was Bctionableo I t also held t h a t i t was u n j u s t i f i a b l e 
according to the lex l o c i d e l i c t i - Ontario law^ because the 
defendant was c r i m i n a l l y l i a b l e o The absurdity of t h i s 
conclusion was t h a t the defendant was acquittedo 
A s i r a i l a r d i f f i c u l t y betwsen t o r t and contract and 
which ha^ exercised American courts i s the d i r e e i action 
1DS 
a t a t u t S o Under such s te tu te B v i c t i m of an accident can 
SUB t h e insures' of the dMver u i t hou t f i r s t p rov ing 
negl igence on the pa r t of the dr ivero Assuming the d r i v e r 
was neg l i gen t the quest ion uihether the insu re r i s l i a b l e 
ma\f depend on a cumulat ion of d i f f e r e n t r u l e s o Thus 
liihether the i nsu re r uas d i r e c t l y l i a b l e may be r s f e r r e d 
to the lex f o r i as a mat ter procedures, to the len l o c i 
d e l i c t i as a mat ter o f tos^ ious l i a b i l i t y to the proper 
law of the con t rac t as a mat ter of con t rac tua l l i a b i l i t y o 
17 
Rabel on the C o n f l i c t of Laws asser ts houever t ha t in such a 
s i t u a t i o n the issue should be determined by the lex I s c i d e l i c t i o 
The e d i t o r s of Dicey on the o ther hand advocate tha t the p l a i n t i f f 
must prove tha t the insured act ms ac t ionab le in England and not 
j u s t i f i a b l e according to the lex l o c i d e l i c t i and then he Must 
prove t h a t the proper law of the con t rac t s l l o u s d i r e c t recovery 
aga ins t the insurero 
C o l l i n s has pa in ted out t ha t t h i s appears to " i nvo lve 
an i n c o r p o r a t i o n of the r u l e i n P h i l l i p s v Eyre i n t o a 
con t rac t of insurancep but a t l eas t m i t i g a t e s the seper i ty 
o f t ha t r u l e by r e l a x i n g the dual prquirament wi th regard to 
the i n s u r e r ' s l i a b i l i t y o " ' ' ^ 
Th is v ieu has been upheld by an Aus t ra l i an Court i n 
Plozza V South Aus t ra l i an Insurance COo''^ The p l a i n t i f f ms 
i n j u r e d by the insured i n U i c t o r i a ujhic^ has no d i r e c t 
ac t i on s t a t u t e „ The insurance p o l i c y ms taken out i n 
South A u s t r a l i a uihich has such a s t a t u t B o The defendants 
Insurance Company contended t ha t as under the V i c t o r i a 
law i t was not d i r e c t l y l i a b l e the secorti branch of the 
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l i e d o The cour t re jec ted 
1Q7 
t h i s con ten t ion and held t h a t the propes' law of the con t rac t 
app l i ed to determine mhethsr the p l a i n t i f f can sue the 
defendantso The Uietos-ia law use re levant to the quest ion 
of l i a b i l i t y of the insuredo 
I n conc lua ion j i t can be seen tha t the ru le i n 
on 
P h i l l i p s V Eyre^" does no more than apply a mechanical 
jur ispsudenceo A ru l e idhich can be avoided by invok ing 
the lex f o r i to determine causes of ac t ion does no more 
than a diacE-edit to the system of p r i v a t e i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
lawo I t i s un fo r tunate t h a t the House of Lords d id not 
choose to do away udth i t i n Chaplin v Boy^and subs t i t u t e 
i n i t s p lace the more f l e x i b l e and i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t approach 
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of Babcock v Jackson 
GE[\]ERAL COIMCLUSIDI\i 
The common lauj has aliisayB been re l uc tan t to impose new 
l i a b i l i t y or to extend e x i s t i n g oneso This has also been 
app l i ed to defences to common laiu actiono Professor K o C o Denia 
i n "The Future of Judge made Pub l ic Lau i n England; A Problem 
o f P r a c t i c a l Jur isprudence^ has c r i t i c i s e d th is . . He s tated 
t h a t the judges lajho "purpor t to l i m i t themselves to precedents 
and l o g i c ; they purpor t to have no concern f o r the p o l i c i e s on 
uihich the law necessar i l y r e s t S o " The fundemental usakness of 
t h i s i s " t h a t Engl ish judges deny r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r remoulding 
judge=-made law i n order to improve i t j to keep i t sbrseat of 
cu r ren t c o n d i t i o n s j and to make i t be t t e r serve the needs of 
l i v i n g peoplSo" There i s much t r u t h i n t h i S o f^or example 
Viscount Simonds i n Midland S i l i cones case res ta ted h i s b e l i e f 
i n p r i v i t y i n very severe language uihen he saids ^For to me 
heterodoxyp or^ as some might say, heresy, i s not the more 
a t t r a c t i v e because i t i s d i g n i f i e d by the name of reforfflo Wor 
w i l l I eas i l y be led by an und isceming zeal f o r some abst rac t 
k i nd of j u s t i c e to ignore our f i r s t duty , ujhieh i s to admin is ter 
j u s t i c e according to lew, the law which i s es tab l ished f o r us by 
2 
Act o f Par l iament or the b ind ing au tho r i t y of precedento" 
I n p r a c t i c e there i s not so much r i g i d i t y to orthodoxy.. 
Hedley Byrne v H e l l e r can j u s t i f y t h i s although some of the 
recent a p p l i c a t i o n s seem to sound a r e t r e a t from p o s s i b i l i t i e s 
opened by t h a t saeeo^ The law should always f o l l o w changing 
c o n d i t i o n s but i t should not necessar i l y keep abreast w i th i t o 
Such w i l l obv ious ly lead to confuaiono I t has to be po in ted out 
t h a t the views advanced have been based s t r i c t l y on p r i n c i p l e and 
i n eoms issses ohange i s m^t ucslcomeo Thus i t miiy be advocated 
here tha'fe gxeraption c lauses should be narrowad m® f a r as possiblG 
by t t h a t the present mis r s l s t i n g to r e l i snce by t h i r d par ty i s 
no t boms out by p r i n e i p l e but by ns fuss l to maka Benaio On t h g 
o the r hand i t can be eontended t ha t the preference f o r the 
c o n t r a c t rule© i s j y s t i f i e d on the b a s i i t h a t a con t rac t probsbly 
ejxprBssgg more e l e s r l y the rgasonsble ej^pectations of the par t ieso 
I n o ther 05?ea© of the law the common lay ha© not proved 
insdequgte al though comparison wi th o ther system msy create such 
impressiono The f a c t t ha t there ii a d i f f e rence does not make 
the eomroon Isiaj inadequate and i t should be remKfjbes'ed tha t checks 
and balancsii cjught to e x i s t i n t h i s branch of the lew i f the 
c o u r t s are not to be f looded i d t h uiauld-=be l i t i g g n t S o The f a c t 
t h a t the Idw i s c e r t a i n helpg set t lements out of courto Thus 
on ly about 2% of t o r t i o u s aets ever corae before the courto Of 
t h i© t i n y percent e very g j i s l l f r a c t i o n even gat to an sippel late 
cou r t iMhere the issues of " I B M " as opposed to the iaeues of " f a c t " 
are l i k e l y to be diacussedo 
Sueh an outcome w i l l not be poss ib le i f jydges lee themselves 
SB e s a e n t i Q l l y refo^es'So 
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